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NATURAL GAS PRICING: THE ETERNAL DEBATE
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of the natural gas conference.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The broad national consensus necessary to translate natural gas policy
debates into major federal legislation has developed only twice in the na-
tion's history. In 1938, the federal natural gas regulatory system was ini-
tiated through the enactment of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to close a
regulatory gap so that natural gas consumers could be protected from the
monopoly powers of interstate pipelines.1 Forty years later, substantial
*B.A., University of Tulsa, 1968; J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, 1972; LL.M.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1976. Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College
of Law. This article was developed during the course of a joint study of energy sectionalism
conducted by the American Bar Association Coordinating Group on Energy Law and the
National Energy Law & Policy Institute of the University of Tulsa College of Law. The author
expresses his thanks to Sherman S. Poland, Esq., Sheila S. Hollis, Esq., James Mitchell, Esq.,
and Tom Johnson, Esq., for sharing with me their immense knowledge of the natural gas
industry. I also wish to thank Cynthia Siegal, Mike Holdgrafer and Nancy Dodson for their
tremendous research support.
The opinions and conclusions contained in this article are exclusively those of the author
and are not to be attributed to the National Energy Law and Policy Institute or to the ABA
Coordinating Group on Energy Law. Copyright American Bar Association Coordinating
Group on Energy Law and National Energy Law and Policy Institute, 1985.
'In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a sale of electricity produced by a company
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changes in the nation's natural gas policies were enacted with the passage
of the National Energy Act (NEA) in order to shepherd the industry
through the turmoil of the 1970's energy crises. Although the NGA and
the NEA were responses to very different stimuli, they had three factors
in common which led to a broad legislative consensus:
(1) They both were enacted during times of economic upheaval
which the electorate felt could not be overcome without sig-
nificant changes in government-industry relationships;
(2) They both embodied natural gas policies which the elector-
ate believed would stimulate greater consumer access to nat-
ural gas service; and
(3) They were regarded by producers either with indifference or
as providers of the markets and resources necessary to sup-
port increased natural gas production.
Despite profound changes in the nation, the economy, and the natural
gas industry, it took forty years before the consensus for legislative chang-
es in the nation's natural gas policies re-emerged. Two factors were large-
ly responsible for this delay. First, the original natural gas regulatory struc-
ture initially produced desirable results. Second, the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC) was reasonably adept in reducing pressures for change by
stretching old policies to fit new problems.
The original structure of natural gas regulation under the NGA facili-
tated an expansion of the natural gas industry. Competition, not regula-
tion, disciplined the wellhead market. Gas prices rose with gas demands,
but not in real terms. Gas supplies were adequate in every area connected
to the gas fields by a pipeline. While some pressures for initiating well-
head price regulation were developing in areas connected with gas ser-
vice outside the producing states, the combined congressional power of
net-producing states and of states convinced that their chances of getting
gas service in the future depended upon producers receiving adequate in-
centives was enough to block any wellhead price control legislation.
in one state and sold to a second company in another state for purposes of subsequent sales
and distribution to end-users in states other than the state of origin constitutes a sale in in-
terstate commerce which cannot be regulated by any state. Public Utilities Comm'n of Rhode
Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927). This decision estab-
lished a regulatory gap that could be closed only by federal regulation of such interstate sales.
The Federal Trade Commission issued a report in 1935 based on a comprehensive study
of the natural gas industry in which it concluded that interstate natural gas pipelines then
in existence enjoyed monopoly and monopsony powers that permitted them to charge ex-
cessive prices and receive unjustified transfers of income from producers and consumers.
As a consequence, the FTC recommended that the sales of natural gas for resale in interstate
commerce be regulated by the federal government. Report of the FTC to the U.S. Senate,
S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 589, 591, 593, 600, 601, 615-17 (1936). The Natural
Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §J 717-17W (1976) was enacted to close the regulatory gap in
the natural gas industry in order to prevent interstate pipelines from abusing their market
positions to the detriment of consumers of natural gas sold in the interstate market.
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin2 brought about that which the political system would not:
a federal wellhead price control system. Net-producing states quickly dem-
onstrated their political clout by passing legislation to overturn the Phil-
lips decision, only to have it vetoed by a sympathetic President out of
his sensitivity to the possibility of scandal surrounding the passage of the
deregulation bill. 3 After that veto, the number of net-producing states be-
gan to decline, while the areas receiving gas service increased. The ability
to enact a congressional reversal of the Phillips case diminished dramatical-
ly, primarily because gas accessibility concerns had lessened due to the
large backlog of proven gas reserves brought on-line by producers during
the expansionary era.
Price became the central natural gas debate, a debate that sharply di-
vided net-producing states from net-consuming states. The price debate
became increasingly acute as a dual market formed out of producers' at-
tempts to avoid the regulatory pitfalls of the interstate market. Although
the FPC was never really able to develop a price control methodology
that would permit a diverse and competitive natural gas production sec-
tor to perform well, its attempts succeeded in galvanizing the net con-
suming states' opposition to the removal of wellhead price controls.
The FPC's regulatory failures could not be hidden forever, as the gas
shortages of the seventies demonstrated. The gas shortages revived sup-
ply accessibility concerns within the net-consuming states. The contrast
between interstate gas shortages induced by regulatory failure and intra-
state supply surpluses stimulated by free market pricing eventually renewed
the net-consuming states' awareness of the connection between producer
incentives and gas supply adequacy. The revival was aided by FPC flirta-
tions with market oriented price ceilings and increased transportation flex-
ibility as ways of securing additional dedications of natural gas to inter-
state commerce. 4 In fact, the FPC's pricing innovations and attempts to
2Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
'S. BRYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION By TE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION58
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Basvu & MAcAvovi.
'From the mid-1960's until its wellhead price setting functions were altered by the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) experimented with vintaged
price ceilings and production incentive rates as means of stimulating dedications of greater
volumes of gas to the interstate market. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
784-87, 795-803 (1968); American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016,
1030-31, 1063-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Feder-
al Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. California Co. v.
Federal Power Commission, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). The Commission also permitted emergen-
cy sales above area and national ceiling prices, see R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON, & P. MARTIN,
EcONOMIc REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION & UTILITIES 596 (1980), and initiated trans-
portation programs to facilitate direct sales between interstate gas end-users and natural gas
producers, see American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d
1089 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming FPC Opin. Nos. 533, 533-A).
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reintegrate the interstate and intrastate natural gas markets provided the
framework for the natural gas policies embodied in the NEA. s The desire
of consumers for gas supply security merged with producers' needs for
greater production incentives to form the consensus necessary to enact
the NEA's phased deregulation program.
The phased deregulation program of the NEA has ended, at least tempo-
rarily, the pressing supply concerns of the interstate market. A gas deliv-
erability surplus has developed, a gas bubble that continues in existence,
despite annual predictions that it soon will burst. At the same time, gas
prices have increased to levels far above what the sponsors of the NEA
had predicted. 6 The price increases even continued for awhile in the face
of supply surpluses, a phenomenon that was counter to market theory.
Consumers have been faced with burnertip prices above market-clearing
levels and possibly above the levels they would have faced in a totally
free wellhead market. Producers have been witnessing a contraction in
natural gas markets as burnertip prices exceed consumers' costs of con-
servation or use of alternative fuels. As a consequence, producers have
been facing declining demands at the wellhead and pressures to renegoti-
ate their contracts to reduce wellhead prices and pipeline take-or-pay ob-
ligations. In the meantime, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) has been engaged in crisis management, resorting once again to
free market pricing principles and increased transportation flexibility to
diffuse yet another gas market controversy.
With consumers concerned more about high prices than with gas short-
ages, producers concerned about low prices and low wellhead demands,
and the FERC engaged in reducing the pressures for significant policy
'The natural gas ceiling price provisions of title I of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
reflect the FPC-FERC pattern of establishing multiple price ceilings with higher prices auth-
orized on a vintaged basis for newer gas supplies than for older gas supplies. Compare price
ceilings under NGPA §§ 102, 103, & 107, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312, 3313, & 3317 (1976 and Supp.
IV 1977-1981), with price ceilings authorized under NGPA §§ 104, 105, and 106, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3314-3316 (1976 and Supp. IV-1977-1981). The Commission's experiments with emer-
gency sales authorities and direct sales with facilitating transportation authorities are re-
flected in the emergency and transportation authorities provided by title III of the NGPA.
15 U.S.C. §§ 3361-63, 3371, 3372, 3374 (1976 and Supp. IV 1977-1981).
6Gas prices at the burnertip have risen much faster than predicted because (1) world oil
prices doubled unexpectedly shortly after the passage of the NGPA, D. YERGIN, CRIsIs AND
ADJUSTMENT: AN OVERviEw, IN GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND EcoNoMic
RENEWAL 1, 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as YERGiN CRISIS); (2) the failure of the NGPA's mar-
ket ordering provisions to prevent pipelines from making bids for deregulated high cost gas
at prices above market clearing levels, Impact of the NGPA on Current and Projected Natu-
ral Gas Markets, 47 Fed. Reg. 19157, 19159 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NGPA Impacts];
(3) the ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that pipeline production is eligible to receive NGPA
ceiling prices, Public Service Comm'n of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 103 S. Ct.
3024 (1983), and (4) the ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit that the
NGPA does not preclude area rate clauses from escalating interstate contract prices to max-
imum lawful prices under the Act, Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645
F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981).
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changes, it does not appear that any fundamental changes in the NEA's
phased natural gas deregulation program are imminent. The interests of
consumers and producers seem too divergent. The FERC's transportation,
off-system sales, and special marketing programs, and the stability of world
oil markets, seem to be bringing the natural gas markets into a workable
short-term equilibrium. Finally, Congress does not seem to be eager to
get embroiled in another bruising gas policy fight.
And yet, the basis is present for an intersectional consensus to adopt
new competitive policies. The FERC's gas bubble management programs
have demonstrated that gas markets can be expanded if gas burnertip and
wellhead prices are competitive with the end-users' costs of using alterna-
tive fuels or achieving greater conservation. The FERC programs have also
demonstrated that wellhead prices are more responsive to market-clear-
ing prices at the burnertip when more direct sales links are established
between the wellhead and burnertip. As a result, producing states and
net-consuming states may rediscover their interdependence. If so, they
may join efforts to enact the legislation needed to bring about thriving
natural gas spot markets. Such legislation would, at a minimum, allow
the NEA's phased deregulation to continue, establish a mechanism to re-
lease flowing gas supplies from their long-term contractual and regula-
tory dedications to specific markets and consumers, and encourage pipe-
lines to develop a healthy contract carriage network.
In this article, the great gas sectionalism disputes arising from the ener-
gy crises of the 1970's are highlighted and contrasted with the expecta-
tions that provided the consensus for the passage of the NGA. Next, fac-
tors leading to the 1970's energy crises are chronicled to provide an un-
derstanding of why the NEA's natural gas policies were formed the way
they were. The NEA's natural gas policies are then outlined and tied to
the development of the gas bubble. Finally, problems created by the gas
bubble are discussed in the context of current attempts by the public and
private sectors to achieve short-term and long-term equilibria within
natural gas markets.
II. THE GREAT SHORTAGE DEBATE
A. The Overview
Hysteria gripped the nation because of the proliferation of natural gas
shortages during the 1970's. Within the interstate markets, two theories
developed about future natural gas production. The Blackmail Theory
held that the United States had plentiful supplies of low-cost natural gas
which producers were withholding from the interstate markets in order
to coerce Congress into decontrolling natural gas prices. 7 The Depletion
7Long-Term Natural Gas Legislation, pt. 2: Hearings on H.R. 9159, H.R. 11047, Title II
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Theory held that the United States would soon run out of natural gas,
regardless of the pricing strategy adopted.
Proponents of both theories sponsored the same natural gas policy ap-
proach, which was to extend federal natural gas regulation into the intra-
state market. The "blackmail" theorists felt this solution would convince
withholding producers that they had nothing to gain by withholding gas
supplies. 9 New gas supplies would come forth which the interstate mar-
ket could acquire without engaging in bidding contests with companies
in the intrastate market."0
For "depletion" theorists, the goal was to extend federal allocation pro-
grams to the intrastate markets so that the nation's dwindling gas sup-
plies would be shared on the basis of need rather than on a willingness
to pay.1 Not only would this approach give the interstate market a greater
share of the nation's gas supplies,12 it also would prevent petroleum com-
panies from receiving large scarcity rents.'3
Producers, many economists of all persuasions, and the political dele-
gations from producing states sponsored a free market approach to the
natural gas shortages of the seventies. The free market proponents argued
that the cause of the shortages was regulatory failure, not producer fraud
or physical depletion.' Gas supplies were indeed sufficient to provide for
domestic demands for years to come. The trick was to send appropriate
price signals. New gas supplies were more expensive to develop than were
historic supplies. Federal price ceilings were too low to cover these costs.
Moreover, natural gas demands were too high because of artificially low
prices. Deregulating new gas supplies would provide producers with ade-
of H.R. 11265 and Title II of 5. 2310 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1953-54, 1958
(1976) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum of Ohio) thereinafter cited as Natural Metzenbaum].
See also A. WxwAvsxy & E. TENEN Aum, THE PoLrmcs OF MISTRUST: EsTIMATING AMERICAN
OIL mD GAs REsuvis 197-248 (1981) 1hereinafter cited as GAS Mismusfi.
*The depletionists main belief was that productive natural gas reserves are not plentiful
enough to permit natural gas producers to respond expansively to large price increases. This
view is best summed up by the words of John O'Leary, speaking in 1977 in his capacity
as administrator of the Federal Energy Administration: -You have to ask yourself 'what do
you get out of raising the price of natural W'... every indication we have is that you
get very little." I. Bup' & F. SCHULLR, NATUAL GAs: How To Surc A Suumamwz Pu, IN
HA vARD BusiNEss SCHOOL ENERGY PROJEcr, ENERGY FuTur: REPORT or TE ENERGY PRoJcT
AT THE HARvARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 56, 67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GAS PIE. Adding to
the depletionists' rhetorical ammunition were studies conducted by Shell, Mobil, and Exxon
stating that estimated gas reserves were sufficient to last only for 15-30 years. Id. See also
GAS MISxsT, supra note 7, at 206.
'See M. SamEus, TiE REGLAnoN oF NATURAL GAs 148 (1981) thereinafter cited as SAMERS
REGULATION].
'old,
l See BUrY a MAcAvoY, supra note 3, at 87.
1Id., SANDERs REGULATION, supra note 9, at 149.
2"See SANDERs REGULATION, supra note 9, at 148-49.
"See BuYR a MAcAvoY, supra note 3, at 783.
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quate production incentives and induce consumers to use energy more ef-
ficiently.' s The expansion of domestic supplies and contraction of domes-
tic demands would end the shortages and reduce the United States' de-
pendence on foreign energy. 16
A fierce battle erupted between the proponents of extended regulation
and the proponents of deregulation. During the 1976 presidential election,
candidate Carter had promised to deregulate new gas. 17 However, in his
national energy plan, President Carter proposed extending regulation in-
to the intrastate markets. 18 Using the power of his presidential honeymoon,
President Carter's national energy plan passed the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives in August of 1977.19
151d.
161d.
27As a candidate, President Carter wrote to then Governor David L. Boren of Oklahoma
about what energy policies he would adopt if elected president. With respect to natural gas,
candidate Carter wrote:
First I will work with the Congress, as the Ford Administration has been unable
to do, to deregulate new natural gas. The decontrol of producers' prices for new
natural gas would provide an incentive for new exploration and would help our
nation's oil and gas operators attract needed capital.
Deregulation of new gas would encourage sales in the interstate market and
help lessen the prospect of shortages in the non-producing states which rely on
interstate supplies. While encouraging new production, this proposal will protect
the consumer against sudden, sharp increases in the average price of natural gas.
Letter from Jimmy Carter to Governor David L. Boren (October 19, 1976), as reprinted in
124 CONG. REc. 29,659 (introduced into the record by Sen. Dewey F. Bartlett of Oklahoma).
1eThe Carter National Energy Plan proposed to extend a modified price regulation system
to the intrastate market, as follows:
The shift in the natural gas market from surpluses to shortages requires the aban-
donment of historic cost-based regulation and of the artificial distinction between
interstate and intrastate markets.
Therefore, a new commodity value pricing approach is proposed that applies
to all new gas wherever it is used. It recognizes that prices should reflect the costs
and the degree of risk associated with finding replacement supplies. This approach
also recognizes the need to provide a sufficient incentive for the development of
future supplies with substantially higher long-range development costs. By help-
ing bring natural gas supply and demand back into balance, this pricing proposal
would be a first step towrard deregulation. If the natural gas market could be
brought into better balance by the mid-1980"s, it might be possible and desirable
to move further toward establishing full market pricing.
Under this proposal all new gas sold anywhere in the country from new reser-
voirs would be subject to a price limitation at the Btu equivalent of the average
refiner acquisition price (without tax) of all domestic crude oil....
The country would also move toward a single national market for gas, like
that now existing for oil. For new production the interstate-intrastate distinction
would be eliminated, together with the resulting distortion effect on both pro-
duction and distribution....
The Carter Administration National Energy Plan 52, reprinted in 207 ENERGY MGMT (CCH)
pt. 3 (May 4, 1977). '
19H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 27, 244 (1977). The Carter National
Energy Plan passed virtually intact by a vote of 244 to 177 with 12 not votiong. Id.
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In the Senate, it was a different story. There, the producing states and
economic conservatives held a greater balance of power, and they used
that power to pass a deregulation alternative to President Carter's natural
gas program. 20 The two houses remained deadlocked on natural gas policy,
and that deadlock held the entire Carter energy program captive until No-
vember 8, 1978, when a compromise natural gas policy passed, primarily
in the form of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 .21
B. The Struggle for Supplies
This legislative struggle was conducted simultaneously with a regula-
tory struggle concerning the production, pricing, and allocation of natural
gas supplies. The FPC directed the regulatory struggle, desperately trying
to stretch its NGA authorities into a regulatory pattern that could cure
the interstate market's gas shortage problems while still depriving gas pro-
ducers of excessive profits.
The gas shortage crises of the seventies were accentuated by the exist-
ence of intrastate deregulated wellhead gas markets. Gas which was pro-
duced, sold, and consumed solely within key producing states was sub-
ject neither to federal price controls under the NGA nor state price regu-
lation under state regulatory legislation. Producers within these intrastate
markets could choose between their deregulated home markets or the high-
ly regulated interstate markets when they decided to whom to sell their
gas supplies.
Wellhead gas sales of supplies destined for resale in interstate commerce
had to receive approval from the FPC before they could be finalized.22
During the early years of federal wellhead regulation, when the intrastate
market did not generate large demands for gas, the FPC would not ap-
20S. 2104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. 32, 306 (1977).
22The National Energy Act, as passed, contained 5 separate acts: (1) Public Utility Regu-
latory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117;
(2) Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174;
(3) National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206;
(4) Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 stat. 3289; and
(5) Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351.
Most of the National Energy Act's natural gas policies are contained in the Natural Gas Pol-
icy Act of 1978, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, and Title III of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 3149-54). For a detailed discussion
of the controversy surrounding the compromising of the House and Senate natural gas bills
into the national policies contained in the National Energy Act, see SADrnRs REGULATION,
supra note 9, at 167-92.
uSection 7c of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (1976) states in
relevant part:
No natural gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company... shall
engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas compa-
ny a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission
authorizing such acts or operations: ...
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prove wellhead sales contracts unless they contained terms most beneficial
to interstate consumers regarding price, volume, and duration of com-
mitment. Initial sales prices were held to fairly low levels and were sub-
ject to later refunds if the next producer rate case generated still lower
rate levels.2 Wellhead rate determinations took years to finalize, leaving
Section 7e of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 states in relevant part:
[A] certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing in
whole or any part of the... sale.., . covered by the application if it found that
the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the ser-
vice proposed and to conform to the provisions of this chapter and the require-
merits, rules and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed
... sale .... to the extent authorized by the Commission, is or will be required
by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such appli-
cation shall be denied...
"The Act prohibits such movements unless and until the Commission issues a certificate of
public convenience and necessity therefor, § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717 f(c). Section 7e vests in
the Commission control over the conditions under which gas may be initially dedicated to
the interstate use." Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1959)
[hereinafter referred to as CATCO].
23The setting of natural gas wellhead rates under the Natural Gas Act was primarily a
private matter between producers and purchasers. United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp.,
350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956). However these initial rates were subject to review by the Commis-
sion to determine if they were just and reasonable under § 5 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717d.
350 U.S. at 341. Natural gas companies were permitted to change their rates, if rate changes
were allowed under their contracts, subject to the Commission's authorities under § 4(e)
of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e), to (1) suspend temporarily the rate pending a determina-
tion of the new rates lawfulness and (2) to order a retroactive refund should the new rate
go into effect after the suspension period but prior to a ruling on its lawfulness which subse-
quently finds the proposed rate too high. 350 U.S. at 341.
In CATCO, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 7e of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e),
permits the Commission to condition the sales of natural gas upon the establishment of a
rate it feels is compatible to the public's convenience and necessity. 360 U.S. at 391. The
Court found that such scrutiny of initial rates was necessary "to hold the line awaiting ad-
judication of a just and reasonable rate." Id. at 392. The Court was especially concerned
that "if unconditioned certificates are issued where the rate is not clearly shown to be re-
quired by the public convenience and necessity, relief is limited to § 5 proceedings, and...
full protection of the public interest is not afforded." Id.
In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965), the Court
approved of the Commission exercising its § 7(e) powers to: (1) condition the initial rate
in a proposed natural gas sale to a price "in line" with those certificated by the Commission
as just and reasonable under generally contemporaneous contracts governing gas sales from
the same area; (2) set a ceiling price above which the producer could not charge for a period
of time awaiting the outcome of a just and reasonable rate hearing governing rates on gas
sold from the same area; and (3) order a refund of prices charged in excess of the initial
"in line" rate pursuant to an early certificate of public convenience and necessity that was
invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court pending Commission review in light of the CATCO
standards. Id. at 227-30. The Court also found it permissible for the Commission to set the
initial rules by reference to contemporaneous contracts without receiving the mass of evi-
dence it would receive in determining a just and reasonable rate. Id. at 227-28.
Later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an initial price set "in a final, unconditioned
permanent certificate is a lower limit below which a refund cannot be ordered... "even
if that rate turns out to be above the just and reasonable rate ultimately established for the
sale. Federal Power Commission v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 24 (1968). The Court
also held that the Commission would as a condition for the issuance of a permanent certifi-
[Vol. 37:1
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producers faced with relatively constant rates and years of uncertainty.2 4
(1) Clinging to Old Supplies
The FPC took the position, sustained by the United States Supreme
Court in Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission,
25
that its abandonment authority was open-ended and could be used to hold
gas supplies for the interstate market even though the sales contract to
which the gas was subject had expired.2 6 Such rulings turned wellhead
commitments to interstate commerce into federal tarbabies, for once gas
was committed to interstate markets, the producer could not divert it to
other markets absent consent of the FPC. 27
As the world energy markets became exceedingly volatile, causing gas
wellhead market values to rise quickly, producers increasingly chose to
sell their gas in intrastate markets in order to receive more flexible and
advantageous pricing, volume, and duration terms. In the face of declin-
ing producer commitments to the interstate market, the FPC attempted
to maximize the volume of gas supplies available within the interstate
market by aggressively expanding its jurisdiction over previously
unregulated supplies28 and by clinging tenaciously to supplies previously
cate require the applicants to refund amounts collected under outstanding, unconditioned
temporary certificates in excess of the in line price it subsequently established. Id. at 13, 43-45.
z4lndeed, it took the Commission from 1954, when it was ordered by the United States
Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) to regulate pro-
ducer rates, until the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,
390 U.S. 747 (1968) to establish an acceptable and workable methodology for establishing
just and reasonable producer rates. See also supra note 23.
U364 U.S. 137 (1960).
261n Sunray, the producer requested a certificate with a duration term equal to the dura-
tion term in its sales contracts. Id. at 140. The Commission instead issued a certificate of
unlimited duration. Id. The producer accepted the unlimited certificate subject to its right
to contest or review the Commission's right to refuse to issue a limited certificate. Id. at
141. The U.S. Supreme Court sustained the Commission's power to issue certificates with-
out time limitations. Id. at 141-56. The Court reaffirmed that under the Commission's aban-
donment authority, found in I 7b of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. I 717f(b) (1976), once a producer
has commenced service to interstate commerce under a permanent certificate, it cannot aban-
don that service without the Commission's finding that the abandonment is consistent with
the public's convenience and necessity. Id. at 156.
zSupra note 26. The U.S. Supreme Court later made the tarbaby even stickier by ruling
that a certificate of indefinite duration bound gas supplies to the interstate market absent
Commission permission to abandon despite the end of the certificate holder's rights to de-
velop the gas supplies under a limited term mineral lease. California v. Southland Royalty
Co., 436 U.S. 519, 525-27, 530-31 (1978).
'In California v. Lo Vaca, 379 U.S. 366 (1965), the United States Supreme Court ruled
that restricted use provisions in gas purchase contracts, designed to dedicate the gas sup-
plies purchased to non-jurisdictional direct uses rather than to jurisdictional resales, were
ineffective in shielding the gas purchase arrangement from the FPCs regulatory jurisdiction
where the gas involved traveled across state lines in a commingled stream with gas destined
for resale. Id. at 369-70. The commingling or molecule theory was also applied in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 623, reh'g denied, 483 F.2d 1404
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974), wherein the court of appeals sustained
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commited to interstate commerce.29
(2) Enticing New Commitments
The FPC also changed its ratemaking methodology drastically to en-
courage producers to dedicate newly discovered gas supplies to the inter-
state market. Under the FPC's company-by-company utility ratemaking
method, the FPC became so overloaded with data that its rate cases took
years to finalize. 30 As a consequence, producers faced years of uncertain-
ty as to what prices they ultimately would be allowed to receive for their
gas.
To end this regulatory paralysis, the FPC began setting rates first on
the basis of area costs,3 and finally on the basis of national costs. 32 The
national ratemaking approach in particular permitted the FPC to make
much more timely rate decisions. 33 To reduce further the producers' un-
certainties about rates, the FPC adopted initial rate setting procedures that
an FPC ruling that the injection into an intrastate pipeline of small amounts of gas that had
been carried with gas destined for resale in interstate commerce was sufficient to convert
the intrastate pipeline into an interstate facility subject to the FPC's regulatory jurisdiction.
Id. at 631-32. The ruling emerged despite evidence tending to establish that all the gas car-
ried by the intrastate pipeline was produced and consumed within the state of Louisiana.
Id. at 628.
"Supra note 27. See aLso United Gas Pipeline Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979), where-
in the Supreme Court sustained an FPC ruling that, under a contract committing all pro-
ducible reservoirs from a leasehold, the fact that production ceased from all known reserves
under the leasehold for a period of years did not release subsequently discovered reserves
under the leasehold since the FPC had not been asked for permission to abandon delivery
of gas from the leasehold. Id. at 538-39.
3"Supra note 24. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 755-58 (1968).31The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra note 30, represented the first judicial acquies-
cence of the FPC's decision to calculate just and reasonable rates on an area average cost
basis instead of a company by company basis.
32rhe national rate approach was first adopted in Just and Reasonable National Rates for
Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974). In adopting a national rate approach, the Com-
mission also changed its rate making procedure from an adjudicatory hearing process to
a notice and comment rulemaking process. Id. at 2218-24. The Commission's national ratemak-
ing methodology was approved judicially in Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520
F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nora. California Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
426 U.S. 941 (1976). The Commission issued its second national rate opinion in National
Rates for Jurisdictional Sales of Natural Gas, 56 F.P.C. 509 (1976), aff'd, American Public
Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907
(1977).
3Assuring timely regulatory responses to changing natural gas market conditions was
the Commission's primary goal in adopting its national rate rulemaking procedure, as evi-
denced by its statement that:
[Wle have determined that a single uniform national rate promu ted in this rule-
making proceeding will enable us to establish just and reasonab rates for natu-
ral gas sold in interstate commerce without the inherent delays and stale records
which have accompanied the traditional adjudicatory method of regulating pro-
ducer rates. The prescription of a uniform national rate for all areas will avoid
essentially duplicative procedures and evidence to prescribe just and reasonable
rates for the various natural gas producing areas of the Nation, and will enable
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(1) allowed producers to receive initial rates in excess of the latest applic-
able area or national rate; (2) gave producers a decision as to whether
their initial rates were just and reasonable at the same time the producers
were granted a certificate authorizing their interstate gas rates; and
(3) eliminated the refunding requirement so that producers would not face
any refund liability should the next applicable area or national rate case
establish a rate governing their gas sales that was lower than their initial
rates.3
4
Early FPC natural gas rate decisions focused on producers' historic av-
erage costs of recent production. 35 This historic average cost approach
discouraged production because the natural gas industry is an increasing
cost industry with marginal production costs being greater than historic
average costs. 3 To encourage new exploration and production activity,
the FPC began focusing on producers' opportunity costs of developing new
supplies in setting natural gas rates.37 This new focus led to the practice
the Commission to utilize its manpower and resources for more effective admin-
istration of the Natural Gas Act. By the use of the Commission's rate-makig pow-
ers in this and future proceedings, we and future Commissions will be able to
prescribe just and reasonable rates on a biennial basis using the most recent evi-
dence and bringing expertise gained in related proceedings to bear upon this prob-
lem of assuring an adequate supply of natural gas for the Nation.
51 F.P.C. 2218 (1974).
34This so-called optional procedure was first adopted by the Commission in its Order No.
455, Optional Procedure for Certificating New Producer Sales of Natural Gas, 48 F.P.C.
218, 232-35 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Moss v. Federal Power Comm'n, 502 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1020 (1975). Producers exercising the optional procedure re-
ceived greater rate certainty, but at the cost of future rate flexibility, since under the op-
tional procedure:
No contract [would] be accepted for filing if it include(d) any type of indefinite
pricing clause ... (including) "area rate or FPC clauses," a "price redetermination
clause or renegotiation clause" or a "special escalation clause."
Id. at 234. Moreover:
By acceptance of a certificate issued hereunder, the seller-applicant unconditionally
agree(d) to (1) waive all rights to seek future rate increases under Section 4 of
the Natural Gas Act with respect to the contract submitted, other than price escala-
tions, if any, as certified by the Commission; and (2) waive all rights to contingent
adjustment of flowing gas rates as provided by the Commission in area rate deci-
sions heretofore decided, for flowing gas which the seller-applicant produces in
the same geographical pricing area as the pricing area of the production covered
by the application made under this Section.
Id. Often this rate inflexibility left the producer worse off under the optional procedure than
it would have been had it certified its sales under the applicable area or national rate. See
Texas Gas Exploration Corp., 52 F.P.C. 767 (1974), reh'g denied, 52 F.P.C. 1312 (1974).35Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 818-821 (1968).
36See BREER & MAcAvoy, supra note 3, at 70-71.37Thus, in its first national rate case, the Commission made some projections as to future
costs rather than relying entirely on historic accounting costs, and further adopted a rate
of return figure high enough "to put some noncost factors into the rate to make the interstate
market more competitive with other markets." Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520
F.2d 1061, 1066-69 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., California Co. v. Federal Power
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of vintaging, as the FPC granted ever higher rates for recently discovered
gas supplies while keeping rates at lower levels for previously discovered
gas supplies. 38 The FPC also liberalized its price escalation rules. Upon
adopting its area ratemaking method, the FPC decided that producers
should be able to escalate the prices paid for gas sold under existing con-
tracts to the level established by the latest applicable area rate case, since
area rates were established on the basis of gas production costs.39
Finally, the FPC adopted more flexible policies toward the duration of
producer commitments to the interstate market. Producers and intrastate
pipelines were authorized to make short-term sales to interstate pipelines
during emergencies without being subjected to the regulatory authority
of the FPC.40 The FPC also adopted procedures allowing producers to re-
ceive pregranted abandonments of their interstate commitments at the same
time they received certificates approving their interstate gas sales. 41
Comm'n, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). In the second national rate case, the Commission set a rate
of $1.42 per Mcf for new gas, up from the 52c per Mcf rate established for new gas in the
first national rate case. American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1016,
1025-29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1977).
3
'The Commission reasoned that a higher maximum rate for gas-well gas dedicated to
interstate commerce after the approximate moment at which a separate search [between oil
and gas] became widely possible would provide an effective incentive. Correspondingly,
the Commission adopted a relatively low price for all other natural gas produced in the Per-
mian Basin, since price could not serve as an incentive, and since any price above average
historical costs, plus an appropriate return, would merely confer windfalls." Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 797 (1968). In its first national rate case, the Commission
moved away from vintaging and began permitting producers of old gas to collect the higher
new gas rate upon the expiration of their old contracts and the establishment of new
contracts-because the Commission (1) 'found... that a massive commitment of new funds
is necessary to alleviate the natural gas shortage and that internally generated sums are a
necessary source of such funds," and (2) "noted that by phasing out the vintaging prac-
tice. . . .all consumers would more equitably bear the burden of financing added explora-
tion." Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061, 1077 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. California Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). However,
the Commission returned to its vintaging practices in its second national rate case because
the magnitude of its increase in the price of new gas, "the dramatic increase in costs and
decrease in productivity" led it to conclude that it must return to vintaging "to preclude ex-
action of excessive and unjustifiable economic rent from flowing gas." American Public Gas
Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1033 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
907 (1977).
39Area rate clauses were authorized by the F.P.C. in its Order No. 329, Permissible Pro-
visions for Price Changes in Independent Producer Rule Schedules-Liberalization, 36 F.P.C.
925 (1966). See Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 366 (5th
Cir. 1981).
4°Policy with Respect to Establishment of Measures to be Taken for the Protection of as
Reliable and Adequate Service as Present Natural Gas Supplies and Capacities Will Permit,
Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971), as amended, Order No. 431-A, 48 F.P.C. 193 (1972),
Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 52 F.P.C. 700 (1974); Immediate
Institution of Temporary Service by Independent Producers, Order No. 193, 21 Fed. Reg.
9166, 9167 (1956), as amended, Order No. 418, 44 F.P.C. 1574, 1576 (1970), Just and
Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 52 F.P.C. 700 (1974).41Pregranted certificates of abandonment were approved in concept as a part of the Com-
missions Optional Precedure for Certificating New Producer Sales of Natural Gas, Order
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(3) Allocating Shortages
The FPC's regulatory manipulations could not prevent natural gas short-
ages within the interstate markets. Interstate natural gas demands, stimu-
lated by average cost pricing and the nation's emerging environmentalism,
increased significantly each year from the 1950's to the mid-1970's.42 New
natural gas reserve additions, as well as new dedications of natural gas
to the interstate markets, declined as a result of regulatory disincentives. 43
Congressional vacillation on the issue of wellhead price regulation also
discouraged producers, especially when Congress veered toward extend-
ing wellhead pricing regulation into the intrastate markets. 44 By 1971, in-
terstate gas shortages became so severe that the FPC ordered interstate
pipelines to submit curtailment plans for its approval.45 In reviewing the
pipeline's curtailment proposals, the FPC established curtailment guide-
lines favoring curtailment by end-use priorities rather than by pro rata
adjustments. 46
The FPC's curtailment priorities were premised on the FPC's determi-
nation that some end-uses were more efficient or essential than others. 47
No. 455, 48 F.P.C. 218, 233 (1972), rev'd sub. nom. Moss v. Federal Power Comm'n, 502
F.2d 461, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Federal Power Comm'n v. Moss, 424
U.S. 494 (1976). Pregranted abandonments were also adopted to encourage emergency and
short-term sales of gas to the interstate market. Policy with Respect to Establishment of
Measures to be Taken for the Protection of as Reliable and Adequate Service as Present
Natural Gas Supplies and Capacities Will Permit, Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971), as
amended, Order No. 431-A, 48 FPC 193 (1972).42Uniform National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas Produced from Wells Commenced On
Or After January 1, 1973, and New Dedications of Natural Gas to Interstate Commerce
On Or After January 1, 1973, Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas,
51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974).
'3See Ameriran Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 1089,
1095n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also SANDEs REGULATION, supra note 9, at 126 (Table 14),
showing that from 1956 to 1973, natural gas production rose from 10.9 TCF to 22.6 TCF,
while reserve additions fell from 24.7 TCF to 6.8 TCF and the reserves/production ratio
fell from 21.8 to 11.1.
44See SANDERS REGULATION, supra note 9, at 153-64.
4sPolicy with Respect to Establishment of Measures to be Taken for the Protection of as
Reliable and Adequate Service As Present Natural Gas Supplies and Capacities Will Per-
mit, Order No. 431, 45 F.P.C. 570 (1971).
"Utilization and Conservation of Natural Resources, Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85 (1973).
47 We are impelled to direct curtailment on the basis of end use rather than on the
basis of contract simply because contracts do not necessarily serve the public in-
terest requirement of efficient allocation of this wasting resource....
[W~e have determined that interruptible sales are for the most part, predicated
on end-use considerations; those customers, be they direct sales or indirect sales,
who require gas for human needs service or non-substitutable industrial service
do not contract on an interruptible basis .... [Ilnterruptible customers can most
reasonably be expected to have alternative fuel facilities already operational. We
conclude, therefore, that curtailment should first fall on [interruptible customers]
... particularly since these customers are best prepared to accept interruptions
in service and dearly do not require uninterrupted service for protection of life
or property.
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Residential and commercial uses were preferred over industrial uses, in-
dustrial users incapable of using alternative fuels were given preference
over industrial users with alternative fuel capability, firm industrial cus-
tomers were favored over interruptible industrial customers, and within
each priority, small users were favored over large users. 4 Lower priority
uses had to be curtailed entirely before higher end-uses could be affected.
In general, the end-uses accorded the lowest priority levels coincided
with those which had generated the greatest demands for coal prior to
the expansion of the natural gas industry.49 This was especially true for
Finally, if curtailment reaches beyond the level of interruptible service into firm
contract service, we commit ourselves to the proposition that large volume boiler
fuel usage is inferior (emphasis added) and should be curtailed before other firm
service. Aside from the established physical fact that combustion of natural gas
for raising steam in boilers and its subsequent conversion into electricity or
mechanical energy results in a loss of roughly two-thirds of the heating value of
the gas used - which we regard as unacceptably inefficient in times of shortage - we
note also that those who use gas as boiler fuel generally can substitute other fuels
more readily, and at lower overall cost than other gas users; additionally, pollu-
tion control is more practical because of the large size of individual installations
.... [Slubordinating boiler fuel use with its comparative ease of substitutability,
to other large scale industrial and commercial uses should tend to minimize plant
and business closings and the attendant economic loss from decreased produc-
tion and payrolls, and the personal hardships of unemployment.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., Opin. No. 643, 49 F.P.C. 53, 66-67 (1973).
4The curtailment priorities established by the Commission were stated as a general policy
and interpretation, 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(a)(1)(1984), and were as follows:
(i) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a peak day).
(ii) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a peak day), firm
industrial requirements for plant protection, feedstock and process
needs, and pipeline customer storage injection requirements.
(iii) All industrial requirements not specified in paragraph (a)(1)(ii), (iv),
(v), (vi) (vii), (viii) or (ix) of this section.
(iv) Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at less than 3000 Mcf
per day, but more than 1500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel
capabilities can meet such requirements.
(v) Firm industrial requirements for large volume (3000 Mcf or more per
day) boiler fuel use where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
(vi) Interruptible requirements of more than 300 Mcf per day, but less than
1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such
requirements.
(vii) Interruptible requirements of intermediate volumes (from 1,500 Mcf per
day through 3,000 Mcf per day), where alternate fuel capabilities can
meet such requirements.
(viii) Interruptible requirements of more than 3,000 Mcf per day, but less
than 10,000 Mcf per day, where alternative fuel capabilities can meet
such requirements.
(ix) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mcf per day, where al-
ternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
Utilization and Conservation of Natural Resources-Natural Gas Act. Order No. 467-B,
49 F.P.C. 583 (1973).
49As a consequence, legislation mandating coal conversion has been very popular with
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large industrial boiler fuel users and electric power generators. As the gas
shortage crises worsened, consuming areas with large residential loads and
relatively small boiler fuel and power plant loads joined with the major
coal producing areas in proposing legislation that would prohibit indus-
trial boiler fuel users and electric power generators from using natural gas.Y
(4) Acquiring Supplementals
Curtailment plans forced pipelines and their customers to make the dif-
ficult choice of keeping their homes warm or keeping their places of work
open. To make this choice more manageable, the FPC began encouraging
pipelines, distribution companies, and the higher priority curtailed indus-
trial users to acquire supplemental gas supplies. The supplementals came
in four major categories: (1) intrastate gas acquired through the FPC's
emergency sales and direct sales programs, (2) natural gas imports,
(3) liquified natural gas (LNG) (which was largely imported), and (4) syn-
thetic natural gas (SNG).
Supplemental gas supplies were much more costly to acquire than avail-
able interstate natural gas supplies. Intrastate and foreign sources of gas
would not sell their gas to the interstate markets without receiving well-
head prices in excess of both the FPC's wellhead ceiling prices and the cur-
rent deregulated intrastate prices. 5' Costly specialized facilities had to be
built before LNG and SNG could be used.52 SNG production could not
occur without taxpayer subsidization of expensive and lengthy research
and development projects. 53 Great uncertainty costs are inherent in the
use of SNG because its production and consumption feasibility, technical
coal producing states as a means of regaining their "lost" markets, and has played an impor-
tant role in securing legislative support from coal producing states for various natural gas
policy approaches. See SANsDS RE;uLATIoN supra note 9, at 121-123, 135, 139-140, 154-55,
158, 162-63, 165-66, 170-71, 189-192.
"Such legislation was passed in the form of the Energy Supply and Environmental Coor-
dination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246, and the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289.
"
1See New Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders from Secretary of Energy to Economic
Regulatory Administration and Federal Energy Regulatory Administration, 49 Fed. Reg. 6684,
6684-86 (1984); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 649 F.2d
1110, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1981).
"
2Under an agreement between Algeria's national energy company, Sontrach, and El Paso
Algeria Company, for the importation of liquified natural gas (LNG), terminal storage and
vaporization facilities had to be constructed in the U.S. at a cost of over $600 million, LNG
tankers had to be purchased at a cost of $1.6 billion, and a liquification plant had to be
built in Algeria at a cost of $2.2 billion. West Virginia Pub. Services Comm'n v. United
States Dept. of Energy, 681 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Great Plains Coal gasification
project was estimated in 1980 to cost up to $1.5 billion. Office of Consumers' Counsel v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 655 F.2d 1132, 1135 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
$'In recognition of this fact, Congress, through the Energy Security Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611, established the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation which
was authorized to develop a multi-billion dollar synthetic fuel production strategy.
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and economical, remain in question.54
To help insulate residential customers from the high costs of supple-
mentals, the FPC adopted incremental pricing policies. These imposed the
bulk of the costs of acquiring supplementals on the lower priority industrial
users.55 The FPC also attempted to subject incrementally-priced supple-
mental contracts to its curtailment priorities. However, it was forced to
back away from this plan because purchasers of supplementals were un-
willing to pay incremental rates without receiving exemptions from the
FPC's curtailment programs5 6
(5) Allocation Sectionalism
Uneven patterns of gas shortages and gas consumption cost increases
emerged across the nation because the FPC's curtailment and supplementals
54See Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 655 F.2d 1132
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the FERC lacked jurisdiction over coal gasification projects
for purposes of arranging ratepayer guarantees of the capital costs of the project even if
the project proved to be unsuccessful). Note also that in 1982 more than 800,000 bldoe in
coal gasification went from 'design engineering or planning status into cancellation or deferral.
Ninety percent of all projects finally planned were cancelled or delayed indefinitely." Slow
Growth Seen for Synthetic Fuels, 81 Oil & Gas J. 80, 83 (May 2, 1983).
55in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 649 F.2d 1110 (5th
Cir. 1981), the court upheld a FERC ruling that imposed the higher cost burdens of gas pur-
chased by the pipeline under emergency purchase authorities on low priority customers.
Earlier attempts at incremental pricing were less successful. The Fifth Circuit, in Columbia
LNG Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1974), overturned the Com-
mission's adoption of incremental pricing of LNG imports on grounds that the record reflected
insufficient evidence to justify the Commission's departure from rolled in pricing. Id. at 654-55.
The Commission, in a notice entitled End Use Rate Schedules,r 40 Fed. Reg. 8571 (1975),
proposed apportioning the full cost of "new" gas and supplementals on industrial users. This
proposal was still pending when the NGPA, and its incremental pricing provisions, was
enacted. Meanwhile, in 1977 the Commission marched up the incremental pricing hill and
back down again by first imposing incremental pricing on the sales of imported LNG,
Trunkline LNG Co., 58 F.P.C. 726, 741-42 (1977), and then reverting to rolled-in pricing
because LNG was projected to be a high percentage of the pipeline's base load supplies in
the future and because with incremental pricing the firm demands needed to guarantee the
financial integrity of the project would not materialize. Trunkline LNG Co., 58 F.P.C. 2935,
2937-41 (1977).
36With respect to authorizing the Columbia LNG Corp. imported LNG project, the FPC
first stated that:
We reject the concept of rolling in relatively expensive supplemental gas supply
costs with a pipelines unit cost of gas supply. To do so would disguise the economic
cost of this LNG which we find is contrary to the public interest. We, therefore,
will require the filing by the purchasing jurisdictional pipelines of separate LNG
rate schedules, which reflect incremental costing concepts... As a matter of policy,
regasified LNG volumes should be included in the system-wide volumes available
during periods of curtailment due to an insufficient supply of gas to meet the respec-
tive pipelines' obligations under curtailment plans filed pursuant to our orders.
On the other hand, system-wide volumes should not be used to meet unfulfilled
contractual obligations for regasified LNG occasioned by a non-delivery at the
requisite (LNG) volumes.
Columbia LNG Corp., 47 F.P.C. 1624, 1639-40 (1972). Later, the FPC backed down on its
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policies were superimposed on a national market segmented into regulat-
ed and unregulated parts, and, within the interstate market, on a wide
variety of interstate pipeline gas inventory levels and load profiles. s 7 The
variances among interstate pipeline inventory levels and load profiles re-
flected differences in the abilities of interstate pipelines to match long-term
gas demands and supplies through effective gas acquisition and load man-
agement programs. 5'
The imbalances in gas supply fortunes among consuming sectors and
sections produced conflicts among industrial, commercial and residential
consumers, among different service areas within each interstate pipeline
system, between intrastate and interstate consumers, and among consum-
ers of different interstate pipeline systems. Industrial consumers and ser-
vice areas with large industrial loads experienced the greatest curtailments
and cost increases during the gas shortage crises. 59 Therefore, they were
inclined to (1) support pro rata curtailment policies over end-use curtail-
ment plans;60 (2) favor supplemental policies with the most liberal cri-
teria for specifying what supplementals were eligible for acquisitions and
which consumers were eligible to acquire them;6' (3) oppose incremental
curtailment decision, and held that LNG supplementals sold under full costed incremental
rates "should be contracted for on a firm basis, not subject to curtailment." Columbia LNG
Corp., Opin. No. 622-A, 48 FPC 723, 728 (Oct. 5, 1972). Note the incremental pricing ap-
proach of Opinions 622 & 622-A was reversed in Columbia LNG Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1974).
57See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v, Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
676 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
56For an especially revealing critique of how gas producers, interstate pipeline companies,
and the Federal Power Commission interacted in the 1960's to permit expansions of pipeline
customers and service areas without carefully assessing future gas supply and demand
balances, see J. GAULT, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE: THE CASE
OF NATURAL GAS 195-250 (1979). The author suggests that the main reason pipelines en-
countered shortages was the misreading or misuse of statistics indicating that demands were
growing in the wake of declining reserves/production ratios by the pipelines and the Com-
mission. Id. According to Gault, the FPC failed to assess properly the impending shortages
"partly because it felt that it had the task of promoting natural gas usage, partly because
of a desire to preserve the regulatory coalition, and partly because it failed to look seriously
at future gas demand." Id. at 195, 209-37. The pipelines, which had as good, if not better,
access to the information suggesting future shortages failed to act appropriately possibly
because "evidence of declining reserves would have scared away potential investors," and
probably because the pipelines' debt instruments called for accelerated retirement if reserves
fell below a certain level. Id. at 237-50.
59See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
676 F.2d 763, 766-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6OSee Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., Opin. No. 778, 56 F.P.C. 2134, 2143-47 (1976),
rev'd sub nom. North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
61See Policy with Respect to Certification of Pipeline Transportation Agreements, Order
No. 533, 54 F.P.C. 821, 833, 835-38 (1975), aff'd sub norm. American Public Gas Ass'n v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1978), wherein the Commis-
sion, over consumer and some interstate pipeline protests, established a transportation cer-
tification program encouraging high priority industrial and commericial customers to enter
into direct sales relationships with producers for supplemental natural gas supplies.
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pricing of supplementals;62 (4) demand compensation for the losses in-
flicted on them by the pipelines' failure to honor their gas sales contracts
as a result of either poor management or the implementation of curtail-
ment;63 and (5) advocate load growth prohibitions so that the demands
of high priority users would not expand to the point where lower priority
users would face curtailment." Conversely, residential and commercial
consumers enjoyed the highest priorities under the FPC's end-use curtail-
ment policies and consequently supported end-use curtailment, 6s opposed
liberal supplemental policies as practices that would increase the prices
and reduce the availability of intrastate gas supplies," supported the FPC's
incremental pricing of supplementals,6 7 opposed compensating those most
grievously affected by curtailment, since such compensation could pos-
sibly increase the costs or decrease the reliability of the gas service they
received,'6 and were skeptical about load growth limitations.69
62 PIERCE, AN OVERVIEW O REGULATION, IN NATURAL GAs REGULATION HANDBoox 30, 91
(R. Pierce ed. 1980).
"See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 676
F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rate compensation); International Paper Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 476 F.2d 121, 125-129 (5th Cir. 1973) (contract damages); Monsanto v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 799, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (contract damages).
"See Cities Service Gas Co., Opin. 805, 58 F.P.C. 2519, 2528-37 (1977), explained, 59
F.P.C. 1373 (1977).
"See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Opin. No. 778, 56 F.P.C. 2134, 2144-45, 2167-68,
(1976), remanded for further proceedings, North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
"For example, the American Public Gas Association and the Consumers Federation of
America challenged the Federal Power Commission's Order No. 533, 54 F.P.C. 821 (1975),
aff'd sub nom. American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d
1089 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which permitted high priority industrial customers facing curtail-
ment to get transportation services for any natural gas purchases they arranged directly with
intrastate producers on grounds that
it would violate the Natural Gas Act by permitting unregulated prices for sales
that are required to be regulated; would unfairly favor the very largest industrial
consumers, who can afford to purchase gas directly from a producer at unregulated,
intrastate prices; and would operate to establish a new competitor for onshore
gas, unrestrained as to the price it can pay, thus handicapping all interstate pipelines
in their attempts to procure supplies of onshore gas.
587 F.2d at 1093-94.
O'See United Gas Pipeline v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 649 F.2d 1110, 1112-14(5th Cir. 1981) (Commission order prohibiting the rolled-in pricing of emergency gas pur-
chases on grounds that to do so discriminated against high priority customers). See also
Trunkline LNG Co., Opin. No. 796-A, 58 F.P.C. 2935, 2937, 2939 (1977) (noting that only
the Environmental Defense Fund, the Consumer Federation of America and the Public In-
terest Economics Center supported the Commission Staff's defense of incremental pricing).
"See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commn, 676
F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (sustaining the Commission's refusal to require an interstate pipeline
to provide a compensation system to customers curtailed more than the system average);
but see North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (wherein the court acknowledges that high priority customers of the deepest curtailed
distribution companies must pay more than high priority customers of lightly curtailed
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By contrast with the interstate markets, intrastate markets generally en-
joyed gas supplies adequate to meet their growing demands throughout
the gas shortage crises of the 1970's. This contrast lead to the spectre of
high priority residential consumers facing curtailment in the interstate mar-
ket, while in the intrastate markets the lowest priority industrial and power
plant users expanded their demands without difficulty. 70 To protect their
supply advantages, intrastate consumers joined with their producing sec-
tors in opposing the efforts of interstate consumers to extend federal natural
gas price and allocation regulation into the unregulated intrastate mar-
ketsn and to enact legislation prohibiting low priority industrial and power
distribution companies). See also International Paper Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476
F.2d 121, 132 (5th Cir. 1973) (court suggests that an award of contract damages to curtailed
industrial customers would frustrate "the orderly control by the F.P.C. if the damages could
be paid out of current revenues contributed by ratepayers at rates necessarily increased to
care for this exponential liability").
'See Cities Service Gas Co., Opin. No. 805, 58 F.P.C. 2519, 2532-34 (1977). In Cities,
representatives of communities composed largely of high priority residential and commer-
cial customers objected to a load growth moratorium facilitated by a fixed base period volume
on grounds that:
A moratorium or load growth will only continue further into the future Cities
current service to low priority boiler fuel customers. This will be accompanied
by a requirement that virtually all new homes and small commercial establishments
in the Cities area use electricity as a source of heat. Abbeyville, et. al., alleges
that new home construction and small commercial growth may come to a halt
because the cost of electric heat is prohibitive and residents of these towns and
cities will not purchase houses with electric heat.
Id. at 2532-33.
7'0 n hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives concerning the Emergency Gas Act
of 1977, witnesses confirmed the imbalance of natural gas supplies between the interstate
market and the intrastate markets. Governor Briscoe of Texas stated that: "Today we see
shortages prevalent in the regulated market and acceptable supply demand equilibrium in
the uncontrolled intrastate system." Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R.
2500 Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ENGA Hearings] (statement
of Dolph Briscoe, Governor of the State of Texas). In pleading for authority to subject in-
trastate supplies to mandatory allocation, the Governor of New York noted that "[Ilt is time
that we get down to the business of negotiating whatever we must negotiate to draw upon
intrastate supplies ... that is gas that is being consumed within the producing State, par-
ticularly where that gas would otherwise be used for low priority purposes." Id. at 51 (state-
ment of Hugh L. Cary, Governor of the State of New York). And, a consumer represen-
tative plaintively asked: "[Wihy is the mandatory allocation provision limited to interstate
pipelines. Why should we close down factories in Maryland to heat homes in Ohio, while
intrastate gas is being burned freely in Texas for night hours at shopping centers or at amuse-
ment parks or under boilers that could be burning oil." Id. at 120 (statement of James F.
Flug, Director and Counsel, Energy Action Committee).
71The gas supply imbalance problem provided demands for the extension of federal pric-
ing and allocation regulations into the intrastate markets. The response of Cong. Krueger
of Texas to statements made by Governor Brendan Byrne of New Jersey during hearings
on the Emergency National Gas Act of 1977 highlights this controversy.
I see, Governor Byrne, in your testimony that ... you would like to see $1.44
per thousand cubic feet be the statutory ceiling on emergency sales of natural gas.
In your next paragraph you proceed to say. ;. that synthetic gas, which you
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plant facilities from using natural gas. 72 Intrastate consumers also were
reluctant to allow their gas distributors to participate in the FPC's emer-
gency gas sales programs unless they, rather than their distributors, were
credited with all or most of the revenues realized from the distributors'
interstate gas sales. 73
Some interstate pipeline systems had coordinated their supply acquisi-
tion and load growth programs better than others. These pipelines faced
lower curtailment exposure than the more poorly managed systems. The
pipelines facing the greatest curtailment exposure, along with their cus-
tomers, favored mandatory interconnections and supply rationing among
have produced at great capital investment cost, should not be counted in your
total supply, because that is something you have at home. You... indicate that
you would like very much to reach down into Texas and Louisiana, where the
consumers of those states, as Governor Briscoe has so aptly stated, have through
their financing, through their willingness to pay a price three times as high as
you are willing to pay, have financed natural gas at or above $1.42 and have
brought it in.
If I understand your testimony correctly, Governor, you are saying you would
like to hold on to your synthetic gas, which costs you $3.50, but that gas which
may have cost Texans $1.75 to bring in, you would like for us to share with you
at $1.42.
Now frankly, I do not find that a very attractive argument, and I do not find
it even particularly unselfish.
Id. at 66 (statement of Cong. Robert Krueger of Texas).
72In resisting provisions in the proposed Natural Gas Emergency Act of 1975, which would
have prohibited natural gas use in electric power plants, an executive of a large electric utili-
ty operating in the intrastate market testified that:
If all our natural gas was taken away, we calculate that for the 9-month cur-
tailment period, our added costs of fuel... would be $234 million. This would
represent an increase of 370 percent, almost five times the cost of the gas taken
away from us.
... Furthermore, 25 percent of our generating capacity... cannot burn oil
on a continuous basis .... To convert this additional capacity would conser-
vatively cost $92 million with annual caring charges... of $161/ million. None
of the conversion costs I have used take into account the cost of replacing the
5 to 10 percent of generating capacity lost in the act of converting.
... Replacement of all our gas with oil would require about 27 million barrels
additional oil during just the 9-month curtilment period. If this has to be imported,
the consequences for energy independence and balanced payments is obvious.
Natural Gas Shortages: Hearings on H.R. 2418, H.R. 9408, H.R. 9410, H.R. 9464, H.R.
9708, H.R. 9709, H.R. 9710, and H.R. 9884 Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 383 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Shortages Hearing] (statement of Floyd W. Lewis, President, Middle
South Utilities, Inc.).
73For example, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has just recently begun permitting
Oklahoma gas distributors to keep 10% of the profits associated with emergency off-system
sales after several years of requiring the utilities to credit ratepayers with 100% of the pro-
fits associated with such sales. Application of Oklahoma Natural Gas Association for an
Increase in Rates, Order No. 247376, at 71 (October 27, 1983).
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all interstate pipelines. 4 Such interpipeline rationing was bitterly opposed
by areas served by the better managed pipelines.7
III. THE SEEDS OF SHORTAGE
At the time the Natural Gas Act of 1938 was passed, no one anticipat-
ed that federal regulation of the natural gas industry would lead to short-
74Thus, during the harsh winter of 1976-77, the Governor of Indiana felt compelled to
support legislation authorizing mandatory gas allocations, and so instructed the Indiana Con-
gressional Delegation that: "I consider it urgent that President Carter's request for emergen-
cy authority to divert natural gas to hard-hit regions of the nation be enacted by Congress
as rapidly as possible." Letter from Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Governor of State of Indiana
to Members of the Indiana Contressional Delegation (January 27, 1977), reprinted in ENGA
Hearings, supra note 70, at 48. Moreover, given the severity of the shortages that year, one
gas pipeline executive testified that
[tihe shortage has now become so acute and widespread... that there is no in-
terstate pipeline system... that has a surplus of gas. Any transfer of gas to meet
an immediate problem on another pipeline's system necessarily means.., that
the transferor pipeline is taking gas needed to serve its own distribution company
customers in order to supply those of another pipeline,
But .... the transferor may well be subjected to injunctions and damage ac-
tions by its distribution customers or consumers they serve and to legal actions
by state and local government representatives of the areas it serves.
For these reasons, I believe legislation authorizing the President ... to order
the delivery of gas by one pipeline to another is necessary ... to make it clear
that such an order is a complete defense to a legal action arising out of something
done or omitted as a result of compliance with that order.
ENGA Hearings, supra note 70, at 75 (statement of Arthur R. Seder, Jr., Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, American Natural Resources Co.).
"I1n 1975, the Interstate National Gas Association was adamantly opposed to mandatory
allocations of natural gas. Its position was artfully summarized as follows:
[Tlhe entire structure of the industry is based on the proposition that each pipeline
is responsible for supplying its own customers under long term agreements. From
the pipeline's standpoint, its ability to purchase new supplies of gas, and its capacity
to plan its operations are all seriously undermined by the possibility that its gas
will be allocated to other pipeline systems. To be specific: How can a pipeline
undertake new, high-risk gas supply projects if the prospect is that the gas, when
produced, will be diverted to other pipelines? How can a pipeline manage its
underground storage system to meet peak winter loads if its storage balances are
levied upon in mid-winter to serve another system's customers? How can a pipeline
maintain the reserve life index required by its debt capital indentures if its reserves
are subject to appropriation to supply another system?
From the standpoint of the customers of the pipeline which it forced to provide
gas to another system, the unfairness and dislocations inherent in such alloca-
tions are equally manifest. Through payment of the pipeline's cost of service, the
distributors supplied by the pipeline and the consumers they serve have provided
the financial support that has enabled that pipeline to acquire and transport the
gas to market. In particular, gas users served by some pipelines have paid millions
of dollars in increased rates to finance advance payments made by the pipeline
to the producer to obtain a call on newly discovered gas. Appropriation of that
gas to supply another pipeline's customers would amount to nothing less than
an expropriation of those advance payments.
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ages and market restrictions. During the natural gas industry's early years,
natural gas was largely a little valued by-product of oil production. 76 Gas
transmission technology was primitive, thus limiting natural gas use to
those markets close to the oil and gas fields. 77 Many of the most produc-
tive fields were isolated from industrially developed or densely populated
areas, so natural gas was flared in order to permit oil production to pro-
ceed unabated. 78 As gas transmission technology became more sophisti-
cated, gas could be transmitted greater distances to better markets. Natural
gas was still largely a by-product of oil production, however, so natural
gas producers perceived their production costs as being very low and re-
garded their gas sales revenues as icing on the cake. 79 This by-product
psychology helped keep wellhead natural gas prices very low.80
The tendency toward low natural gas price levels was reinforced by the
natural monopoly characteristics of the pipelines. Often, only one natu-
ral gas pipeline connected an oil field with feasible natural gas markets.
Being virtually the only natural gas purchaser in the field, the pipeline
had monopsony power over producers and could acquire natural gas sup-
plies at prices below competitive price levels.$' As a result of low wellhead
prices, pipeline monopsony power, and lowering transmission costs, con-
sumers were provided with gas at low burnertip rates.82
Letter from Wilbur H. Mack, Chairman of the Board, Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America to Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States (August 27, 1975), reprinted
in Shortages Hearing, supra note 72, at 236-37.
"Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 630 (1944) (J. Jackson dissen-
ting); Permian Area Rates- Initial Decision, 34 FPC 306, 324 (1964); BREa & MAcAvoY,
supra note 3, at 56.
77See SANDERs REGULATION, supra note 9, at 24, 25.
78See Determining Just and Reasonable Rates for Natural Gas Producers in the Permian
Basin, Opin. No. 468, 34 F.P.C. 159, 174 (1965); supra note 77.
79See Permian Area Rates Case-Initial Decision, 34 F.P.C. 306, 311, 324 (1964).
'1d.
SiFor example, in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950),
a case decided before the Natural Gas Act was held to apply to wellhead gas rates, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) that fixed
minimum wellhead rates against various constitutional attacks. The Court summarized the
OCC's reasons for fixing minimum rates as follows:
[Tihe Commission concluded that there was no competitive market for gas in the
Guymon-Hugoton Field, that the integrated well and pipe-line owners were able
to dictate the prices paid to producers without pipe-line outlets, and that as a
result gas was being taken from the field at a price below its economic value.
Id. at 183.
uThus, in a Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) proceeding to establish minimum
rates on gas produced in Kansas wells in the Hugoton field, the KCC noted that:
[Glas is not truly competitive with the two other main fuels; namely, coal and
oil. The cheapest and most efficient of the three fuels, gas is more convenient in
more uses to the consumer than are the others. This is all borne out by the record.
Gas is a commodity. Cheapness of a commodity is an avenue to ultimate waste.
It is common knowledge that the records of every pipeline company and distributing
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Natural gas pipelines were also perceived to have natural monopoly
power at the burnertip. Concerns developed that the pipelines could use
their monopoly powers to set burnertip prices above competitive levels.
Not only would supracompetitive burnertip rates cause consumers to pay
more for gas service, they also would inhibit the creation or expansion
of natural gas markets. The producers' desires for expanding natural gas
markets converged with consumer desires to acquire gas service at the low-
est possible rates; this formed the consensus necessary to impose federal
regulation on the interstate pipelines through the enactment of the Natu-
ral Gas Act of 1938.83
A. Consumer Anxiety- Wellhead Price Regulation
Eventually, rising demands for gas caused wellhead prices to rise in ab-
solute and real terms." Having made investments in natural gas consump-
tion facilities, most of which could be converted to use other fuels only
at a high cost, if at all, consumers regarded themselves as captured cus-
tomers vulnerable to unfair increases in natural gas burnertip prices.8s Ris-
company are replete with astonishing numbers of conversions from other fuels
to natural gas where it is available.
Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 180 Kan. 454, 304 P.2d 528, 537-38 (1956)
(Appendix: Memorandum Opinion), rev'd, 355 U.S. 391 (1958). The presiding examiner in
the Permian Area Rates Proceeding had a different theory about the low value of natural
gas. In his view:
Although similar in many respects to other petroleum hydrocarbons, the gaseous
nature of natural gas makes it much less valuable than liquid hydrocarbons with
an equivalent energy value. From wellhead to burnertip it must be connected by
an umbilical cord of pipes. For this reason it cannot be used efficiently as fuel
for motor vehicles or for engines separated from a pipeline; and as a consequence,
a BTU of crude oil or lease condensate is worth some 4 to 6 times the value of
a BTU of gas, and a BTU of natural gas liquids some 3 times the value of a BTU
of natural gas.
Supra note 79, at 311-312.
8See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 609-13 (1943); SANVERs
REGULATION, supra note 9, at 24-58.
"In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, it was noted that:
A significant economic factor has been the rise in the price of natural gas bet-
ween 1945 and 1960.
Prior to 1945 natural gas had a low economic value. Its price averaged below
4 cents per Mcf. Vast amounts were flared from oil wells and from natural gas
plants for lack of a market. Gas reservoirs found in the course of a search for
oil were shut in.
Between 1947 and 1960 the average price paid by pipelines for gas trebled from
4.95 cents to 15.61 cents. Even after adjusting for changes in the purchasing power
of the dollar, prices in 1960 were some 2.3 times their 1947 level.
Supra note 79, at 312. However, "from 1938 to 1948, the price of gas to consumers actually
declined while coal prices increased 70 per cent and oil prices, almost 80 per cent." SANDERs
REGULATION, supra note 9, at 61.
81"Once residential and commercial consumers have installed gas using equipment, they
are to a considerable degree locked in; their demand for gas tends to be fixed regardless
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ing wellhead prices made consumers anxious, especially since they had
doubts as to whether natural gas pipelines price-regulated on a cost plus
basis had any incentives to bargain for the lowest possible wellhead pric-
es.8 6 From this consumer anxiety came efforts to extend natural gas price
regulation under the NGA to the wellhead level. The wellhead pricing de-
bate assumed sectionalist dimensions, since the major consumer forces were
located in non-producing states in the north central and northeast regions,
while the major producing interests were located primarily in the mid-con-
tinent and southwest regions.
The consumer regions won the debate in the judicial arena. Previous-
ly, legislative efforts to specify the regulatory status of wellhead pricing
had been stalemated8 7 But consumers began arguing before the FPC and
the federal courts that an ambiguous section of the NGA gave the FPC
regulatory jurisdiction over wellhead prices of gas sold for resale in inter-
of price i.e. relatively inelastic. The demand of industrial consumers is generally more elastic
because they usually have alternative sources of supply. However, in Los Angeles County,
where a great amount of Permian gas is consumed, natural gas is virtually required throughout
the entire year as a result of additional restrictions on the industrial use of fuel oil imposed
in January 1964 to alleviate the smog situation. Also in California as a whole, industrial
demand for gas is less elastic than in other areas of the country." Supra note 79, at 313-14.
$6As noted by Sanders:
Although gas maintained its price advantage in comparison with other fuels,
wellhead prices began to rise sharply in the late 1940s. From 1945 to 1956, prices
paid to southwestern producers, which had previously been stable or declining,
rose from about three cents per thousand cubic feet (mcf) to about nine cents.
The wellhead price of gas was only a small fraction of the final price paid by con-
sumers, but it was the only segment of that price that remained beyond govern-
mental control. As prices in the field began to rise, it was inevitable that state
regulatory commissions, particularly those in states with large concentrations of
consumers, would begin to urge an extension of regulation to gas production itself.
SANDERs REGULATION, supra note 9, at 61, 66.
8'Throughout the 1940's, FPC and U.S. Supreme Court opinions gave rise to fears among
producers that the Natural Gas Act might be interpreted to extend federal regulation of natural
gas rates to the wellhead level. During this period, the Commission, affirmed by the Supreme
Court, applied cost-based regulation to the production facilities of pipelines and their af-
filiates. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 684-93 (1947);
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581, 595-604 (1945); Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 607-15 (1944). Producing states sought
legislation to make it clear that the FPC lacked jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act to
set wellhead rates for gas produced by independents, pipelines, and affiliated companies.
Such a bill, the Moore-Rizley Bill, H.R. 4501, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) passed the House,
but it died in the Senate in 1948. In the next Congress, a more modest bill, one exempting
only independent producers from federal wellhead rate regulation, passed the House in 1949
and the Senate in 1950. This was the Harris-Kerr bill, H.R. 1758, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
However, President Truman veoted the Harris-Kerr bill in 1950. See S. Doc. No. 139, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). The momentum for a deregulation bill slowed when the FPC issued
an opinion, reversing an earlier trend in its opinions, that it lacked regulatory jurisdiction
under the Natural Gas Act over the wellhead rates of independent natural gas producers.
Phillips Petroleum Co., Opinion No. 217, 10 FPC 246, 261-81 (August 16, 1951), rev'd sub
nom. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd sub nom.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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state commerce.8 8 The FPC ruled that wellhead prices were not within its
jurisdiction under the NGA. 89 The federal courts reversed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit9" and an af-
firming United States Supreme Court, ruled that wellhead prices of gas
supplies which were sold for eventual resale in interstate commerce should
be regulated under the Natural Gas Act. 91
B. Average Cost Pricing-Natural Gas Shortages
The wellhead price regulation established by the interaction between
the FPC and the federal courts balanced the just and reasonable rates called
USee authorities cited supra note 87. The ambiguous section of the Natural Gas Act which
provided the legal battleground in the controversy over whether the NGA extended federal
regulation to cover rates at the wellhead was § lb, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982), which pro-
vides that:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale
for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other
use, and to natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but
shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local
distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the
production or gathering of natural gas.
0In denying jurisdiction over Phillips, the Commission found that Phillips was exempt
because (1) its sales of natural gas were part and parcel of, or at least incident to, produc-
tion and gathering of natural gas. Phillips Petroleum Co., Opinion No. 217, 10 FPC 246,
276-78, rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954); and (2) that Phillips
sales "are so closely connected with the local incidents of... (production and gatheringi
as to render rate regulation inconsistent or a substantial interference with the exercise by
the affected states of their regulatory functions. Id. at 278-79.
wrhe court of appeals based its reversal on its conclusion that:
[Section 1b) proceeds to exempt both "local distribution" and "production or gather-
ing," but it exempts nothing between "production or gathering" and "local distribu-
tion." The exemption of production or gathering does not exempt sales made after
production and gathering have been completed.
Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 205 F.2d 706, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd sub nora.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
911n sustaining the court of appeals ruling, the Supreme Court stated:
[Tjhe legislative history indicates a congressional intent to give the Commission
jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce,
whether by a pipeline Company or not and whether occurring before, during,
or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company... Thus, we are satisfied
that Congress sought to regulate wholesales of natural gas occurring at both ends
of the interstate transmission systems.
Regulation of the sales in interstate commerce for resale made by a so-called
independent natural-gas producer is not essentially different from regulation of
such sales when made by an affiliate of an interstate pipeline company. In both
cases, the rates charged may have a direct and substantial effect on the price paid
by the ultimate consumers. Protection of consumers against exploitation at the
hands of natural-gas companies was the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act.
... Attempts to weaken this protection by amendatory legislation exempting in-
19851
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for by the NGA with rates based on producers' costs of service. 92 The rel-
evant costs were historic average costs of recent production, rather than
current opportunity costs.93 As an increasing cost industry, the natural
gas production sector faced marginal costs in excess of average costs. Be-
ing limited to receiving prices based on average costs, producers could
not and did not produce gas supplies with costs of production in excess
of the FPC's average wellhead price calculations."
At the burnertip, natural gas was underpriced. Pipelines and distribu-
tion companies had access to gas supplies through a myriad of gas pur-
chase contracts containing a wide variety of pricing terms. Some gas sup-
dependent natural-gas producers from federal regulation have repeatedly failed,
and we refuse to achieve the same result by a strained interpretation of the ex-
isting statutory language.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682-85 (1954).
9ZSee Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380,400 (1974) ("the Commission
lacks the authority to place exclusive reliance on market prices .... "); Shell Oil Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061, 1066-69, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nor. California Co., v. Federal Power Conm'n, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ("Petitioners have not
met their burden of demonstrating that the natural gas rate must reflect noncost, market
conditions in order to be just and reasonable, i.e., they have not shown that the FPC policy
of basing the natural gas rate on cost rather than on market forces produces an end result
which is harmful to the public interest," Id. at 1084); Determining Just and Reasonable Rates
for Natural Gas Producers in the Permian Basin, Opin. No. 468, 34 FPC 159,174-76, 189-220
(August 5, 1965)
Except for those parties who advocate existing contract prices as the primary
regulatory standard, all parties recognize that costs must be a major factor in deter-
mining the area price. If the area rate approach is to rest on a solid foundation
there must be an objective test by which the industry, the consumers and the courts
can appraise the fairness of the price we fix. We are convinced that a composite
cost determination is the bedrock on which a regulated price must be established.
Id. at 189-90.
131n Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 975), cert. denied
sub nor. California Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), the court rejected
the commodity value of natural gas as the basis for the first national rate for natural gas
by observing:
The commodity price of gas would most likely be set by the prevailing price of
oil and the cross-elasticity of demand between gas and oil. To accept this free
market "commodity value" would be to eschew the congressionally mandated
responsibility of rate regulation which is devised to reach a "just and reasonable"
rate.
Id. at 1083-84. See also, BREYER AND MAcAvoy, supra note 3, at 66-72.
9"See BREYEx & MAcAvoY, supra note 3, at 70:
The similarity of the final ceiling prices to the provisional prices is not at all sur-
prising, given the method. This is because the provisional price ceilings themselves
probably biased the effort to ascertain the cost of new production. If producers
surmised that they were unlikely to be able to sell gas at more than these 1960
prices, they would have developed only those reserves having marginal costs lower
than such prices. This would have resulted in average costs of new reserves being
slightly 6elow the interim ceilings. Thus, using the historical average costs to set
future prices was to use historical prices to set future prices.
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plies were priced very cheaply under contracts entered into when market
conditions gave gas purchasers the edge in bargaining power. Other con-
tracts reflected pricing terms more favorable to producers. Few, if any,
of the pricing terms exceeded the FPC's latest average cost calculations.
The average gas acquisition costs of individual pipelines and distribution
companies were lower than the prices being paid under the latest gas con-
tracts.95 As a consequence, under the average cost rate methodology us-
ed by the FPC and State Public Utility Commissions, consumers faced
burnertip prices below the gas suppliers' marginal costs of providing gas
service. 96
With producers receiving wellhead prices below their marginal costs
of service and consumers paying burnertip prices below the marginal costs
of providing them with services, additions to reserves began to decline
while consumption remained above market clearing levels.97 The gas short-
ages of the seventies were the inevitable results.
IV. THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT OF 1978
Energy shortages dominated the nation's consciousness during energy pol-
icy debates, leading to the enactment of the National Energy Act of 1978.
95This is especially true since the concept of vintaging was introduced in the Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 795-99 (1968). Under the concept of vintaging, maximum
ceiling prices are set at higher levels for gas produced from the most recently developed wells
than for earlier developed wells. Id. at 795-96. Production methods, well production
characteristics, and producer size have also been factors used to set different levels of rates
for gas of the same quality and quantity. Id. at 784-87, 795-97.
96The utility rate making methodology of the IERC and State Utility Commissions is general-
ly a modified average historical ratemaking method wherein the gas company is entitled
to recover directly its prudent non-capital operating expenses, taxes, and depreciation on
a dollar for dollar basis plus a rate of return on the undepreciated portion of its total capital
investments. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944);
see also DETERMINING RELEVANCE OF MARGINAL COSTS TO ELECTRIC STRucTuREs IN EcONOMIc
REGuLATIoN: ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITIES 129-445 (R. Pierce, G. Allison & P.
Martin eds. 1980). As a consequence, the rates to individual customers tend to fall below
the utility company's marginal cost of service during times when fuel acquisition, construc-
tion and capital costs are rising. See id. at 411, 413, 415.
97From 1964 to 1973, total reserve additions declined from a high of 21.2 Tcf in 1965 to
a low of 6.5 Tcf in 1973. Additions to the interstate market, not counting Alaska, ranged
from a high of 14.8 Tcf in 1967 to a low of (0.2) Tcf in 1972. From 1970 through 1973,
the interstate market's share of annual reserve additions ranged from 0 to 21%. From 1964
to 1969, the interstate market captured a 53 to 74% share, with its share consistently in
the 70's from 1966-1969. Smmuts REGuLATION, supra note 9, at 126. This performance reflects
not only the problem of low price incentives in general, it also reflects the gravitational pull
of the higher prices receivable in the intrastate markets as compared to interstate price ceil-
ings. New contract prices for interstate gas were consistently below new contract prices for
gas sold exclusively in intrastate markets, with the difference between them widening steadily
until the second national rate case, American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n,
567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1977), which raised the interstate
1985]
30 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1
The shortage theme was stronger in debates concerning natural gas policy
than in debates concerning other energy sources because natural gas shortag-
es had been predicted long before the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973,98 and had
ceiling price on new contracts to $1.42 per Mc. See GAs PiE, supra note 8, at 63. The dif-
ferences in new contract prices were as follows:
Interstate Intrastate
Year New Contract Prices New Contract Prices
1966 17c 20c
1967 19 22
1968 19 23
1969 20 26
1970 n.a. 29
1971 27 45
1972 29 63
1973 37 80
1974 46 100
1975 57 140
1976 142 160
1977 142 190
Id.
"$For example, consider the remarkably prescient opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (194). In questioning whether the
traditional utility rate base rate making methodologies should or could be applied to natural
gas production facilities in order to set wellhead rates, Mr. Justice Jackson offered the following
observations:
The heart of this problem is the elusive, exhaustible, and irreplaceable nature
of natural gas itself. Given sufficient money, we can produce any desired amount
of railroad, bus, or steamship transportation, or communications facilities, or
capacity for generation of electric energy, or for the manufacture of gas of a kind
.... But the wealth of Midas and the wit of man cannot produce or reproduce
a natural gas field.
Id. at 629. Going further, Justice Jackson stated that:
Gas itself is tangible, possessible, and does have a market and a price in the field.
The value of the rate base is more elusive than that of gas. It consists of intangi-
bles-leaseholds had freeholds-operated and unoperated-of little use in
themselves except as rights to reach and capture gas. Their value lies almost wholly
in predictions of discovery, and of price of gas when captured, and bears little
relation to cost of tools and supplies and labor to develop it .... Hence the reason
for resort to a roundabout way of rate base price fixing does not exist in the case
of gas in the field.,
Id. at 648. Moreover, Justice Jackson observed that:
The amount and quality of service rendered by the usual utility will, at least
roughly, be measured by the amount of capital it puts into the enterprise. But
.. Ithere is no such relationship between investment and amount of gas pro-
duced .... The service one renders to society in the gas business is measured
by what he gets out of the ground, not by what he puts into it, and there is little
more relation between the investment and the results than in a game of poker.
Id. at 649. Finally, Justice Jackson admonished:
A price cannot be fixed without considering its effect on the production of gas.
Is it an incentive to continue to exploit vast unoperated reserves? Is it conducive
to deep drilling tests the result of which we may know only after trial? Will it
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been occurring with devastating frequency since 1971.99
The brunt of the nation's natural gas shortages was borne by consum-
ers residing within the interstate market. 1 ° Not surprisingly, the congres-
sional delegations of the states within the interstate market, states which
gave President Carter his electoral majority, supported President Carter's
natural gas policy proposals.10 1 The Carter proposals focused primarily
on allocating natural gas supplies more evenly among the states and on
giving residential consumers greater protection from curtailment and high-
er burnertip prices.102
induce bringing gas from afar to supplement or even to substitute for [depleting
reserves of I gas? Can it be had from distant fields as cheap or cheaper? If so, that
competitive potentiality is certainly a relevant consideration. Wise regulation must
also consider, as a private buyer would, what alternatives the producer has if
the price is not acceptable .... What can it do by way of diverting its supply
to intrastate sales? What can it do by way of disposing of its operated or reserve
acreage to industrial concerns or other buyers? What can [a producing state] do
by way of conservation laws, severance or other taxation, if the regulated rate
offends?
Id. at 654-55.
w"Pipeline curtailments totalled about one trillion cubic feet in 1970-71; by 1976-77, they
reached 3.4 trillion cubic ft." SANoERs REGULATION, supra note 9, at 127. Curtailments were
also severe in 1977-78. See GAs PIE, supra note 8, at 56.
lCOSee BREY R & MAcAvoy, supra note 3, at 53-87.
2OlSee SANDERS REGULATION, supra note 9, at 165-71.
102Part D of President Carter's proposed National Energy Act dealt with natural gas. The
stated purposes of Part D were:
(1) to bring the natural gas market back into better balance by reducing the
demand for natural gas and increasing the supply through the establishment of
an incentive based pricing approach for new natural gas, wherever it is used, that
moderates producer revenues and protects consumers by moving toward a com-
modity value price ceiling;
(2) to deal with short-term supply shortages through extension of the alloca-
tion provisions of the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977; and
(3) to provide for the conservation of natural gas by pricing natural gas to cer-
tain industrial and other users at a level which will provide incentives for conver-
sion to other more plentiful fuels and for conservation.
H.R. 6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a) (1977), reprinted in 207 ENERGY MGcur. (CCH)
pt. 4 (May 4, 1977). Under the President's bill, the wellhead prices of all gas, interstate or
intrastate were to be regulated. The new gas price was to be a BTU related price equal to
a fraction of the average price per barrel crude oil. Id. at § § 402(a)(18), 403, 404. (Note
that since domestically produced crude oil was at the time being price controlled, this new
gas price was not too attractive to gas producers). The President's bill also contained sec-
tions establishing incremental pricing, Id. at § 414, broadening emergency allocation authorities
to allow mandatory allocations of surplus gas from intrastate supplies, Id. at § 416, and
a strorig coal conversion program, Id. at § 1 601-03.
A good summary of the President's attitude on natural gas policy is contained in his Na-
tional Energy Plan, as follows:
The pricing of oil and natural gas should reflect the economic fact that the true
value of a depleting resource is the cost of replacing it. An effective pricing system
would provide the price incentives that producers of oil and natural gas need by
focusing on harder to find new supplies. The system should also moderate the
adjustment that households will have to make to rising fuel costs. It should end
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The congressional delegations from the intrastate gas producing states
sponsored different solutions to the nation's gas shortage problems. They
advocated the deregulation of all natural gas wellhead prices in order to
stimulate increased natural gas production. 10 3 They opposed mandatory
coal conversion, because their economies lacked access to low cost coal
supplies, a fact which had caused many of their industries and power gen-
erators to become heavily dependent on natural gas as a primary fuel. 10 4
To encourage efficient natural gas use, the producing states proposed tax
incentives instead of tax and pricing penalties to help inefficient gas users
the distortions of the intrastate-interstate distinction for new natural gas which
is a national resource. It should also promote conservation by raising the ultimate
price of products made by energy intensive processes.
The Carter National Energy Plan XI and XII, reprinted in 207 ENERGy MGMT. (CCH) pt.
3 (May 4, 1977).
'03Former Senator Bellmon's (Oklahoma) advocacy of the Pearson-Bentsen deregulation
amendment to S. 2104 is a particularly eloquent summary of the producing states' views
about natural gas deregulation. 123 CONG. Rac. 32, 297-98 (1977). As a part of his advocacy,
Sen. Bellmon stated that:
We in the producing States have long paid the price for energy need, on the in-
trastate market. We have not exactly enjoyed paying those prices, but we realiz-
ed that we either had to pay the true cost, or the product would not be available.
We have no shortage of gas. The price brought on the supply and reduced the
demand. People reduced their demand for gas, not to save gas, but to save money.
Now some propose to take away the gas which the people of the producing States
have paid for. We do not particularly object to that, as an emergency matter,
but when Congress in its great wisdom then says that the future price of the inter
and intrastate markets will be regulated at some artificial level, we do have a pro-
blem. Some politicians seem determined to enforce policies which will cause con-
sumers to starve to death in the dark. We in the producing States prefer policies
which insure production of the gas needed for the Nation. We prefer to continue
the progress which has been made in the intrastate market states, where gas prices
are uncontrolled, in developing supplies adequate to meet the need.
Id. at 32,297.
1041n House debate on coal conversion provisions of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act of 1975, Rep. Pickle (D-Texas) made the following plea to delete mandatory conversion
requirements:
I can remember the time when I was a young man working in the west Texas
oil fields. We were looking for oil. We had no or little concern for gas. That was
in the days of gas flaring, and through all these fields the extra gas was being
just burned and was not being put to good use. In our part of the country we
found out how to use natural gas, and we began to use it. Not only did we build
industries and business by natural gas, we fired most of our utilities by natural gas.
Almost every utility that we have in Texas is fired by natural gas....
This is not so in many parts of the country, because those utilities could burn
either coal or oil. In the South and the Southwest, though, natural gas is the only
fossil fuel really that they have. ...
More than that, if we were attempting to comply [with conversion] it would
cost us I suppose in the neighborhood of $18 billion in our state alone .... The
intent to convert is good, but the practical effect is to bankrupt every utility in
the Southwest.
121 CONG. Rac. 29,331 (1975).
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make their facilities more energy efficient.105 Seeking support from west-
ern coal producing states, the intrastate gas producing states proposed mar-
ket assistance programs to help western coal boomtowns adjust to their
new growth without unnecessary trauma.106
In the legislative collisions of these alternative energy proposals, the
Carter-consumer states' proposals won the first round in the House of Rep-
resentatives,107 where the heavily populated consumer states have repre-
sentation proportionate to their share of the nation's population. Howev-
er, the producer states and their western coal producing allies had the vot-
ing power to block passage of the Carter NEA in the Senate 08 where states
are equally represented, despite their populations. Differences in natural
gas policy views between the two competing legislative coalitions became
the center of the nation's energy policy controversy and held up passage
of a national energy plan from August, 1977, until November 8, 1978.
The energy policy logjam was broken by compromise and Presidential
arm-twisting. The resulting natural gas policies contained in the NEA repre-
sent a fusion of the major concepts sponsored by the Carter-consumer
states coalition and the natural gas producing states-western coal producing
states coalition.
A. Partial Market Fusion
The NEA embodies four major philosophies with respect to natural gas
policy. First, it reflects the consensus sentiment that whatever wellhead
pricing philosophy is adopted, it must apply to both the intrastate and
lOsTheir views became embodied in the energy conservation and conversion incentives
reported to the full Senate by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and
the Senate Committee on Finance. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
proposed a package of conversion compensation, conversion loans, and conversion loan
guaranties. Natural Gas and Petroleum Conservation Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 210-13,
in S. Rep. No. 361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19. (1977). See also Sen. Rep. No. 361, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1977). In summarizing the Energy Production and Conservation Tax
Incentive Act, which it recommended to the Senate, the Senate Finance Committee observ-
ed that:
This bill uses tax incentives in an effort to reduce demand for energy, to induce
conversion from oil and gas to more abundant domestic energy sources, and to
increase U.S. production of a broad range energy sources. The committee believes
this approach will be more effective than an approach which relies largely on tax
increases to reduce demand for energy. Also, unlike the House bill. . . , which
emphasized reducing consumption, the committee's bill balances incentives for
conservation and incentives for increased energy production.
S. Rep. No. 529, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977). See also Id. at 3-11, 30-115.
1 6Assistance to regions impacted (sic) by expanded coal production was proposed in the
Natural Gas and Petroleum Conservation Act of 1977, S. 997, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. f 306,
in S. Rep. No. 361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 23 (1977).
107supra note 19.1 0 They in fact passed a deregulation bill. Supra note 20.
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interstate markets. Accordingly, Title I of the Natural Gas Policy Act
(NGPA) establishes federal price ceilings on first sales of natural gas that
are applicable nationwide. 109 However, the complicated vintaged system
created by the wellhead price provisions treat historic interstate gas sup-
plies quite differently from historic intrastate supplies. 1 ° Historic inter-
state supplies are also less likely to be deregulated than are historic intra-
state supplies.", As a result of this difference in treatment, the inventory
costs of intrastate pipelines tend to be higher than those of interstate pipe-
lines.112 The net impact is that the intrastate and interstate markets still
are not completely fused together as a matter of national natural gas policy.
B. Consumer Protection
Second, the Act reflects the regulatory proponents' desire to protect res-
idential ratepayers from market level gas prices as long as possible. In-
109Title I of the NGPA establishes multiple categories of natural gas ceiling prices that
apply to all first sales of natural gas produced in the lower 48 states regardless of whether
the sale occurs in intrastate or interstate commerce. NGPA § § 101-110, 15 U.S.C. § §
3311-3320 (1982). Natural gas produced in Alaska from the Prudhoe Bay Unit and transported
through the transportation system approved under the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation
Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § § 719-190, 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (1981) note, is not eligible to be sold
under certain incentive price ceilings by which it might otherwise be covered. NGPA § §
102(e), 103(d), 15 U.S.C. § § 3312(e), 3313(d) (1982). Generally, the NGPA seems to assume
that most natural gas produced from the Prudhoe Bay Unit will be priced under a catchall
price ceiling category that establishes a ceiling price for gas not covered by any other ceiling
price category. NGPA § 109(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 3319(a)(4) (1982).
110The NGPA continues and amplifies the old FPC's practice of establishing vintaged ceil-
ing prices in order to provide special incentive rates for new efforts, NGPA § § 102, 103,
107,109, 15 U.S.C. § § 3312, 3313, 3317, 3319 (1982); for high-cost, high-risk efforts, NGPA
§ 107, 15 U.S.C. § 3317 (1982); and for marginal producing wells that may not be produced
in absence of higher per unit sales prices (stripper wells production), NGPA § 108, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3318 (1982). Historic gas supplies are those which on Nov. 8, 1978, the day before the
enactment of the NGPA, were dedicated to interstate commerce, NGPA § § 104(a), 106(a),
15 U.S.C. § § 3314(a), 3316(a) (1982), or were subject to an intrastate sales contract, NGPA
§ § 105(a), 106(b), 15 U.S.C. § § 3315(a), 3316(b) (1982). Generally, the price ceiling philosophy
applicable to historic gas supplies is that the real income levels derivable from existing con-
tracts should be preserved. Therefore, the price ceilings of historic gas supplies are essen-
tially comprised of the price being paid for gas under the applicable contracts as of a certain
date, adjustable by an escalation provision designed to increase the price ceiling by the rate
of annual inflation. NGPA, § § 10-(b), 105(b), 106(a), 106(b), 15 U.S.C. § § 3314(b), 3315(b),
3316(b) (1982). As a consequence of this pricing philosophy, the relative price differentials
between interstate sales and intrastate sales of gas that was flowing prior to the NGPA's
enactment have been preserved, thereby causimg the historic gas acquistion costs of interstate
pipelines to be lower than those of intrastate pipelines. See Impact of the NGPA on Current
and Projected Natural Gas Markets, 47 Fed. Reg. 19157, 19159-61, 19164-66 (1982).
"'Absent qualification as new gas, high-cost gas, or new onshore well production gas
that was not dedicated to interstate commerce on or before April 20, 1977, the only historic
gas supplies eligible for deregulation are intrastate gas supplies, the price of which will be
in excess of $1.00 per MMBTU on Dec. 31, 1984, by operation of contract pricing terms
not involving indefinite escalation clauses in existing or successor intrastate contracts. NGPA,
§ § 105(b)(3), 121(a)(3), (e), 15 U.S.C. § § 3315(b)(3), 3331(a)(3), § 3331(e).
llzSupra note 110.
[Vol. 37:1
NATURAL GAS
stead of immediately deregulating natural gas wellhead prices, the NGPA
establishes multiple federal price categories which together form a more
complicated version of the old FPC's vintaged pricing system. Old gas is
priced on the basis of maintaining its real price level over time as it exist-
ed on the day the NEA was enacted.1' 3 Therefore, producers of old gas
will not be able to earn economic rents as the real market value of gas
increases. Incentive rates are provided for new gas and high cost gas cate-
gories. 114 These incentive rates reflect the regulatory proponents' accept-
ance of the fact that the cost of discovering and developing new gas re-
serves is rising. While some gas categories are to be deregulated," s the
deregulation is phased over a period of years and can be rescinded tem-
porarily if the results are not compatible with the nation's political and
economic environment. 116 The phased approach to deregulation reflects
the regulatory proponents' views that deregulation should be approached
on an experimental basis over a time frame long enough to insure that
consumers will not face any dislocating price shocks.
The NGPA and the companion Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act I17 (PIFUA) further protect the residential gas user by continuing many
of the burdens industrial users faced under the NGA.2i8 The NGPA es-
tablishes an incremental pricing policy which forces large industrial users
to bear the brunt of the costs of the incentive rate gas acquired by the
pipelines and distribution companies which serve them."19 The NGPA's
1131d,
2241d
.
115Supra note 111.
216Section 122 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3332 (1982), provides a standby price control
authority permitting either the President or the Congress to reimpose price controls on gas
that was deregulated on January 1, 1985, for a one time reimposition period of 18 months
commencing any time between July 1, 1985, and June 30, 1987. The President may reim-
pose price controls by written order issued after May 31, 1985, which will become effective
within 30 days unless Congress nullifies the order with a concurrent resolution of disap-
proval within the 30 day waiting period. NGPA, § 122(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 3332(c)(1) (1982).
Congress can impose the standby controls through a concurrent resolution any time after
May 31, 1985, which will cause the price controls to take effect at the first of the month
following the passage of the resolution. NGPA, § 122(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 3332(c)(2) (1982).1 7Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 42, 45 U.S.C.
and 15 U.S.C. § 796, 49 U.S.C. § 26b) (1982).
'"For a summary of the earlier curtailment and pricing burdens borne by industrial us-
ers, see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
11tritle II of the NGPA, § § 201-208, 15 U.S.C. § § 3341-3348 (1982), establishes an incre-
mental pricing scheme designed to allocate more of the gas acquisition costs attributable
to the purchase by pipelines and distributing companies of gas eligible for incentive rate
price ceilings under the NPGA, certain gas imports, and other supplemental supplies to
price-sensitive industrial users than to other higher priority end-users. Congress hoped that
incremental pricing would (1) forc interstate pipelines to restrain their bids for new gas sup-
plies in order to keep from losing their industrial loads, and, (2) by keeping these new gas
bids down and allocating more of the costs to industrials, shield higher priority customers
1985!
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curtailment policies target industrial users as the first users which should
be curtailed in times of shortages. 120 Under the PIFUA, existing industrial
users and electric power plants, under certain conditions, may be required
from much of the increased costs of acquiring gas attributable to the NGPA's gradual dereg-
ulation. Rule Required Under Section 202 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Order
No. 80, 45 Fed. Reg. 31622, 31623 (1980).
Incremental pricing was to be adopted in two stages. The first stage was to be implement-
ed within 1 year from the date of the NGPA's enactment by FERC rules, and was to be ap-
plicable only to "boiler fuel use of natural gas by any industrial boiler fuel facility." NGPA,
§ 201, 15 U.S.C. § 3341 (1982). The FERC issued this rule on Sept. 28, 1979. Regulations
Implementing the Incremental Pricing Provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
10 C.F.R. § 282 (1984). In the second phase, the FERC was to extend by additional rulemak-
ing incremental pricing to "any industrial facility which is within a category defined by the
Commission" and is not otherwise exempt within 18 months of the NGPA's enactment. NGPA,
§ 202, 15 U.S.C. § 3342 (1982). The Commission, over vigorous protest, issued the Phase
II rule on May 6, 1980. Rule Required Under Section 101 of the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, Order No. 80, 45 Fed. Reg. 31622 (May 13, 1980).
However, Phase II was subject to a congressional veto, which could occur by a resolution
of disapproval by either House of Congress within 30 days after the rule was submitted to
Congress for review. NGPA, § 202(c), 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c) (1982). On May 20, 1980, the
House voted 369-34 to veto the Phase II rule. H. Res. 655, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., 126 CONG.
Rc. H3855 (1980). The House vetoed Phase II because of (1) uncertainty about the poten-
tial impacts of incremental pricing; (2) concern that incremental pricing was not effective
in furthering the market-ordering tasks it was to facilitate; (3) interfuel competition from
No. 6 fuel oil which was inducing enough bidding restraint to make incremental pricing
superfluous; and (4) fear that the effects of an expanded incremental pricing might exacerabate
the inflationary and recessionary conditions then facing the country. H.R. Rep. No. 938,
96 Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1980).
Consumer groups challenged the constitutionality of the congressional veto. FERC Order
Denying Rehearing and Revoking Amendments Made by Order No. 80, 45 Fed. Reg, 54741
(Aug. 18, 1980). The FERC rejected the constitutional argument, Id., but the consumer groups
prevailed on appeal. Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group
v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1402 (1983) U. White, dissenting),
77 L. Ed 2d 1403-04. Ultimately the F.E.R.C., in considering the status of Phase II after the
congressional veto was declared unconstitutional, concluded that its Phase II expansion should
be revoked for the same reasons the Congress cited in vetoing it. Rule Required Under Sec-
tion 202 of the Natural Gas Policy Act, Order No. 363, 49 Fed. Reg. No. 62 12207 (1984).
Relying on the decision in Ohio Ass'n of Community Action Agencies v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 654 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(exempting industrial customers from
incremental pricing surcharges that would cause their delivered price of gas to exceed the
price of No. 6 fuel oil), the Commission ruled that it could lawfully decline to expand in-
cremental pricing beyond Phase I by exempting all end-users that potentially would be af-
fected under Phase II. Order No. 363, 49 Fed. Reg. No. 12207, 12208-09 (1984).120The NGPA's curtailment policies are found in Title IV, §§ 401-04, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3391-94
(1982). In general, the NGPA adopted the FPC's end-use curtailment approach, but modified
the priorities to give certain social institutions, agricultural uses and industrial process and
feed stock uses more specific and higher priorities than they were previously given. Thus,
§ 401 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3391 (1982), specifies that essential agricultural users without
fuel alternatives are to be accorded a curtailment priority higher than all users other than
a high priority user, who is a person that:
(A) uses natural gas in a residence;
(B) uses natural gas in a commercial establishment in amounts of less than 50
Mcf on a peak day;
(C) uses natural gas in any school, hospital, or similar institution; or
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to convert away from using natural gas as a boiler fuel.122 Further, natural
gas is forbidden as a boiler fuel for most new major industrial and power
plant facilities.122
C. Gradual Deregulation
Third, the Act reflects the deregulation proponents' beliefs that a free
market can operate at the producer level just as fairly and even more effi-
ciently than can any system of cost-based wellhead price controls. Thus,
the NGPA establishes total deregulation of natural gas wellhead prices
as the ultimate goal.1Z3 The fact that, in the short run, the Act only par-
tially decontrols gas prices reflects the deregulation proponents' conces-
sions to distributional justice. Old gas prices are kept at constant real levels
as a means of cushioning the impact on consumers of the higher incentive
and market prices applicable to new and high cost gas. The gradual de-
control reflects the deregulation proponents' awareness that consumers
need time to adjust politically and economically to the reality of higher
natural gas prices.
(D) uses natural gas in any other use the curtailment of which the Secretary of
Energy determines would endanger life, health, or maintenance of physical
property.
NGPA § 401(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 3391(f)(2) (1982). Further, § 402 of the NGPA, 15 U.S.C.
§ 3392, specifies that gas users using gas for essential industrial process and feedstock uses
and lacking fuel alternatives are to be given a priority higher than all users other than essen-
tial agricultural users and high-priority users.
For an overview of the complexities the NGPA added to the formation of interstate pipeline
curtailment plans, see Process Gas Consumers Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
712 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Process Gas Consumers Group v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
694 F.2d 728, reh'g granted in part, 694 F.2d, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 694 F.2d
778 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub noma. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 103 S.Ct. 1874 (1983). Note, that the NGPA's curtailment authorities
apply only to interstate pipelines. Therefore, the old intrastate-interstate dichotomy is not
ended by the NGPA with respect to curtailment policies.
iziEssentially, unless covered by a temporary or permanent exemption, existing power
plants and major fuel burning installations may be required to convert to the use of a fuel
other that petroleum or natural gas if it is economically and technically feasible for them
to use an alternate fuel without incurring substantial physical modifications or reductions
in their rated capacities. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act §§ 301-03, 311, 312; 42
U.S.C. §§ 8341-43, 8351, 8352 (1982). Most of the exemptions relate to (1) difficulties in
acquiring alternate fuel or meeting environmental, site, or other governmental regulations;
(2) use of fuel mixtures or supplemental gas supplies; (3) difficulties in operating adequately
or providing essential services reliably. PIFUA, § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 8352 (1982).
1
-Subject to the same type of exemptions relating to existing fuel burning facilities, supra
note 121, new electric power plants and major fuel burning installations are prohibited from
using natural gas or petroleum as primary energy sources. PIFUA, §§ 201-02, 211-13, 42
U.S.C. §§ 8311-12, 8321-23 (1982).
123The NGPA provides for deregulation of only certain natural gas supplies. NGPA § 121,
15 U.S.C. § 3331 (1982); supra notes 110-11. Total deregulation will not be achieved until
all gas subject to permanent NGPA price ceilings is totally depleted. This means total deregula-
tion will not occur until sometime in the mid to late 1990's.
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D. Freer Gas Flows
Fourth, the NGPA embodies mechanisms designed to permit freer flows
of gas between the intrastate markets and the interstate market so that
gas surpluses in one market may be used to relieve gas shortages in an-
other. However, reflecting the conditions prior to the enactment of the
NEA, when the surpluses were intrastate and the shortages were inter-
state, the NEAs allocation mechanisms favor intrastate gas flows into the
interstate market. The emergency mandatory transfer authorities under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and the NGPA benefit only high
priority end-users in interstate markets and affect only gas supplies owned
or transported by interstate pipelines. 124 NGPA emergency purchase au-
thorities cannot be used to acquire gas supplies from interstate pipelines.125
The NGPA permits intrastate pipelines to sell or assign surplus gas quan-
tities to the interstate market, but interstate pipelines are not given simi-
lar authority. 12' Intrastate pipelines are given exemptions from federal reg-
ulation under the NGPA's transportation authorities with respect to trans-
portation services they perform for the interstate market.2 7 Interstate pipe-
lines are also permitted to perform transportation services for intrastate
pipelines.128 Finally, the NGPA imposes transfer barriers on the sale of
historic interstate gas supplies that do not apply to the sale of historic in-
trastate gas supplies. 129
V. POST-SHORTAGE GASic DisTREss
In the six years the NGPA has been in force, many changes have oc-
curred within the energy markets of the United States. The world energy
crisis of 1973-74 helped spur a worldwide effort to secure non-OPEC sourc-
es of oil, eventually resulting in the discovery and development of large
producing fields in Alaska, Mexico and the North Sea.' 3" Another energy
crisis occurred in 1979, triggered by the Iranian Revolution. This crisis
caused world oil prices to rise dramatically between 1979 and 1981 to a
14See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, § 607, 15 U.S.C. 717z (1982); NGPA,
§ 303, 15 U.S.C. § 3363 (1982).
12NGPA, § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 3362 (1982).
I-NGPA, §§ 311(b), 312, 15 U.S.C. §§ 337a(b), 3372 (1982).
127NGPA, § 601(a)(1)(C), (a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1)(C), (a)(2) (1982).
128NGPA § 311(a), 15 U.S.C. § 3371(a) (1982).
'
2 The NGPA accomplishes this by not removing the sales of historic interstate gas sup-
plies from the Natural Gas Act jurisdiction unless such historic supplies qualify as new natural
gas, high-cost natural gas, or natural gas produced from a new, onshore production well.
NGPA, § 601(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 3431(a)(1)(B). Therefore, such historic interstate sup-
plies are subject to NGA abandonment requirements and cannot be transferred unless the
transferor obtains an abandonment certificate. See supra and accompanying text.
130YERGIN CRISIS, supra note 6, at 8-10; E. SHnPIo, MAcRo~coNomc ANALYSIS 540-41
(Sth ed. 1982) (hereinafter cited as SmAPIo ANALYSIS).
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level approximately three times what they were the day the NGPA was
enacted into law.131 Meanwhile, the United States phased out its price con-
trols on domestic oil supplies from mid-1979 to January 1981.132
The dramatic jump in world oil prices caused the market values of all
conventional energy sources to rise in concert. These increasing market
values stimulated greater energy production activity. Decontrol of domes-
tic oil prices reinforced this production trend, and unprecedented num-
bers of oil wells were drilled in 1979 through 1982. 3 The decontrol mech-
anism of the NGPA permitted natural gas prices to rise throughout this
period.13 However, since the NGPA pricing mechanism was premised on
the prediction that world oil prices would be only fifteen dollars per bar-
rel by 1985,135 the NGPA kept natural gas wellhead prices from rising as
fast as oil prices, except for wellhead prices of deregulated high cost gas.
As a consequence, production incentives on natural gas were not as gen-
erous as they were on oil, and natural gas reserve additions were not as
large as they otherwise might have been.136
HIlSee YERGiN CRIsIS, supra note 6, at 1, 3; Sarto ANALYSIS, supra note 130, at 540.
13rrhe Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163 § 18, 89 Stat. 871, 955(1975), extended mandatory price controls on domestically produced crude oil for forty months
beginning December 22, 1975, and extended discretionary price controls until Sept. 30, 1981.
As the EPAA's mandatory controls approached expiration, President Carter extended the
control period under his discretionary authority to provide for a gradual decontrol of all
oil and petroleum products from June 1, 1979, to Oct. 1, 1981. President Carter's address
to the nation of April 5, 1979, in 15 Pres. Doc. 609-14 (1979). President Reagan terminated
President Carter's phased decontrol and immediately removed price and allocations con-
trols from the petroleum industry on Jan. 28. 1981. Exec. Order No. 12287, 46 Fed. Reg.
9909 (1981). Allison, Energy Sectionalism: Economic Origins and Legal Responses, 38 Sw.
L. J. 703, 719#n.72 (1984).
133The total exploratory and development oil wells drilled during this period were 19,383
(1979); 27,026 (1980); 37,671 (1981); 40,301 (1982). Energy Information Administration Mon-
thly Energy Review, Pt. 5. Oil & Gas Resource Development 64 (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as April Energy Review.]
'"The national average wellhead natural gas prices rose steadily, $1.18 Mcf (1979), $1.59
Mcf (1980), $1.98 Mcf (1981), $2.62 (1983). Natural gas wellhead prices experienced some
softening in 1983, falling below the February $2.64 Mcf average until September, when the
average price rose to $2.70 Mcf. From September, 1983, through March, 1984, wellhead
prices have been spotty: $2.62 Mcf (Oc., 1983), $2.63 Mcf (Nov., 1983), $2.65 Mcf (Dec.,
1983), $2.72 Mcf (Jan., 1984), $2.64 Mcf (Feb., 1984), $2.66 Mcf (Mar., 1984). April Energy
Review, supra note 133, at 98.
L"See Ringleb, Natural Gas Producer Price Regulation Under the NGPA: Regulatory Failure,
Alternatives, and Reform, 20 Hous. L. Rev. 709, 712 n. 7 (1983).
13See FRcxsoN, NATURAL GAs AND TE NATURAL GAs POLICY AcT: A PRAGuATIc ANALYsIs
III, 2-6, 28, 53-59 (1981); United States Department of Energy, Securing America's Energy
Future-The National Energy Plan: -A Report to Congress Required by Title VIII of the
Department of Energy Organization Act, (Public Law 95-91) 5.6 (1981). See also April Energy
Review, supra note 133, showing that from 1979-1982 total exploratory and development
wells drilled for the year increased from 49,816 in 1979 to 85,795 in 1982, with the number
of oil wells increasing from 19,383 in 1979 to 40,301 in 1982, while the number of gas well
increased only from 14,681 in 1979 to 18,952 in 1982. (Dry holes account for wells unac-
counted for by oil and gas wells).
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Meanwhile, the high energy prices contributed to the high inflation the
United States experienced in 1979 through 1981, and were also factors in
the United States' recessions of 1979-80 and 1981-82. These recessions
caused domestic energy consumption to fall off significantly over the last
two years. 137 High energy prices caused the nation's energy consumers to
become more efficient than anyone imagined they would, and U.S. ener-
gy demands fell even more. 13s The convergence of stable or increasing en-
ergy supplies and lower energy demands has thus produced downward
pressures on domestic energy prices. Crude oil and petroleum products
prices have been very responsive to downward market pressures. 139
A. Sticky Gas Prices
Within domestic gas markets, a different scenario has occurred. A de-
liverability surplus has appeared nationwide and within the service areas
of most gas transmission and distribution companies. 140 Yet, contrary to
137Total energy consumption for the last 11 years was as follows:
Year Energy Consumption (Quads)
1973 74.212
1974 72.479
1975 70.485
1976 74.297
1977 76.215
1978 78.039
1979 78.845
1980 75.900
1981 73.940
1982 70.822
1983 70.638
Through April of 1984, 1984 energy consumption has been running well ahead of 1983's
pace. April Energy Review, supra note 133, Pt. 2, at 21.
138d. Also, recent trends in natural gas demand show that since the 1979 peak demand
of 20.24 tcf, domestic demand for gas has fallen steadily. This decline is attributable mainly
to "decreasing oil prices, conservation by natural gas users and reduced industrial activity."
United States Department of Energy, First Report Required by Section 123 of the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 2-1 through 2-3 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as DOE NGPA Report].
139
1981 1982 1983
Domestic Avg. Crude Oil Wellhead
Price* $31.77 $28.52 $26.19
Composite Refiner Acquisition Cost of Crude Oil* $35.24 $31.87 $28.99
Residual Fuel Oil Avg. Sales Price to End-Users? 75.6c 67.6c 65.1c
"Price in dollars per barrel
tPrice in cents per gallon excluding tax
April Energy Review, supra note 133, Pt. 9, at 87, 93.
14DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 2, 3, 2-4, 2-5. The DOE estimated that the
deliverability surplus, the difference between productive capacity and actual production,
peaked in 1983 at 3-5 TCF. The DOE further predicts that the surplus will decline to 1-3
TCF in 1984 due to increased consumption and reductions in drilling activity caused by the
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the mechanics of a free market, rigidities in natural gas industry contract-
ing customs, inflexibility in the regulation of gas transmission and distri-
bution companies, and the effects of partially decontrolling natural gas
wellhead prices have combined to cause natural gas wellhead and bur-
nertip prices to increase even in the face of the deliverability surplus.141
dampening effects of the surplus overhanging the natural gas market. See also, Inquiry on
Impacts of Special Marketing Programs on Natural Gas Companies and Consumers, 49 Fed,
Reg. 3193, 3193-95 (1984), noting that the surplus has been overhanging U.S. natural gas
markets since 1981.
2421d. Average wellhead natural gas prices rose steadily from an annual average of $1.59
Mcf in 1980 to $2.62 in 1983. Average end-user prices have also risen steadily over the same
period: $2.53 to $4.25 Mcf for industrial purchasers, $2.28 to $3.58 Mcf for electric power
plants, and $3.68 to $5.99 (est.) Mcf for residential consumers. April Energy Review, supra
note 133, Pt. 9, at 98.
These price increases have been stimulated by a variety of factors. First, some gas pur-
chasers have alleged that:
the combination of NGPA price deregulation of a small amount of total supplies
and the Commission's historic regulation of pipeline rates under the NGA, which
allows averaging, unduly subsidizeld the production of deregulated gas to the
detriment of the ultimate users. Since the price of this dereglated gas [was] allowed
to be "roled-in" with the price of less expensive supplies there is little incentive
to attempt to keep the price low through negotiation ....
NGPA Impacts, supra note 6, at 19,159-60. As a result, deregulated section 107 gas was
sold for prices as high as $7-10 per MMBTU. Id. at 19159.
Second, the gas shortage psychology engendered by the pre-NGPA gas shortages com-
bined with producers' desires to to reduce their risks on expensive new exploration and pro-
duction projects to cause an intense price and non-price competition for new gas supplies
since 1973. As a consequence, "many of the 1973-79 take-or-pay provisions require takes
up to 90% of the deliverability of the acreage dedicated to the contract." Review of Off-
system Sales Program; Informal Public Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. 37664, 37665 (1982). High
take-or-pay provisions have contributed to rising gas prices, because pipelines must either
take the contractual take-or-pay quantities or pre-pay for them at the contract price. Recently
pipelines have been faced with declining demands due to conservation, fuel switching and
recession, causing end user demands for natural gas to fall below the pipelines' take obliga-
tions. The resulting prepayment liability exposure has been estimated to be as high as $10.5
billion between 1982-1985. DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 3-6. Faced with this dilem-
ma, pipelines have sought to reduce their take-or-pay liabilities by increasing their rakes
of high-cost gas while reducing their takes of law cost gas. Id. at 3-4, 3-5; Take or Pay Pro-
visions in Gas Purchase Contracts- Statement of Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 57268 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Take-or-Pay Policy).
Third, most gas purchase contracts contain indefinite escalator price clauses which per-
mit producers to collect applicable NGPA ceiling prices. With NGPA ceiling prices
automatically increasing at a rate equal to or greater than the annual inflation rate, pur-
chasers face automatically increasing prices. See Governor Signs Measure to Limit Prices
on Gas Produced, Consumed within New Mexico, 12 ENERGY UsRs REP. (BNA) 251 (March
22, 1984).
Finally, the FERC has been relatively permissive in permitting pipelines to quickly pass
through their purchased gas acquisition costs to consumers. Their ability to pass through
their gas acquisition costs has reduced the pipelines incentives to hold down costs. Unitl
recently, the FERC attempted to provide pipelines with cost minimizing incentives by disallow-
ing expenses it found to be imprudently incurred. However, the NGPA eliminated the pruden-
cy standard and replaced it with a fraud and abuse standard which, as interpreted by the
FERC, is a considerably easier standard for the pipelines to meet. See Natural Gas; Fraud
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B. Industrial Load Losses
More recently, the prices in new natural gas contracts have gone
down,142 and some prices and other terms in existing contracts have been
renegotiated.143 While this downward movement of wellhead prices has
provided some relief from the upward pressures on burnertip prices, in
many cases this relief has been inadequate to prevent gas burnertip prices
from rising above the falling prices of residual fuel oil and other substi-
tutes for industrial uses of natural gas. 1" With their industrial gas bur-
nertip prices above market clearing levels, many gas distribution compa-
nies have lost industrial loads. These industrial load losses have forced
the distributing companies to impose greater fixed cost burdens on their
remaining customers, causing per unit delivered prices of gas to rise.1 45
C. Potential Price Fly-up
On January 1, 1985, the prices of nearly sixty percent of the nation's
flowing gas were decontrolled.246 With oil prices much higher than they
were predicted to be by the authors of the NGPA, many of the contracts
on these flowing gas supplies could produce wellhead prices well above
their December 31, 1984, NGPA price ceiling.147 The result could be a
Standard; Statement of Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 6253 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FERC Fraud
Std]. Under the new fraud and abuse standard, costs that would have been disallowed under
the prudency standard have been routinely allowed by FERC. See Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corp. Opin. No. 204, 26 F.E.R.C. 61,034 (Jan. 16, 1984); Columbia Gas Transmis-
sion Corp., Opin. No. 204-A, 26 F.E.R.C. 1 61,334 (Mar. 16, 1984).14Partly because of the decline in new gas contract prices, average wellhead prices in-
creased by only 2.4% in 1983. This represents a significant moderation in natural gas prices,
since from 1979 to 1982 average wellhead prices increased over a range of 14.1% to 24.2%.
DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 1, 1-1. Moreover, the projected change in wellhead
prices of high cost (section 107) gas for 1983 is a negative 14.2%. Id. at 1-1, 1-4.
14in response to U.S. Department of Energy inquiries, the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America reported that pipelines have successfully renegotiated some take-or-pay obliga-
tions, but "to date, pipelines report virtually no success in renegotiating pricing provisions
such as indefinite price escalator clauses and other control terms which will put upward
pressure on gas prices upon partial decontrol." 12 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 463 (May 31,
1984). See also DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138 at 5-1, 5-2.144Over the past three years, gas prices have moved closer to the prices of oil in all mar-
kets where the two fuels compete. The gap between the two fuels closed completely in the
industrial market before it reopened to a 51c per MMBTU differential in favor of gas in
January, 1984. From January, 1981, to January, 1984, the gap in the residual market nar-
rowed from $4.26 MMBTU to $1.71 per MMBTU. 12 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 494 (June
7, 1984). According to one commentator, "52 percent of all industrial users have the capa-
bility to switch to oil, . . . and about 75 percent of those have the capability to switch to
residential fuel oil." 12 ENERGY Usais REP. (BNA) 144 (Feb. 23,1984) [comments of Nicholas
J. Bush of the Natural Gas Supply Association]. Data indicate that in 1982 "317 billion cubic
feet of gas use was lost to oil... and 55 percent of that conversion was to residual fuel oil." Id.
1'%See FERC Fraud Std., supra note 141, at 6255-56.
1 See DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 6-3.147The primary concern is over the effects of indefinite price escalation clauses on natural
gas contract prices of supplies scheduled to be deregulated in 1985. Some escalators call for
[Vol. 37:1
NATURAL GAS
damaging fly-up in natural gas prices, taking them well above market clear-
ing prices at the wellhead and the burnertip.148
D. Future Gas Shortages
Present and prospective burnertip prices, in excess of natural gas mar-
ket clearing prices, is restricting the demand for natural gas supplies to
subefficient levels. Facing declining markets, gas transmission and distrib-
uting companies are trying to extricate themselves from pricing and tak-
ing obligations in their current contracts.149 In response to this downward
prices equal to 110% of fuel oil No. 2 under so-called oil parity clauses. By 1980, 59.1%
of all post-NGPA production volumes (production from wells subject to the NGPA's incen-
tive rates under sections 102, 103, 107, and 108) was being sold under contracts with dereg-
ulation clauses and indefinite price escalation provisions. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINIS-
TRATIoN, NATURAL GAS PROVUCEIWPURCHASER CoNTRAcrs AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON
THE NATURAL GAS MARxET 32, table 10 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as EIA CoNTRAcT
ANALYSIS). Furthermore, 21.5 percent of the gas volumes being sold under deregulation and
indefinite price escalation provisions were subject to oil parity clauses. Id. at 33, table 11.
Even more ominous was the fact that only 21% of such volumes was subject to contracts
with market out clauses, and only 9.7% was subject to contractually specified maximum
prices. Id. However, 57.2% of section 107 gas volumes subject to indefinite price escalation
was also subject to market out provisions. Id. Statistics such as these spurred fears that the
January 1, 1985, deregulation would cause average wellhead and burnertip gas prices to
soar above previous levels, and well above the levels of alternative fuels. See Means, A PE-
LIMINARY ANALYSIS O TuE NATURAL GAS MARxET-ORDERiNG PRoLEm 2, 25, 3445 (1981).
In quantitative terms, pipeline trade associations estimated in 1981 that average wellhead
prices could increase by 50 to 60% between 1984 and 1985. 12 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA)
336 (April 19, 1984).
141Recently, fears about a fly-up have diminished. The Interstate Natural Gas Associa-"
tion of America now predicts only a 9 to 12% increase in average wellhead prices in 1985.
The downscaling of the fly-up predictions stems from 3 factors: (1) More recent assessments
use lower forecasts for world oil prices because of a softening in world markets; (2) More
extensive information indicates that a smaller portion of deregulated gas is involved in con-
tracts governed by indefinite price escalators; and (3) More recent studies factor in the ef-
fects of market-out clauses. 12 ENERGY USERs RE. (BNA) 336 (April 19, 1984).
Recent DOE forecasts predict an even smaller increase in wellhead prices in 1985 (about
2-3%), and attribute these potential increases solely to demand increases and gas bubble
reductions. DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 6-3. Factors the DOE cites as providing
limits on a price fly-up include: (1) increasing wellhead price flexibility because the per-
centage of gas volumes subject to market-out provisions is increasing due to renegotiations,
and because most new gas purchase contracts contain market-out clauses, (2) increasing
gas-on-gas competition among pipelines, distribution companies, and producers for the
business of end-users; (3) continuing competitive pressures from alternative fuels, especial-
ly fuel-oil. Id. at 6-1 to 6-8.
I4Pipelines are attempting to shed onerous take-or-pay and pricing burdens by a variety
of methods, including: (1) invoking market-out clauses in high cost contracts to extinguish
the contracts or renegotiate their more burdensome terms; (2) attempting to get producers
to directly renegotiate pricing or taking terms or to insert market-out provisions in con-
tracts presently lacking buyer protection mechanisms; (3) initiating off-system sales to im-
prove their sales and to increase their capacity to honor their take obligations; (4) estab-
lishing special marketing programs designed to retain industrial loads, reduce take-or-pay
liabilities, and increase overall gas sales; and (5) refusing to honor their take-or-pay obliga-
tions where other avenues of burden reduction are unavailable. This has resulted in produc-
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pressure on contract prices and takes, producing gas wells are being shut-
in and new drilling rates have fallen drastically.s These falling drilling
rates are generating fears that a strong economic recovery or another Mid-
die East energy crisis could turn a deliverability surplus into shortages. 11
While reserve additions have exceeded production levels over the last three
years,152 with drilling rates down, reserve additions will fall to lower levels
and the deliverability of gas could decline significantly over the next few
years.' 5 3
E. The Bid-away Problem
In general, the NGPA price ceilings created a disparity between intra-
state pipelines and interstate pipelines in the gas acquisition costs. Prices
of gas flowing under contract on November 9, 1978, were essentially fro-
zen, except for regular inflation adjustments. Also, prices on flowing gas
were generally higher in the intrastate markets than they were in the in-
terstate markets. 54 Thus, the real prices of old intrastate gas have been
ers either forgiving the obligation, thereby implicitly renegotiating, or filing suit and confront-
ing pipeline defenses based on force majeure theories. DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138,
at 5-1 to 5-10. When avoidance of onerous contractual obligations has been too difficult,
pipelines have sought to reduce their financial hardships by taking high cost gas instead
of low cost gas; the FERC allows direct recovery of the costs of gas actually taken but re-
quires capitalization of take-or-pay prepayments, the ultimate recovery of which is uncertain.
See Take-or-Pay Policy, supra note 141; DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 3-4, 3-5, 5-4.
'"For example, in 1983 a recent Merrill Lynch report states that new drilling declined about
17.7% in 1983 and projects another 10.3% decline in 1984. 12 ENERGY UsEs REP. (BNA)
224 (March 15, 1984). Gas wells are being shut-in as pipelines attempt to ration their declin-
ing demands among their contractual suppliers with the aid of, or maybe more properly,
under the command of state conservation commissions. See 11 ENERGY Usn REF. (BNA)
710 (July 14, 1983). See also Inquiry into Purchasing Practices of Interstate Pipelines-In-
formal Public Conference, 48 Fed. Reg. 25, 264 (1983).51Opinions about impending gas shortages range from producers allegations that short-
ages are inevitable sometime within the next three (3) years, 12 ENERGY USERs REP. (BNA)
312 (April 12, 1984) [Statements of Donald P. Mitchell, Vice President-processing and
marketing for the Louisiana Land and Exploration Company; Stuart C. Mut, Sr. Vice Presi-
dent-engineering and operations, Arco Oil & Gas Co.] to those who flatly state that the
current gas glut is a demand-side phenomenon which has ended gas shortages for good.
See 12 ENERGY Usus REP. (BNA) 407 (May 10, 1984) [Statement of James T. Jensen, Presi-
dent of Jensen Associates Inc.]; Tussing & Barlow, A Survival Strategy for Gas Companies
in the Post-OPEC Era, Pub. Util. Fort. Feb. 3, 1983,13-14.
1S"The American Gas Association reported that for 1983 additions to reserves exceeded
production by 6 percent. For the past three years reserve additions have exceeded produc-
tion about 7 percent. Excluding Prudhoe Bay, since the enactment of the NGPA, reserve
additions have averaged 96 percent of production. For the period 1968-78, reserve addi-
tions averaged only 48 percent of production. 12 ENERGY UsEs REP. (BNA) 449 (May 23,
1984).
2$Supra note 151. In a recent report, Merrill Lynch predicted that natural gas shortages
could occur as early as 1986 as the result of rising gas demands, lower drilling rates, and
overestimates of deliverability from existing sources over the near future. Merrill Lynch ex-
pressed especial concern over the negative impacts on future deliverability of the high pro-
duction rates in the Gulf of Mexico. 12 ENERGY Uss REP. (BNA) 224 (March 15, 1984).
'See NGPA Impacts supra note 6, at 19, 159.
[Vol. 37:1
19851 NATURAL GAS
permanently frozen at levels higher than the real prices of old interstate
gas. Exacerbating this gas acquisition cost disparity is the fact that the
NGPA deregulation mechanism on January 1, 1985 decontrolled more in-
trastate gas than interstate gas.155
The importance of this disparity in historic gas acquisition costs between
intrastate pipelines and interstate pipelines lies in the prices each pipeline
can pay for new gas supplies. Pipelines with the lowest acquisition costs
on existing inventories can bid higher prices for new gas supplies and can
still keep their burnertip prices at or below market clearing levels by us-
ing their lower gas inventory values to cushion the impact of their more
expensive new supplies.lss With their lower historic gas acquisition costs,
interstate pipelines have, in fact, bid away a disproportionate share of
new gas supplies from the intrastate pipelines,157 leaving intrastate pipe-
15s1t has been estimated by the Department of Energy that the percentage of intrastate
gas that will be decontrolled under the NGPA equals 60% in 1985, 76% in 1987, and 88%
in 1990. Comparable figures for the interstate market are 54% in 1985, 64% in 1987, and
75% in 1990. 0ff-system sales-Statement of Policy, 23 FERC 61, 140, at 61,315 n.21 (April
25, 1983) (Comm. Richard, concurring).
1511d. at 61,309, 61,313.
15Evidence of the bid-away problem in major intrastate markets was provided by Texas
and Louisiana during congressional hearings on natural gas pricing policies in 1982. In Texas,
the variance among intrastate pipelines in gas acquisition costs resulted in an average price
differential of $1.68 per Mcf to $2.66 per Mcf in 1980. The Texas interstates also had vari-
ances among them, but at lower levels (49¢ per Mcf to $2.15 per Mcf). Texas Energy and
Natural Resources Advisory Council, Impact of the NGPA on Current and Projected Natural
Gas Markets, in Natural Gas Issues (Pt. I-Vol. 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fossil
and Synthetic Fuels of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
1400, 1435 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Texas NGPA Impact). The intrastate market in Texas
is losing reserve position relative to the interstate market. Six major Texas intrastates supp-
ly more than 60% of the gas consumed in Texas, but have cumulative reserve additions
equaling less than 50% of the state's total cumulative reserve additions. Id. at 1437. The
reserve/production ratio of Texas intrastates has fallen steadily from 1978 to 1981 from 9.34
to 6.18. Id. The RIP ratio slippage is even greater for the Texas Gulf Coast Region over
the same time period-8.08 in 1978 to 4.74 in 1981. Id. at 1438. At current production levels,
the U.S. as a whole in 1982 had 57 years of remaining supply as compared with 36 years
for Texas and 29 years for Louisiana. Id.
Louisiana data show a similar profile for the Louisiana gas markets. In March of 1982,
the cost of purchased gas averaged $3.45 per Mcf for Louisiana intrastates as compared with
$2.64 per Mcf for Louisiana interstates. Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, the
Impact of the NGPA on Intrastate Markets in Louisiana, in Natural Gas Issues (Pt. 1-Vol.
2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels of the House Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1136,1172 (1983) [hereinafter cited as La. NGPA
Impacts]. In 1980, the discrepancy in average cost of purchased gas between Louisiana in-
trastates and interstates was $2.60 per Mcf to $1.88 per Mcf. In 1981, the differential was
$3.20 to $2.41 per Mcf. Id. at 1174-75. These price differentials are largely attributable to
the differences in prices paid for old gas by the intrastates and interstates. As of March,
1982, the old gas acquisition cost differential was $2.75 per Mcf for the intrastatse as com-
pared with $1.42 per Mcf for the interstates. Id. at 1176. The intrastates have had to bid
primarily for deep gas primarily in their attempts to replace declining deliverability. As a
consequence, they have lost much of their old gas cushions and are experiencing difficulty
in outbidding interstates for additional gas supplies. Id. at 1177, 1183, 1187. Symptomatic
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lines and their customers facing potential deliverability shortages. The bid-
away problem is further compounded by the fact that the NGPA and the
NGA provide greater access to all supplies of gas to interstate pipelines
than they do to intrastate pipelines.lss
VI. How Do You SPELL R-E-L-I-E-F7
A. The Competitive Brombide-An Introduction
To deflate the gas bubble, blunt a price spike, and minimize economic
dislocations, the nation must modify its natural gas practices, policies,
and market structures. These policies and structures were established to
protect investors and consumers during the gas industry's developmental
phase and to avoid gas shortages at all costs during the turbulent 1970's.
In this regard, the NEA has made important contributions to improving
the nation's understanding of its natural gas policy problems by initiating
enough price reform so that the truly great responsiveness to price of pro-
ducers and consumers could be demonstrated. It is now particularly im-
portant for gas consumers, all segments of the gas supply system, and
regulators to understand that it is no longer possible, much less desirable,
for the natural gas market to be insulated from vigorous competition with
alternative energy sources and conservation. Even gas-on-gas competi-
tion may now be desirable.
of the intrastates' bidding difficulties is the decline of their share of total proved reserves
in Louisiana from 41% in 1978 to 32% in 1980. Id. at 1159.
LSSee supra notes 25-27, 124-29 and accompanying text. Gas is interstate in nature if it
is sold across state lines, dedicated to interstate commerce by a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity, or commingled with gas already in interstate commerce, Texas NGPA
Impact, supra note 157, at 1447, unless such gas is sold under a Hinshaw exception or in-
volves gas not dedicated to interstate commerce as of Nov. 8, 1978, and sold directly by
an out-of-state producer to an intrastate pipeline or by an intrastate pipeline to an out-of-
state end-user. Id. at 1449. Moreover, gas from the federal O.C.S. is by definition interstate
gas. Id. at 1451. As a consequence, an intrastate pipeline can get access to non-exempt in-
terstate gas only if (1) it is sold off-system pursuant to FERC off-system sale authority; (2) it
has received an abandonment certificate under section 7 NGA proceedings, o; (3) in the
case of contracts for new gas the original purchaser has exercised its right of first refusal.
Id. at 1456-57. The Texas Energy and Natural Resources Advisory Council alleges that:
[Tlhe F.E.R.C. has taken a very conservative approach to granting abandonments.
The F.E.R.C., historically, has granted abandonments of facilities reaching fields
which are no longer productive. Hence, dedicated fields are never again availa-
ble as long-term supplies to the intrastate markets.
Consistent with its NGPA authority, the F.E.R.C. has liberally endorsed off-sys-
tem sales from the interstate market into the intrastate market....
As a result ... of these two policies, the interstate market has had a dual ad-
vantage. By allowing surpluses to be sold into the intrastate market, the F.E.R.C.
is provid a virtually penalty-free environment for interstate pipelines to hoard
supplies. Interstates have bought available supplies at almost any price, paying
no penalties for such inefficient buying behavior because short-term surpluses may
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Competition at the burnertip is now unavoidable. With oil prices de-
regulated, producers of fuel oil are offering bargain prices to users who
could potentially use multiple fuels in order to help reduce the oil deliver-
ability surplus.159 Energy users of all classes are finding energy conserva-
tion to be a good investment. Gas consuming businesses in international
competition are limited to what they can pay for natural gas by the cost
structures of their most efficient foreign competitors. 160
B. The Congressional Stalemate
Because of the perceived problems within natural gas markets, which
many attribute to the NEA, numerous revisions to the NEA have been
proposed over the past two years. Like the shortage debates of the seven-
ties, the legislative proposals range from national deregulation of all well-
head prices to total deregulation. However, unlike the debates of the sev-
enties, natural gas contracting customs and pipeline regulation methods
are also being critically examined.
(1) Moderating Prices
Those who are primarily concerned with the stickiness of natural gas
burnertip prices and the potential price fly-up support the following pro-
posals:
1. regulation of all gas wellhead prices or the continuation of the
NGPA's phased deregulation;
2. declaration that indefinite price escalation and take-or-pay contract
terms are void because they work against the public interest in hav-
ing adequate gas supplies at reasonable prices; and
3. modification of NGA regulation of interstate pipelines so that pipe-
line purchased gas acquisition costs can be more strictly scrutinized.
Through these proposals, the price critics, primarily from nonproducing
states, hope to keep natural gas wellhead and burnertip prices below mar-
ket clearing levels, recapture lost industrial loads, force pipelines and pro-
ducers to shoulder most of the risks inherent in dynamic energy markets,
be sold in the off-system intrastate market when their markets collapse.
Id. at 1457.
S19See Natural Gas Issues- (Pt. 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fossil and Synthet-
ic Fuels of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 879-80 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Gas Issues I (testimony of George H. Lawrence, Pres. -American Gas
Association); Natural Gas Issues- (Pt. 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fossil and Syn-
thetic Fuels of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 173 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Gas Issues III (statement of Ray J. Lynch- Pres. of Michigan Wisconsin
Pipe Line Co.).
I-TIhis is especially true of the petro-chemical and refining industries that are heavily con-
centrated along the Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coast Regions. See Texas NGPA Impacts,
supra note 157, 1406-10.
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and prevent the producers of old gas from selling their supplies at market
values above NGPA price ceilings.161
161Most groups concerned with high natural gas prices oppose total decontrol achieved
by deregulating gas not subject to decontrol under the NGPA. As one opponent put it, "In
fact, what happens under deregulation is the dollars all flow to the South and the heat all
flows to the North. Unfortunately, that heat is political heat and pricing heat and not the
gas that we so sorely need at reasonable prices." Economic Impact of Natural Gas Deregula-
tion; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (Feb. 4, 1982) [herein-
after cited as Deregulation Impactl (statement of Bernard M. Fox, V. Pres. and General Man-
ager-Northeast Utilities). Groups sharing this viewpoint, include:
1. Organized Labor-which fears that natural gas deregulation will cause infla-
tion, unemployment and taxes to increase and economic growth and govern-
mental services to decreases. See Economic Impact of Natural Gas Decontrol;
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resourc-
es of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-3
[hereinafter cited as Decontrol Impacts] (statement entitled AFL-CIO ISSUE
ALERTI Natural Gas Deregulation: Another Oil Industry Swindle);
2. Low-Income Lobbying Organizations-who contend that increased energy pric-
es produce disproportionately negative impact on low-income households, of-
ten resulting in them being unable to acquire gas in order to heat their homes
and still be able to acquire other essential goods and services. Besides oppos-
ing decontrol, these groups lobby for increased funding of low-income
weatherization and energy conversion programs. See Deregulation Impact,
supra at 178-88 (statement of Toni Hurst, Project Director, Low-Income Ener-
gy Advocacy Project); Decontrol Impact, supra at 110-17 (Statement of Steven
P. Hershey, Counsel for Action Alliance of Sr. Citizens, Association of Com-
munity Organizations for Reform Now, and the Tenant Action Group);
3. General Consumer Advocacy Groups-which contend that natural gas decon-
trol will cause unemployment to increase, massive transfers of wealth from
energy-users to energy producers, and very little, if any, economic growth.
As one group puts it, "with a massive transfer of wealth to gas producers....
the pie might get a little bigger, but even after 15 years only those who own
gas related capital services ... will be better off. Everyone else .... labor
and owners of non-gas related capital services, would still be worse off after
15 years." See Deregulation Impact, supra at 127; Id. at 120-47 (Consumer En-
ergy Council of America, Natural Gas Price Deregulation: A Case of Trickle
Up Economics); Id. at 74-88 (Citizens/Labor Energy Coalition, Pipeline to Disas-
ter: The Impact of Natural Gas Decontrol on American Jobs);
4. Institutions of Higher Education- which fear that high energy bills are handi-
capping their efforts to provide an affordable college education to American
students, and ask that if deregulation occurs, Congress act to eliminate pass-
through and price guarantees producers, transmission companies and distri-
bution companies currently can use to impose high risks and high prices on
end-users. See Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 212-15 (Statement of Christopher
Crittenden, Director-Higher Education Energy Task Force);
5. Marginal Farmers-which fear their production costs will rise at a time when
their crop prices will not support any further expenditure increases. See Gas
Issues II, supra note 159, at 817-20 (statement of Harold Wright, President - In-
diana Farmers Union);
6. Distribution Companies Served by Interstate Gas Supplies-which fear ac-
celerated load losses and bad debt write off losses should decontrol be accelerated
by administrative decision or legislation. Distribution companies have also been
extremely critical of pipeline-producer contracting practices, especially take-
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(2) Avoiding the Bid-away
Those primarily concerned about the bid-away problem support pro-
posals:
1. allowing the prices of all old gas categories to rise to new gas price
ceiling levels or market clearing levels within the context of a pro-
gram which decontrols all natural gas wellhead prices over a 2-3 year
period, and
2. modifying current restrictions in the NGA and NGPA which pre-
vent the free transfer of gas supplies among pipelines and between
the intrastate and interstate markets.
or-pay and indefinite pricing contract provisions, and the privileges permit-
ting pipelines to flow through most of their purchased gas acquisition costs
to distribution consumers. Distribution companies are also concerned with the
level of funding for low income energy assistance programs. See Consumer
Impact of NGPA and Proposals for Accelerated Decontrol of Wellhead Gas
Prices, reprinted in Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 39-57 (prepared statement
of Stephen Schachman-Chair, Associated Gas Distributors; Pres. & C.E.O. -
Philadelphia Gas Works); Deregulation Impact, supra at 57-8 (prepared state-
ment of Bernard M. Fox-V. Pres. & Gen. Manager, Northeast Utilities);
7. Interstate Transmission Companies-which are primarily concerned about the
impacts on end-user prices of indefinite price escalator and take-or-pay con-
tract provisions. Interstate transmission companies have incurred large take-
or-pay penalties and load losses. They generally recommend that legislation
focus on remedying the problems created by producer contracts before ac-
celerated decontrol is given any emphasis. Interstate transmission companies
also support the preservation of purchased gas acquisition costs flow through,
repeal of incremental pricing, repeal of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act, enhanced government energy research funding. See Gas Issues II, supra
note 159, at 8-36 (statement of Jerome J. McGrath-Pres., Interstate Natural
Gas Association of America); Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 868-913 (state-
ment of George H. Lawrence - Pres., American Gas Association);
8. States with Economies Heavily Reliant on Interstate Gas Supplies -which fear
that gas prices at the burnertip are already at the market-clearing level within
their economies, a condition that could be exacerbated by accelerated decon-
trol. Most of these states feel that the NGPA has solved their shortage prob-
lems, so that decontrol of old gas will merely raise consumer prices without
providing any corresponding supply benefits. These states deny that bidding
disparities exist between them and intrastate markets, and therefore resist the
decontrol of old gas as a way of eliminating bidding disparities. To the extent
regional disparities exist, consuming states advocate their elimination by restrict-
ing or prohibiting the use of indefinite price escalators and take-or-pay con-
tract requirements, restoring the prudency standard for judging the validity
of pipelines purchased gas acquisition costs for pass-through purposes, encourag-
ing liberalized off-system sales procedures, and increasing federal support for
alternative energy research and low-income energy assistance program. See
Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 1231-58 (statement of Priscilla C. Grew -
Commissioner, California Public Utilities Commission); Id. at 1296-1346 (state-
ment of Christine A. Hansen-Commissioner, Iowa State Commerce Com-
mission); Id. at 1280-92 (statement of Eric J. Schneidewind- Chair., Michigan
Public Service Commission); Id. at 1223-25 (statement of Edward H. Hynes-
Commissioner, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities); Id. at 1352-57 (statement
of Willie J. Nunnery-Commissioner, Wisconsin Public Service Commission);
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Proponents of these proposals, mostly located within the old intrastate
markets, hope to eliminate the old gas cushion provided by the NGPA's
vintaged price ceilings and partial decontrol mechanisms. 162 The equal ac-
cessibility proposals are designed to provide all purchasers with equal ac-
cess to O.C.S. gas, gas subject to NGA abandonment certification pro-
ceedings, and gas subject to the NGPA's first right of refusal require-
ments.163 The accessibility proposals would also alter the off-system sales
policies of the FERC and state public utility commissions so that gas can
Deregulation Impact, supra at 271-74 (statement of Bradford S. Chase-Acting
Undersecretary for Energy, Connecticut Office of Policy and Management).
Note also, producing states have not been without their own pricing concerns,
mostly with respect to price increases attributable to indefinite price escala-
tors. Oklahoma, Kansas, and New Mexico have passed legislation limiting the
effects of indefinite price escalators. Oklahoma Natural Gas Price Protection
Act, OKLA. STAT., tit. 52, §§ 260.1-260.13 (West Supp. 1984-85); Kansas Natural
Gas Price Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to 55-1455 (1983); New
Mexico Natural Gas Pricing Act, N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-7-11 to 62-7-23 (1978).
The validity of state restrictions on indefinite price escalators in intrastate gas
purchase contracts was upheld in Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v. Kansas Power
& Light Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 4106 (1983). Moreover, a blue ribbon Texas energy
policy panel has recommended that federal legislation be enacted to restrict
the operation of indefinite price escalators and take-or-pay contract provisions.
See Texas NGPA Impacts, supra note 157, at 1466-67.
162Proponents of Bid-away proposals include:
1. Organizations whose members are spread out all over the country and conse-
quently face large disparities in prices of and accessibility to gas supplies. Such
groups include the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners, Gas Issues 1, supra
note 157, at 83-98 (statement of Richard J. Bryan); the American Association
of School Administrators, Id. at 194-209 (statement of J. Maxey Bacchus); the
National Association of Manufacturers, Id. at 67-78 (statement of Gary S. Fur-
man).
2. The Gulf Coast States of Texas and Louisiana, whose industries are heavily
reliant on natural gas supplied by intrastate pipelines. See Texas NGPA Im-
pacts, supra note 157; La. NGPA Impact, supra note 157.
3. Industries which must use natural gas as a feedstock and which are heavily
concentrated within the Gulf Coast intrastate markets. A prime example is the
chemical manufacturing industry, see Gas Issues 1, supra note 159, at 405-500
(statement of James D. Beatty).
4. Intrastate pipelines, See Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 281-305 (Statement
of J. L. Terrill-Pres. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp.).
5. Interstate Pipelines experiencing gas supply and pricing problems, see Natural
Gas Contract Renegotiations and FERC Authorities: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Fossil & Synthetic Fuls of the House Comm. on Energy & Com-
merce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 434-50 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Contract Har-
ings) (Response of Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. by Jack H. Ray-Pres.).
6. Independent natural gas producers, see Gas Issues II, supra note 158, at 514-38
(statement of David W. Wilson-Pres., Association for Equal Access to Natural
Gas Markets and Supplies); Id. at 542-54 (statement of Danny H. Conk-
lin-Chair., Natural Gas Committee of Independent Petroleum Association
of America).
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be freely transferred among pipelines and distribution companies. 16
(3) Retaining Industrial Loads
To help pipelines and distribution companies retain the industrial loads,
proposals have been made for:
1. eliminating the NGPA's incremental pricing mechanism, which es-
tablishes a rate setting policy that imposes higher rate burdens on
industrial users;
2. repealing the PIFUA's restrictions on the present and future industrial
use of gas; and
3. altering rate design methodologies so that transmission companies
and distribution companies can quickly adapt their industrial rates
on natural gas to meet changes in the prices of competitive fuels.
Sponsors believe these proposals will provide pipelines with the op-
portunity to retain industrial loads currently being lost to other energy
sources through intense interfuel competition. 165 By preserving the indus-
'-See Texas NGPA Impacts, supra note 157, at 1442-57; see also supra note 158 and ac-
companying text.
'"SThe case against incremental pricing has been well summarized by the American Gas
Association (AGA), as follows:
Incremental pricing was intended to send "market signals" to producers from
non-exempt users so as to restrain wellhead price increases. These market signals
do not occur, however, because the system operates to charge non-exempt end-
users the maximum rate regardless of what prices are bid at the wellhead. In part
this is because most states have raised non-exempt end-users rates to the max-
imum level as part of normal state ratemaking procedures. There is, therefore,
no capability to increase non-exempt end-user rates through incremental pricing.
The second factor leading to the failure of incremental pricing -and a large part
of the reason the system acts to charge non-exempt users the maximum rate re-
gardless of wellhead price bids- is that the surcharge is too great to be absorbed
by non-exempt end-users....
Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 868, 883-84 (statement of George H. Lawrence-Pres.,
American Gas Association) (emphasis added).
As to the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, the AGA states that:
The industrial market is, however, the gas utility industry's major potential source
of growth -and the FUA blocks gas competition. This market distortion is un-
necessary in light of gas availability and, therefore we recommend modification
of FUA to allow gas to be burned in new industrial facilities.
Id. at 885.
An overall summary of the case against these gas marketing restrictions was provided
in the testimony of the Colorado Interstate Gas Co., as follows:
The prohibitions against gas use in the Fuel Use Act and the incremental pricing
provisions of Title II of the NGPA are out of tune with the demand-limited nature
of our business and unnecessarily restrict the economic use of gas.
Gas Issues 1I, supra note 159, at 37, 41 (Statement of Peter J. King, Jr., -Pres., Colorado
Interstate Gas Co.,) (emphasis added).
The rate flexibility issue boils down to the fact that
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trial loads of transmission and distribution companies, these proposals
will enable residential users to avoid the fixed cost expense they would
have to bear in the absence of the industrial load.166 The removal of in-
dustrial gas use restrictions and prohibitions may give producers an ex-
panded market sufficient to take up the current deliverability slack now
depressing gas drilling rates. 167
These proposals are more sectoral than sectionalist in orientation. Sup-
port for them comes primarily from pipelines and distribution companies
anxious to retain their industrial loads168 and from large industrial boiler
fuel users who wish to take advantage of the current stiff competition
among fuels used by industrial customers.16 9 However, in their search for
ways to dissipate the current gas glut, producers have made the repeal
of incremental pricing and the PIFUA top legislative priorities.1 70 Opposi-
tion to these proposals comes largely from organized consumer lobbying
groups, which fear that the residential ratepayer is a captive customer who
will be forced to subsidize industrial users if these proposals prevail.171
[P]ipelines... can propose virtually any rate structure [they) feel appropriate.
The process of review and approval, however, is often long and arduous, so it
has been difficult for the industry to be responsive to certain market competition
in a timely manner (e.g. dump prices for residual fuel oil). We believe that rate
structures and filing procedures which are flexible and timely to meet changing
market conditions are necessary. If they do not have the flexibility to meet com-
petitive conditions, particularly in the industrial sector, pipelines and distribu-
tors will unnecessarily lose loads, and rates charged to residential and commer-
cial customers would be forced up as a consequence.
Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 167, 174-75 (statement of Ray J. Lynch-Pres., Michigan-Wis-
consin Pipe Line Co.).1"Id.
167See Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 357, 386 (statement of Nicholas J. Bush -Pres.,
Natural Gas Supply Association); Id. at 542, 543-44 (statement of Danny H. Conklin-
Chair., Natural Gas Committee of Independent Petroleum Association of America).168See Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 819-52 (statement of Stephen Schachman- Chair.,
Associated Gas Distributors); Id. at 868-913 (statement of George H. Lawrence-Pres., Amer-
ican Gas Association); Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 8-36 (statement of Jerome J.
McGrath-Pres., Interstate Natural Gas Association of America); Id. at 37-48 (statement
of Peter J. King, Jr. -Pres., Colorado Interstate Gas Co.); Id. at 167-89 (statement of Ray
J. Lynch-Pres., Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.); Contract Hearings, supra note 162,
at 161-78 (written statement of El Paso Natural Gas Co.); Id. at 434-50 (statement of Jack
H. Ray-Pres., Tennessee Gas Transmission); Deregulation Impacts, supra note 161, at 137-58
(statement of Thomas M. Matthews-V. Pres., Tennessee Gas Transmission).
169See Gas Issues I, supra note 159, at 67-78 (statement of Gary S. Furman on behalf of
the National Association of Manufacturers); Id. at 83-98 (statement of Richard J. Bryan on
behalf of Council of Industrial Boiler Owners); Id. at 405-20 (statement of James D. Beatty
on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Association).
"'OSee supra note 167.
lnThe cases of Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer
Energy Council of America, 77 L. Ed.2d 1402 (1983) (Consumer constitutional attacks on
the legislative veto of the FERC's incremental pricing Phase II order sustained), and Ohio
Ass'n of Community Action Agencies v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 654 F.2d 811
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In terms of sectionalism, the producing states, which are among the
states most heavily dependent on natural gas as a fuel for their industrial
and electrical power generation sectors, 172 strongly supported plans to help
industrial and power generation users have greater access to natural gas
supplies. 173
The industrial states of the north central region are also heavily depend-
ent on natural gas as an industrial fuel. 17 Therefore, the north central
region, as it should, provides strong support for industrial load saving
proposals.17s However, many of these same states are among the most
dependent on natural gas for residential uses.' 76 Due to this concern for
both industrial and residential ratepayers, the north central region has not
supported attempts by southwestern states to exempt electric power plants
from the PIFUA's restrictions on gas usage in new power plants. 77
(4) Avoiding Gas Shortages
Future gas supply concerns have been addressed by proposals which
(D.C. Cir 1981) (Consumer challenge to the FERCs authority to exempt industrial users from
incremental pricing surcharges that would raise their delivered prices above those of fuel
oil no. 6 rebuffed) illustrate organized consumer action groups' opposition to cutbacks in
the NGPA's incremental pricing system. Senator Bumpers of Arkansas, in recent Senate hear-
ings on proposed natural gas legislation, stated his opposition to repeal of the Powerplant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act's restrictions on gas use by saying: "this bill repeals that part
of the Fuel Use Act that restricts the use of natural gas to premium uses, which I have always
strongly favored." Natural Gas Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1983). By premium uses, Senator Bumpers
refers to the high priority uses consistently protected by FPC, FERC and Congressional natural
gas curtailment policies. See supra notes 47-50, 120-22 and accompanying text.
172Supra notes 72 and 104. The gas producing states of Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas
were all over 65% dependent on natural gas to fuel electric power generation fuel as of 1980.
See STATE ENERGY DATA REPORT, STATISTICAL TABLES AND TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS, ANNUAL
July, 1982 (DOE/EIA-3164-39) [hereinafter cited as STATE DATA).
273Supra notes 72 & 104, 11 ENERGY UsEas REP. (BNA) 756 (July 28, 1983).
174The industrial sectors of 10 north central states are at least 19% dependent upon natu-
ral gas as a fuel source, causing them to be ranked among the nation's 26 most gas depen-
dent industrial sectors. These states, listed by rank and percentage dependent, include: Ne-
braska (8th-29.89%), Iowa (10th-28.4%), Wisconsin (11th-28.15%), Michigan
(14th-25.79%), Illinois (15th-25.1%), Minnesota (18th-22.69%), Missouri
(22nd-20.49%), Pennsylvania (24th-19.24%), Indiana (25th-19.04%), Ohio
(26th-19.03%). STATE DATA, supra note 172.
173The vote on H.R. 655 to veto the FERCs Phase II of incremental pricing passed by a
vote of 370 to 34. Of the 34 negative votes, 10 came from New York, 7 from California,
3 each from Massachusetts and New Jersey, 2 each from Connecticut, Illinois and Ohio,
and 1 each from Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island and West Virginia. 126 CONG.
REc. H3855 (1980). See also 11 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 756 (July 28, 1985).
276The residential sectors of 10 north central states are at least 33 % dependent on natural
gas as a fuel source, causing them to rank among the nation's 16 most gas dependent resi-
dential sectors. By rank and percentage these 10 states are: Illinois (2d-54.57%), Michigan
(3d -54.11%), Ohio (6th-46.56%), Nebraska (9th-39.14%), Indiana (10th-37%), Mis-
souri (12th-36.09%), Iowa (13th-35.8%), Wisconsin (14th-35.75%), Minnesota
(15th-35.66%), and Pennsylvania (16th-33.97%). STAT DATA, supra note 172.
I'"See 11 ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 756 (July 28, 1983).
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would: (1) decontrol all categories of natural gas over a short phase-out
period; (2) eliminate the NGPA's incremental pricing provisions; (3) re-
peal the PIFUA; and (4) facilitate direct sales of gas between producers
and industrial users by requiring pipelines to act as contract carriers.
These proposals focus on promoting the efficiency of natural gas pro-
duction and consumption.178 The decontrol proposals are designed to per-
mit producers to maximize their sales revenues by engaging in drilling oper-
ations that produce the most hydrocarbons at the lowest possible cost rath-
er than by matching drilling operations with the characteristics of vari-
ous statutory wellhead pricing categories in order to qualify for the high-
est possible ceiling prices. 179 The other proposals are designed to insure
that producers are allowed to sell gas to anyone who can pay for it and
to insure that the markets in which gas is sold are defined by price com-
178Among the groups most concerned about efficiency as a natural gas policy goal are:
(1) producers of varying sizes. See Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 375-60 (state-
ment of Nicholas J. Bush- Pres., Natural Gas Supply Association); Id. at 403,
404, 406-08, 417-19 (statement of Perry 0. Barber, Jr. on behalf of the Do-
mestic Petroleum Council);
(2) Large end-users in geographically widespread industries. See Gas Issues 1, supra
note 159, at 67, 77-8 (statement of Gary S. Furman on behalf of the National
Association of Manufacturers); Id. at 83, 86-88, 95 (statement of Richard J.
Bryan on behalf of the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners); Id. at 405, 407,
411-12 (statement of James D. Beatty on behalf of the Chemical Manufac-
turers Association);
(3) non-marginal farmers. See Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 814-16 (statement
of James Barnett-Director, Natural Resources Dept. of Indiana Farm Bureau,
Inc.).
179As one Congressional testifier has eloquently stated:
Reliance upon the marketplace results in the efficient and methodical explora-
tion for production of natural gas resources. Producers will direct their efforts
toward exploration for natural gas which can be produced and marketed for a
profit at the prevailing market price. Geologists, geophysicists, and other indus-
try experts will evaluate individual prospects for exploration dollars on the basis
of maximizing production and reserves discoveries for each dollar expended (more
"bang for the buck"), without having to fit their decisions into the pricing
pigeonholes created by the NGPA. Gas which cannot be sold for a profit at that
price will not be produced, and producers will not endeavor to discover gas un-
marketable at current prices, nor should they, for if consumers need more expen-
sive supplies the market price would increase to elicit them.
Resources expended in the search for the production - or importation - of un-
economic gas supplies are unwisely spent. If such gas is successfully marketed,
through externally imposed distortions, consumers are penalized to the extent that
the price exceeds the value really placed upon the commodity. In short, free-mar-
ket-generated incentives encourage natural gas producers to perform each func-
tion, including exploration, at an optimum level determined by consumer prefer-
ences. The market is able to adjust rapidly to changing supply and demand con-
ditions, while a legislative or regulatory framework cannot make these adjust-
ments so timely or efficiently. Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 359-96 (statement
of Nicholas J. Bush-Pres., Natural Gas Supply Association).
Accord Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 406-07, 417-18 (statement of Perry 0. Barber, Jr.
on behalf of the Domestic Petroleum Council).
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petition instead of legislative and institutional restrictions on natural gas
uses.180
Needless to say, this package of proposals receives heavy support from
producing states.18 1 Yet, even among producing states, the deregulation
proposals are getting mixed reviews. The same states which favor federal
natural gas deregulation have taken legislative and administrative steps
to insulate their consumers from some of the impacts of phased deregula-
tion under the NGPA.18 2
To date, no mix of these proposals has attracted the consensus neces-
sary for Congress to enact modifications in the NEA's natural gas poli-
cies.18 3 As a result, the private sector and state and federal regulatory agen-
cies have been interacting on an ad hoc basis to improvise relief from gas
bubble distress.
'-See generally supra notes 157-58 for a discussion of restrictions impeding intrastate pipe-
lines' access to old interstate gas supplies and new gas supplies. General limitations on the
free flow of gas include:
a. abandonment certification and first right of refusal requirements applicable
to the tramerability of gas supplies dedicated to interstate commerce. See supra
note 158; Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 291-93 (testimony of J. L. Ter-
ril-Pres. of Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp.).
b. the bid-away problems caused by the practice of vintaging gas prices prior to
the enactment of the NGPA, thereby creating bidding difficulties for pipelines
currently lacking an old interstate gas cushion. See supra notes 154-58.
c. restrictions on industrial and power plant gas use imposed by the Powerplant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act, which are opposed on grounds that gas is now
demand-limited, not supply-limited, and should be allowed to flow to any pur-
chaser willing to pay for it. See Gas Issues I, supra note 156, at 578 (statement
of John Johnson on behalf of the Petrochemical Energy Group); Id. at 419 (state-
ment of James D. Beatty on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Association).
d. the industrial pricing disadvantages imposed by the incremental pricing pro-
visions of the NGPA, which are opposed as being discriminatory and ineffec-
tive market ordering devices. See Gas Issues 1, supra note 159, at 227 (American
Meat Institute White Paper on Natural Gas Deregulation); Id. at 88-92 (state-
ment of Richard J. Bryan on behalf of the Council of Industrial Boiler Owners).
lslSee 11 ENrRGY UsEns REP. (BNA) 799 (Aug. 1, 1983); Id. at 755-56 (July 28, 1983).
i32Most notably, Kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico have passed statutes limiting the
pricing effects of indefinite price escalation clauses in old intrastate gas contracts. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Price Protection Act, Om.A. SrAT. tit. 52, § 260.1-260.13 (West Supp. 1984-85);
Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. I§ 55-1401 to 55-1455 (1983);
New Mexico Natural Gas Pricing Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-7-11 to 62-7-23 (1978). See
also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. The Kansas Power and Light Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 4106
(U.S. Jan. 24, 1983).
I&lPn July 26, 1983, the Senate Energy Committee voted to send a deregulation bill to
the Senate floor which would have decontrolled immediately all gas sold under contracts
entered into after the passage of the act, natural gas sold under contracts renegotiated after
the date of enactment if the new renegotiated contract permits a deregulated price, and gas
released by pipelines through their exercise of a statutory take-or-pay reduction mechanism.
The bill would have deregulated all gas supplies over a 44-month phaseout during which
high priced gas would be subject to a 12 month rampdown price mechanism designed to
reduce their prices to a Free Market Price Indicator, low priced gas would be subject to a
36 month ramp-up price mechanism designed to raise their prices to the Free Market Price
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C. Producer Curtailments
Pipelines can lower their gas acquisition costs by curtailing their gas
purchases under selected contracts. In effect, this cost reduction measure
amounts to producer curtailment. The pipelines' goal in curtailing pro-
ducers is to reduce their current take-or-pay obligations without endan-
gering their long term gas supply positions.
Balancing short term cost reduction goals with long term supply con-
cerns is not an easy task. The ideal contract to curtail is one involving
high prices, no specific take obligation, and gas supplies subject to the
FERC's NGA abandonment authority. Such contracts can be curtailed
without much fear that the producer will be able legally to sell his gas
to another buyer. Unfortunately, this ideal contract is rare.
Most contracts subject to the NGA abandonment jurisdiction have low
price terms, while many of the high price contracts contain high take-or-
pay obligations and involve supplies which the producer is free to sell to
others if the current purchaser refuses to honor its terms.184 As a conse-
quence, perverse curtailment profiles have developed as pipelines have
curtailed low-cost gas subject to NGA abandonment regulation in order
to be able to honor the take obligations in their high cost gas contracts.185
Indicator, then all gas would be controlled at the Free Market Price Indicator for 6 months
prior to deregulation. The bill also provided for a unilateral market-out provision, reimposition
of the prudency standard for judging the validity of interstate pipeline gas acquisition costs
for pass-through purposes, repeal of incremental pricing, and repeal of most of the Powerplant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act restrictions on natural gas uses. See 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA)
at 755, 769-770 (July 28, 1983). This bill proved to be the highwater mark of efforts to achieve
a total decontrol of natural gas wellhead prices.
In the House, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce passed a bill that not only
would have kept price controls on old gas, but also would have frozen incentive price ceil-
ings through Dec. 31, 1984, limited ceiling price escalations to the inflation rate for gas not
decontrolled after Jan. 1, 1985, and capped prices obtained through indefinite price escala-
tors at their Dec. 31, 1984, level for gas sold under existing contracts that have not been
renegotiated. 12 ENERGY UsES REP. (BNA) 335-36 (April 19, 1984). Neither house managed
to pass a new natural gas bill by the time Congress recessed for the 1984 elections.1
"For example, ceiling prices covering new gas and new onshore well gas are $3.774 per
MMBTU and $2.925 per MMBTU respectively while the ceiling prices on old interstate natural
gas range from $0.30 to $2.421 per MMBTU. 18 C.F.R. § 271.101(a), 49 Fed. Reg. 30297
(1984). Moreover, the pre-1974 vintages have a maximum ceiling price of only $2.051. Id.
While it is true that the weighted average take requirements of contracts entered into from
1973 through 1979 have ranged between 82.3% to 85.9%, as compared to 59.6% for pre-1973
contracts and 78.3% for post-1979 contracts, see DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at
3-3, it is also true that the later vintaged contracts' take-or-pay requirements are only slight-
ly below that of the older vintages, are not subject to the NGA abandonment requirements
and generally command a much higher price. In early 1983, the average cost of acquisition
for interstate pipelines by category were $3.65 per Mcf for new gas and $3.08 per Mcf for
new onshore well gas as compared to a range of $0.55 to $2.39 per Mcf for old interstate
gas. FosTER AssociATEs INC., TEND IN NATURAL GAs PURCHASES BY NGPA CATEGoRY 9 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as NGPA PURCHASES].
lsThis perversity was documented in a recent DOE study, which found that:
Take-or-pay provisions provide pipeline companies with an incentive to reduce
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When this relief has not been enough, pipelines have unilaterally abrogated,
some of their most expensive contracts in hopes that any expenses incurred
as a result of contract damage actions will be less than the expenses they
would have incurred in honoring the abrogated contracts.1 s6
Producer states' enforcement of their oil and gas conservation laws can
aid or impede pipelines' efforts to reduce their gas acquisition costs. If states
reduce their allowable production rates, they also lower the volumes of
gas producers can legally deliver to their purchasers, thereby effectively
lowering purchaser take requirements.18 7 However, producing states also
use their conservation authority to promote the maximum recovery of
minerals and to allocate equitably the benefits of mineral production
among owners of mineral rights in common pools.1ss Both the maximum
takes of low cost gas in periods of slack demand and to maintain minimum re-
quired takes of high-cost gas. The reduced takes of low-cost gas occur because
total prepayments are lower when higher cost gas is taken and prepayments are
made only on lower cost gas .... Between mid-1982 and mid-1983, old gas [pur-
chases) declined at a high rate. The normal depletion rate of an old gas well is
about 12 percent per year.... [TIhe rate of decline in old gas purchases was 26
percent between mid-1982 and mid-1983. During the same period, projected pur-
chases of new gas increased and declined while purchases of high-cost gas were
projected to increase throughout the period.
DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 3-4, 3-5.
l6Supra note 141.
107See Memorandum of Patrick H. Martin, Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation, (June
2, 1983) (discussing use of producer nominations for establishment of allowables under or-
der 29-F).
18 8The producing states attempt to balance their legitimate concern for assuring a maxi-
mum recovery of their mineral resources with treating equitably all who own a right to de-
velop minerals. State conservation practices restrain the practical effects of the Rule of Cap-
ture, a rule of mineral ownership that dominated the early history of the oil and gas indus-
try, which holds that persons own only the minerals they reduce to their dominion and con-
trol and that persons have the right to capture as many units as they can, even if they drain
their neighbors' properties of minerals. Needless to say, when allowed to operate unabated,
the Rule of Capture gives mineral owners incentives to extract minerals as rapidly as possi-
ble to avoid losing them to their neighbors. This rapid extraction creates physical and ec-
onomic waste. Physical waste occurs because rapid extraction may dissipate reservoir pres-
sures that would permit a greater total recovery of minerals if the reservoir were drained
at a more leisurely rate, and because once extracted, minerals may be lost through evapora-
tion, dissipation, or uneconomic uses if the total supply exceeds reasonable demands. Eco-
nomic waste results from the diminishment of the discounted cash flow that would be possi-
ble if maximum efficient recovery of the minerals were achieved and if minerals were devel-
oped at the lowest possible extraction costs and sold at prices high enough to insure that
the minerals were consumed efficiently.
The major tools developed by producing states to achieve maximum efficient recovery
of their minerals are well spacing rules, compulsory unitization, production prorationing,
and compulsory pooling. Well spacing rules control the density of development wells per-
mitted to penetrate producing formations. The goal of these rules is to insure that a max-
imum efficient recovery of minerals is achieved at the lowest possible extraction costs. This
is accomplished by the state determining from the geological characteristics of the produc-
ing formation and current economic conditions how much acreage a single well can effi-
ciently drain, and then issuing spacing rules to insure that each well drilled has the opportu-
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recovery and equitable allocation goals may require producer states to
enforce common purchaser (ratable take) laws in ways that limit inter-
state pipelines' abilities to lower their gas acquisition costs by curtailing
producers.ls 9 The potential clash between state conservation goals and
the moderating of interstate gas acquisition costs has assumed a constitu-
nity to drain an efficient number of acres without interference from other wells. See El Paso
Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 640 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1981).
Compulsory unitization enables producing states to insure that each common pool is pro-
duced through extraction strategies most likely to achieve maximum efficient recovery of
the minerals in the pool. Often, the mineral rights to a common mineral pool are owned
by several persons. Yet, the recovery strategies most likely to effect maximum efficient re-
covery may require that the common pool be developed as it would be if only one person
owned the mineral rights to it. Such development strategies usually dictate that some min-
eral tracts be declared unsuitable as a location for development wells or selected for the lo-
cation of facilities that support the operations of development wells on other tracts. Com-
pulsory unitization enables the state to order that a common pool be developed with the
most efficient extraction strategies and that all mineral owners share equitably in the bene-
fits of the development even if their tracts are not the sites of development wells or support-
ing facilities. See 6 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MEWRS, OIL AND GAS LAw §§ 901, 910, 912-13.2(1984).
Production prorationing enables producing states to control the rate of production of min-
erals from their producing reservoirs to those levels which will not cause excessive produc-
tion declines or losses of reservoir energy in times of high consumptive demands, and to
allocate equitably the right to produce minerals to meet efficient consumptive demands dur-
ing times when the efficient consumptive demands are less than the total amount producers
could produce in the aggregate if they produced at the rate of maximum efficient recovery.
In times of high demand, prorationing obviously prevents physical waste. In times of low
demand, prorationing helps maintain an orderly production environment by stabilizing pric-
es and assuring producers of a fair share of the available market. Some physical waste may
be alleviated by prorationing during times of low demands to the extent that it prevents
either production losses inherent in evaporation of minerals in post-production storage or
losses in reservoir energy attributable to imbalanced production within a common pool that
could occur if only a few of many wells within the pool are able to produce. See Erickson,
Crude Oil Prices, Drilling Incentives and the Supply of New Discoveries, 10 Nat. Resources
J. 27 (1970).
Compulsory pooling economically integrates the mineral interests in tracts of land smal-
ler than the spacing units that cover them. This integration permits all mineral owners of
tracts covered by a spacing unit to share in the revenues produced from the spacing unit's
allowable development wells even though development wells are not located on all the tracts.
This forced integration of economic interests prevents spacing rules from effectively taking
the value of a small tract owner's mineral interest. Therefore, through compulsory pooling
producing states insulate their spacing rules from due process attacks. See 6 H. WILLIAMS
AND C. MayRs, OIL AND GAS LAw § 905.1 (1984).
1
'"Common purchaser (ratable take) statutes help meet producing states' conservation and
equity goals by specifying how mineral purchasers shall apportion their demands for min-
erals among available producers during times when total market demands for minerals are
less than the aggregate supply of minerals that would be produced if producers produced
at the maximum efficient rate of recovery. Typically, the ratable take statutes and rules speci-
fy that purchasers shall buy first from wells with characteristics that would cause waste if
they were produced below a certain rate of production. These wells include wells producing
casinghead gas, and certain distressed wells which must be operated at maximum capacity
in the interest of public safety. After these special needs are met, purchasers are required
to satisfy their remaining demands by purchasing in a non-discriminatory proportionate
manner from all producers within the fields from which they are buying minerals. See Okla.
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tional posture, with the FERC and some interstate gas purchasers con-
tending that the producing states' imposition of their conservation laws
on wells supplying gas to interstate commerce is unconstitutional. 190
D. Contract Renegotiation
Contract renegotiation, where possible, is a less divisive way of reduc-
ing pipeline take-or-pay obligations and gas acquisition costs. Such rene-
gotiations can lower gas prices at the burnertip, causing an increase in
gas sales as the gas industry reclaims customers lost to other fuels and
makes more sales to current customers. Producers can benefit as well, if
their percentage gain in current or future sales is greater than the percent-
age decrease in their contract prices.
Unfortunately, producers and pipelines face significant barriers to suc-
cessful renegotiation of their contracts. Highly leveraged small producers
may not be able to survive if their cash flows are interrupted or reduced
even for a short period of time. 19' Some producers compete for end-use
Corp. Comm'n O&G Ruling 1-305 (January 1, 1984).
The proportionate purchase requirement serves producing states' equity goals by insulating
a producer who would not have a market in absence of ratable taking from the drainage
of his minerals to producers who enjoy a greater market outlet for their production. See
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84, 88-9 (1963). Pro-
portionate purchase requirements may also serve conservation goals to the extent that un-
balanced production can cause a loss in reservoir energy. However, if a pipeline purchaser
is required to take ratably from all available suppliers or sources, it loses the freedom to
comply with its obligations or to exercise fully its rights under contracts it entered into with
producers in order to balance its cost of acquisition goals with its long term supply require-
ments. Id. at 87-89.
-n Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84 (1963),
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the application of Kansas' ratable take laws to the pur-
chasing practices of an interstate pipeline unconstitutionally invaded the jurisdiction of the
Federal Power Commission to regulate interstate pipeline purchasing practices under the
Natural Gas Act, because such an invasion encroached upon a federally preempted regula-
tory domain. Id. 89-96. However, the rationale of Northern Natural Gas is once again under
challenge by producing states. See Inquiry into Purchasing Practices of Interstate Pipelines,
48 Fed. Reg. 25, 264 (1983). Recently, the state of Mississippi ruled that its ratable take pro-
visions could constitutionally be applied to interstate pipelines with respect to purchases
of natural gas decontrolled under the provisions of the NGPA. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Board, 457 So.2d 1298 (Miss. 1984) [hereinafter referred
to as Transco]. In its Transco opinion the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the NGPA
provisions dealing with deregulated gas have removed the purchases of deregulated gas from
the pervasive regulation of the federal government. As a consequence, the preemption ra-
tionale relied on in Northern Natural Gas is inapplicable to state ratable take statutes and
rules as they are applied to interstate pipeline purchases of deregulated gas supplies. Id. at
1318. The Mississippi court also ruled that ratable take limitations on interstate pipeline
purchasing powers did not impose impermissible burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at
1321-22.
-' During congressional hearings on natural gas issues, one representative of independent
producers noted that:
Independents, unlike many larger companies, do not have substantial financial
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sales with the pipelines that purchase their gas, and therefore are reluc-
tant to improve the pipelines' competitive positions through contract re-
negotiation.192 Free rider problems are pervasive, because no producer
wants to provide relief unless all of the producers that sell to the pipeline
provide a fair share of the relief.193 Antitrust laws may prevent producers
and their gas suppliers from negotiating equitable gas acquisition cost re-
duction packages.194 Producers also must consider the impact which re-
negotiation may have on persons holding non-executive mineral interests
in the subject wells.195 Lessors and non-executive mineral owners, espe-
reserves. Therefore, day to day cash flow requirements are crucial to staying in
business. Curtailed gas wells resulting in curtailed cash flow represent one of the
largest single reasons forcing independents out of business.
Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 544 (testimony of Danny H. Conklin - Chair, Natural Gas
Committee of the Independent Petroleum Association of America). A large producer sub-
mitted a paper to Congress on take-or-pay problems which noted that:
[A) producer, especially a small producer, needs a steady income from his wells
in order to pay his fixed costs, operating costs, and taxes. In many instances, the
steady income from existing production provides the collateral on which a pro-
ducer borrows money to continue to drill wells to explore for and develop new gas.
Contract Hearings, supra note 162, at 525 (paper submitted by Stuart C. Mut-Sr. V.P.,
Arco Oil and Gas Co.),
192During the late 1982 and on into 1983, Amoco Production Co. and Northwest Central
Pipeline Corp. engaged in a particularly bitter contract renegotiation which spilled over in-
to congressional testimony. A part of that testimony, cited in a letter from Amoco to Con-
gress, sharply noted Northwest's complaint that:
We are contracted to buy $6.80 gas from Amoco in Wyoming-shutting in 80
cent gas in Hugoton-because we have to buy the Amoco gas, and we are com-
peting with Amoco fuel oil in the Kansas City area and we are not competitive.
Contract Hearings; supra note 162, at 285 (letter from Bryan C. Edwards, V.P. Gas Sales -
Amoco Production Co, to Cong. Sharp).193For example, during renegotiations with Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., Amoco Pro-
duction Co. expressed its reluctance to renegotiate because:
[Wie have yet to receive your overall plan for systemwide operating revisions,
involving all your suppliers which are within your control, nor any procedure
for balancing any required relief equitably among all your producer and pipeline
suppliers. This information is necessary before Amoco can reasonably determine
the extent to which relief may be justified.
Contract Hearings, supra note 162, at 215 (letter from A. P. Payne, Regional Gas Sales
Manager of Amoco Production Co. to Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. -Jan. 28, 1983).
194As noted by one producer representative, 'Producers have and are continuing to enter
into contracts without a clear idea of the competitive market for their production. This oc-
curs because of fear of antitrust implications of exchanging information." Gas Issues II, supra
note 159, at 528 (statement of Davis W. Wilson-Pres. Association for Equal Access to natural
Gas Markets and Supplies). Exchanges of price information for purposes seemingly as bene-
ficial as exchanges to facilitate contract renegotiation have been declared antitrust viola-
tions. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1969).
1 sThe duty owed non-executive mineral interest owners by executives has been described
as follows:
The executive is required to exercise his exclusive leasing power in the same man-
ner as an ordinary, prudent land owner would exercise the leasing power inher-
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cially royalty owners, may be entitled to payments based on factors oth-
er than cash flows achieved through the renegotiated contracts. 196 Final-
ly, the large number of contracts that must be dealt with dictates that much
time must be spent renegotiating before significant relief will be felt at
the burnertip.197
E. Renegotiation Coercion- Contract Impairment
Consumers, distribution companies, and some pipelines have been and
are seeking legislative and administrative price rollbacks, escalation clause
ent in the mineral fee, The executive's conduct will be judged by such standard
as if no royalty or non-executive mineral interest were outstanding... If the
conduct of the executive satisfies the normal, prudent land owner's standard, the
fact that the non-executive owner has been harmed is not actionable under this
view. But if an ordinary, prudent land owner, not burdened by an outstanding
non-executive interest would have acted differently, then the executive's conduct
is actionable if it causes harm. We believe this standard fairly effectuates the in-
tent of the parties; it does not require more than can be expected of ordinary land
owners and does not permit less, especially where the less," is due to the execu-
tive's effort to profit at the expense of the royalty or non-executive mineral owner.
2 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MyRS, OIL AND GAs LAw § 339.2 (1981), cited with approval in
J. M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enterprises, Inc. 645 S.W.2d 410, 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
Executive interest owners may be required to enforce implied lease covenants in favor of
non-executive interest owners to the extent that the non-executive interest owners lack stand-
ing to enforce implied lease covenants directly against lessees. 2 H. WILLIAMS AND C. MUams,
OIL AND GAs LAw § 339.3(5) (1981). An implied covenant that might be .violated by a lessee
or an executive interest owner renegotiating a gas purchase contract so as to reduce its cash
flow level or security under circumstances where the gas purchaser could only obtain such
concessions through the voluntary give-backs of the gas seller is the implied covenant to
market, which is violated whenever the person having the power to make gas sales fails
to secure the best terms available for the gas. See Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist
Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. -1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Under such cir-
cumstances a court could conclude that the best terms available for the gas were those em-
bodied in the original contract, and that the lessee or executive interest owner gratuitously
gave up the advantage of those terms through renegotiation. See id.
96See authorities cited supra. In congressional hearings, producers cited their potential
liability to royalty owners as a renegotiation stumbling block. The Getty testifier stated:
(AIs a producer, Getty must consider the potential liability we have to a royalty
owner before proceeding to renegotiate price terms downward. It is also worth
noting that one of the most significant royalty owners that we are concerned about
is the Mineral Management Service of the U.S. Department of Interior.
Contract Hearings, supra note 162, at 88 (statement of Robeart J. Menzie-V.P. and Gen-
eral Manager, Crude Oil and Natural Gas Supply Division of Getty Oil Co.). See also id.
at 515 (letter from S.C. Mut- Sr. V.P., Arco Oil and Gas Co. to Cong. Phillip Sharp-June
12, 1983).
1"7 As the Getty testifier stated in recent congressional hearings:
My company is a medium-sized producer of natural gas. In round numbers we
sell gas under the terms of some 3,000 contracts. Renegotiation of even a small
fraction of that number is a large, time-consuming task given the fact that con-
tracts are renegotiated individually. The point is that this is a long-term project
which will produce observable results gradually rather than immediately.
Contract Hearing, supra note:162, at 89 (statement of Robert J. Menzie-V.P. and General
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restrictions, and take-or-pay relief. The FERC has responded in a mixed
fashion to these efforts, while legislative relief has been provided only at
the state level by some producing states which have enacted tough con-
sumer protection statutes.
The FERC has rejected arguments that pipelines should be denied the
right to pass through costs associated with excessive take-or-pay obliga-
tions resulting from past imprudent or reckless gas acquisition activities.'98
Prospectively, the FERC has established limits on take-or-pay obligations
in future contracts, 199 suggested that pipelines that do not engage in good-
faith efforts to renegotiate their contracts may be denied the right to pass
through some of their future gas acquisition costs,2 ° and permitted pipe-
lines on a case-by-case basis to grant make-up periods to distributing com-
panies and end-users that have incurred minimum bill deficiencies. 201 Ad-
ditionally, the FERC has ruled that pipelines should not be permitted to
recover variable costs through commodity bills they themselves have not
incurred in acquiring gas from their suppliers.202
Manager, Crude Oil and Natural Gas Supply Division, Getty Oil Co.).
951n 1982, the FERC issued an extremely restrictive definition of the meaning of "fraud,
abuse or similar grounds" set forth in section 601(c)(2) of the NGPA. Section 601(c)(2) re-
quires the FERC to allow pipelines to pass through amounts paid for natural gas to the ex-
tent they are paid for gas supplies subject to NGPA price controls and are not in excess
of applicable price ceilings or are paid for gas supplies decontrolled by the NGPA, unless
the prices paid are excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds. NGPA §§ 601(b)(1)(A),
(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3431(b)(1)(A), (c)(2) (1983). As promulgated, the FERC fraud standard
equated fraud with fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, abuse with negligent mis-
representation or concealment, and similar grounds with innocent misrepresentation of fact.
18 C.F.R. § 2.300 (1984); Natural Gas; Fraud Standard; Statement of Policy, 47 Fed. Reg.
6,253, 6259-61 (1982). The FERC expressly ruled that the fraud standard was a lesser stan-
dard of duty than an imprudency standard. Id, at 6258-59, 6262. Later in applying its fraud
standard, the FERC held that a pipeline's gas acquisition and cutback policies and practices
constitute abuse if they "(i) evidence reckless disregard of the pipelines fundamental duty
to provide service at the lowest reasonable rate consistent with maintenance of adequate
service and (ii) have a significant adverse effect on customers or consumers. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp., Opin. No. 204A, 26, F.E.R.C. 61, 334, at 61,710 (Mar. 16, 1984).
However, in applying the new fraud standard to the Columbia purchasing practices, which
the FERC found constituted reckless disregard of Columbia's duties toward ratepayers, the
FERC went to great lengths to find that any harm Columbia's ratepayers were experiencing
was caused by recessionary conditions and regulatory limitations rather than by Colum-
bias reckless purchasing practices. Id. at 61,710-22.1
'The FERC take-or-pay policy states in part that:
(b) with respect to gas purchase contracts entered into on or after December 23,
1983, the Commission intends to apply a rebuttable presumption in general rate
cases that prepayments to producers will not be given rate base treatment if the
prepayments are made pursuant to take-or-pay requirements in such gas purchase
contracts or amendments which exceed 75 percent annual deliverability.
18 C.F.R. § 2.103(b) (1984).
mColumbia Gas Transmission Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,334 at 61,725-25 (1984).
"'Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co., 15 F.E.R.C. 61,161 (1981),
20218 C.F.R. § 154.111 (1984); see Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural
Gas Pipeline Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions, Order No. 380, F.E.R.C. Reg. & Stat.
30,571 (May 25, 1984).
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All federal natural gas legislation under current consideration would,
if enacted, alter existing contracts as to the operation of their take-or-pay
and escalation clauses. 3 Some federal proposals contain statutory market-
out clauses and call for price roll-backs. 204 Several producing states have
enacted consumer protection legislation limiting the operation of price es-
calation clauses, 205 or rolling back the prices called for in contracts gov-
erning gas supplies which are produced and consumed within their bor-
ders. 206 This state legislation has survived constitutional challenges based
on due process, equal protection, preemption, and contract clause
grounds."7 However, the constitutionality of consumer state legislation
abrogating or limiting the operation of take-or-pay and price escalation
-For example, the natural gas bill which passed the House Energy Committee on April
12, 1984, called for procedure whereby for three years gas purchasers could limit their take-
or-pay obligation to 50% of a contract's original take-or-pay quantities in return for the
gas seller obtaining a release of the gas volumes involved in the take-or-pay reductions from
the sales contract, the Natural Gas Act abandonment certification process, and the NGPA's
first right of refusal limitations. 12 ENERGY UsEs REP. (BNA) 335 (April 19, 1984); id. at
326 (April 12, 1984). The same bill limits price escalations on gas volumes not deregulated
by the NGPA on Jan. 1, 1985, to the rate of inflation, for a period of two years caps price
escalators applicable to gas subject to deregulation under the NGPA to the selling prices
applicable on the day before deregulation if the gas is sold under contracts that were not
renegotiated prior to the deregulation date, and escalates price abragates in contracts sub-
ject to NGPA deregulation that are not renegotiated prior to or within two years after de-
regulation. 12 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 335 (April 19, 1984); id. at 327 (April 12, 1984).
By comparison, S. 1715, which was under active consideration in the Senate during much
of 1984, would, subject to a gas volumes release mechanism, allow gas purchasers to limit
take-or-pay obligations for a period of up to four years after enactment of the bill to 50%
of deliverability in the first year, 52.5% in the second year, 55% in the third year, and 60%
in the fourth year. Natural Gas Policy Act Amendments of 1983, S. 1715, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess, 6,101 (1984). From Jan. 1, 1985, to Jan. 1, 1992, S. 1715 would limit price escalators
to the higher of the selling price applicable to the gas in question as of Dec. 31, 1984, or
a free market price indicator calculated by taking a weighted average of prices negotiated
for deregulated gas supplies during the previous six month period. Id. at § 102.
SThe bill which the Senate Energy Committee sent to the Senate floor without recom-
mendation on July 26, 1983, contained a statutory market-out provision that permitted either
party to a gas purchase contract unilaterally to terminate the contract subject to first right
of refusal or first right of offer provisions running in favor of the party not exercising the
market-out privilege. See 11 ENRcY UsERs REP. (BNA) 769 (July 28, 1983). In reaction to
President Reagan's decontrol proposals, on March 23, 1983, ten senators, including Nancy
Kassebaum, from gas-producing Kansas, cosponsored legislation to roll back the prices on
NGPA new gas to those in effect on August 1, 1982. 11 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 337 (Mar.
24, 1983). See also H.B. 2154, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984).
wSee Oklahoma Natural Gas Price Protection Act, Okla. Stat., tit. 52, §§ 260.1-260.13
(1979), Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 55-1401 to 55-1455
(1983); New Mexico Natural Gas Pricing Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 62-7-11 to 62-7-23 (1984).
aOn March 7,1984, Governor Anaya of New Mexico signed H.B. 219, which rolls back
intrastate prices on intrastate gas produced from wells drilled between 1974-83 to the same
levels as are federally applied to gas of the same vintage sold to interstate pipelines. See
12 ENERGY UsERs RE'. (BNA) 251 (Mar .22, 1984).
-Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 4106 (1983).
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clauses in contracts governing gas supplies purchased by local consumers
is very doubtful. 208
F. Free Market Price Caps
While Congress dawdles, the FERC and the Department of Energy
(DOE) have been busy conducting experiments in integrating free market
pricing into their price regulation functions. The value of gas service at
the burnertip to customers with alternative fuel capability has become the
regulatory guidepost, with regulators attempting to discern the level of
gas prices that will prevent price-elastic customers from switching fuels
or adopting more effective conservation methodsz09 More specifically,
regulators have focused on the prices of alternative fuels available to gas
end-users to calculate market clearing burnertip prices for gas. 210
2See 11 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 899 (Sept. 15, 1983), reporting that on August 8, 1983,
Governor Cuomo of New York vetoed a bill designed to impose by or force of state law
restrictions on take-or-pay provisions in gas contracts involving the sale for resale of natu-
ral gas in interstate commerce. In his veto message, Gov. Cuomo expressed his opinion that
such regulation of natural gas is federally preempted by the provision of the Natural Gas
Act and the Natural Gas Policy Act. Id.
"WValue of service pricing focuses on the customer, and what influences its purchasing
decisions, rather than on the utility company and its cost structure. Simply put, value of
service pricing requires the ratemaker to set rates based on the customer's willingness and
ability to pay for a unit of service. What a customer is willing or able to pay is a function
of (1) the costs to it of acquiring alternative utility services or employing means to reduce
its needs for utility service and (2) the interaction of its cost structure and its income pro-
ducing characteristics which dictates how much it can afford to pay for utility services. See
R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, EcONoMic REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION &
UTILITIES 276-307 (1980). Recently, the natural gas industry has been forced to employ
value-or-service analysis in its attempts to prevent severe losses of industrial customers to
fuel switching, conservation, and recession. Among recent industry actions reflecting its re-
newed value-of-service consciousness are: (1) designing rates to attract new types of customers
such as co-generators and compressed gas using vehicles, 12 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 342
(April 19, 1984); (2) adopting regulatory reforms to encourage flexible transportation ar-
rangements, for end-users, off-systems sales, innovative rate designs, special sales programs,
and minimum bill adjustments, 12 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 172 (Mar. 1, 1984); (3) appor-
tioning a greater percentage of fixed costs to demand charges and less fixed costs to com-
modity charges. See Gransee, Natural Gas Pricing in a Competitive Market. The Emerging
Value of Service Standard, 112 Pub. Util. Fort., Nov. 10, 1983 at 55; (4) interjecting market
responsive pricing policies into regulatory standards governing the importation of natural
gas. New Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders from Secretary of Energy to Economic
Regulatory Administration and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Relating to the Regula-
tion of Imported Natural Gas, 49 Fed. Reg. 6684 (1984). [hereinafter cited as Import Std. I
210For example, the FERC has proposed limiting price incentives on gas it has deregulated
as high cost under its NGPA f 107 authority to a commodity value price based on the price
of alternative fuels. Two methods of establishing the commodity values of gas are under
consideration. Under one method, a three month average retail price for fuel oil No. 6 will
be calculated as a reference price from which will be subtracted average natural gas trans-
portation and distribution costs to impute a wellhead commodity value for high-cost gas.
The other method under consideration involves adopting as a reference price a 3 month
average BTU equivalent price of crude oil which, when multiplied as a percentage factor
estimated to be the ratio of deregulated natural gas wellhead prices to deregulated crude
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Once the market clearing burnertip price is determined for price-elastic
gas consumers, it can be used to calculate market clearing wellhead pric-
es through net-back pricing. Net-back pricing involves subtracting from
the market clearing burnertip price of gas all the costs associated with pro-
cessing it and transporting it from the wellhead to the burnertip. 211 The
remainder is an approximation of the market clearing wellhead price of
gas. The net-back pricing calculation can be performed by regulators as
a part of their price regulation functions, or by the marketplace through
the direct bargaining of producers and end-users. Over the last five years,
both the FERC and the DOE increasingly have been engaged in introduc-
ing net-back pricing into their price regulation functions or in taking steps
to remove obstacles between producers and end-users that may impede
their ability to bargain directly.212
G. Circumventing the Pipeline Bottlenecks
The FERC also has been experimenting tentatively with competitive pro-
grams designed to sharpen the market signals between. the burnertip and
the wellhead. These programs include direct sales between producers and
end-users, special marketing programs, and off system sales. To make these
competitive programs more flexible and responsive to changing conditions,
the FERC has introduced a variety of blanket transportation certificate
programs designed to permit the freer flow of gas among geographic areas,
pipelines, and distributing companies, and between suppliers and end-
users.
(1) Direct Sales
Direct sales between producers and end-users remove pipelines and dis-
tribution companies from the marketing chain between the wellhead and
the burnertip. Removal of these "middlemen" can be an important step
for the gas industry in recapturing lost customers or in acquiring new cus-
tomers, because in some cases the delivered cost of gas in a direct sale
will be below the end-user's costs of either using alternative fuels or ac-
quiring gas from a pipeline or distribution company.213
oil prices, yields an imputed commodity value of high-cost gas. Limitation on Incentive Pric-
es for High-Cost Gas to Commodity Values, 48 Fed. Reg. 7535 (1983). [hereinafter cited
as Netback Incentive]. In its recent adoption of new guidelines governing the importation
of natural gas, the U.S. Department of Energy has made competitive terms, pricing, and
market negotiations the major standard by which gas import arrangements are to be ap-
proved. See Import Std., supra note 209.
"'See Net Back Incentive, supra note 210, at 7170-71.
212Supra notes 209-11.
213In its Order No. 319, which liberalized the terms under which certain high priority
customers can obtain transportation of natural gas they have purchased directly from pro-
ducers, the FERC stated:
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Direct transactions between producers and end-users quickly and clear-
ly translate market clearing burnertip prices into market clearing wellhead
prices, giving producers the information they need to understand what
kinds of production programs and costs will enable them to maximize their
profits. With this information, producers may be induced to compete more
vigorously as to prices than they do when the only sales they make are
to pipelines.214
To help facilitate direct sales, the FERC has instituted several self-exe-
cuting blanket transportation programs under its NGA and NGPA
transportation authorities.215 The most advantageous transportation au-
A direct sale program can serve a variety of policy objectives. Although these
programs were originally designed to be a "stop-gap measure rather than a per-
manent palliative to curtailment, the emphasis of the programs has shifted....
In the context of present natural gas markets, the primary objective of a direct
sale program should be market-ordering. Direct sale arrangements make price com-
petition from competing fuels directly felt in wellhead gas markets and serve to
keep wellhead prices responsive to reductions in the burnertip price of alterna-
tive fuels.
By providing end users with an alternative to purchasing all their gas require-
ments from the system supply of a distributor or interstate pipeline, these pro-
grams encourage pipelines to adopt gas purchasing practices which keep their de-
livered prices competitive. In addition, to the extent that an end user consumes
gas purchased in a direct sale instead of switching to alternative fuels, the trans-
portation service to the end user continues to bear some of the fixed costs of the
transporting pipeline which might otherwise be shifted to the pipelines remain-
ing customers.
Sales and Transportation by Interstate Pipelines and Distributors: Expansion of Categories
of Activities Authorized Under Blanket Certificate, F.E.R.C. Order No. 319, 48 Fed. Reg.
34,875, 34,877 (1983) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 157.207). [hereinafter cited as Order 319.].
2141d.
215n a series of orders in late 1983, the FERC established several self-executing blanket
certificate programs to make it less burdensome for end-users to acquire transportation for
their own gas supplies. Under Order 319, supra note 213, as modified by Order 319-A, Inter-
state Pipeline Blanket Certificates for Routine Transactions and Sales and Transportation
by Interstate Pipelines and Distributors, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,436 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Order
319-A], the FERC established blanket certificates permitting high priority end users (defined
as consumers acquiring gas for process, feedstock, plant protection, essential agricultural
uses or for use in a large commercial establishment, school, hospital, or similar institution)
to obtain transportation automatically under a blanket certificate held by an interstate pipe-
line for a term of:
(1) the lesser of ten years or the life of the reserves for gas produced and devel-
oped by the end-user, and
(2) five years or less for gas purchased from instrastate pipelines, the local sup-
plies of local distribution companies, and any first seller of natural gas except
interstate pipelines selling their own pipeline production.
Order 319-A, supra at 51,43740.
Under Order 234-B, Interstate Pipeline Blanket Certificates for Routine Transactions and
Sales and Transportation by Interstate Pipelines and Distributors, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,872 (1983)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 157.209), the FERC created a blanket certification program ena-
bling interstate pipelines to transport automatically gas supplies owned by any end user,
including boiler fuel users, for a term up to 120 days. The Order 234-B program is experi-
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thorities are directed primarily toward transportation of new gas supplies.
Only supplies actually developed by the purchaser are eligible for the ten
year self-executing transportation program.2 16 Gas supplies dedicated to
interstate commerce prior to the enactment of the NEA and offshore gas
supplies may not be transported pursuant to the blanket transportation
authorities.217 These limitations give the blanket transportation a decid-
edly sectionalist flavor. Offshore gas and the gas dedicated to interstate
commerce have been contracted for mostly by interstate pipelines.218 With
these gas supplies ineligible for blanket transportation, they are more dif-
ficult for intrastate end-users to acquire through direct sales.
(2) Special Marketing Programs
The special marketing programs (SMP) initiated by several pipelines
and producers illustrate the case-by-case approach the FERC is taking in
authorizing additional direct sales opportunities. Each of these programs
serves purposes other than those served by regular direct sales programs.
Specifically, these purposes include (1) relieving pipelines and affected dis-
tribution companies from take-or-pay and minimum bill liabilities;219
(2) ensuring that on-system customers ineligible to purchase gas through
these programs will not be forced to subsidize eligible SMP customers;220
and (3) promoting on a step-by-step basis competition at the pipeline and
distribution company level for marginal end-users while still protecting
the core markets of each pipeline and distribution company.221
SMP's are triggered by pipelines, with the consent of their supplying
producers, releasing specified volumes of gas committed to them by con-
tract for a brokered direct sale between participating producers and eligi-
ble end-users.2z Producers are required to give pipelines take-or-pay cred-
it for any volumes of their gas that is sold through the SMP.223 Only cer-
mental only, and will expire absent FERC renewal on June 30, 1985.
End-user transportation for terms in excess of those prescribed by Orders 319 and 234-B
may be acquired under a notice and protest procedure. Order 319-A, supra at 51, 437. More-
over, "because it provides the missing link for expeditiously moving end-user owned gas
pursuant to blanket certificate authorization.... the Commission adopt[ed] the proposed
change... to allow, on a self-implementing basis, intrastate pipelines transportation...
incidental to an interstate pipeline's transportation of end-user owned gas under a blanket
certificate" pursuant to the NGPA's § 311(a)(2) transportation authority for intrastate pipe-
lines. Order 319, supra note 213, at 34,885-86.
3C0rder 319-A, supra note 215, at 51,437.
217Id. at 51,439-40.
ZlBSee supra notes 25-27, 124-29, 158 and accompanying text.
Z19Inquiry on Impact of Special Marketing Programs on Natural Gas Companies and Con-
sumers, 49 Fed. Reg. 3193, 3195 (1984) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. Ch. 1).
mOid. at 3195-96.
222See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,220 (Nov. 10, 1983), Trans-
continental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 25 F.E.R.C. 11 61,219 (Nov. 10, 1983).
U3id.
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tain end-users, mainly marginal swing customers, are eligible to purchase
SMP gas in order to insulate pipelines' core markets from SMP competi-
tion. 224 To ensure that the core customers of participating pipelines are
not forced to subsidize the SMP's, pipelines may not release gas supplies
purchased at contract prices below the weighted average cost of gas
(WACOG) composing their total system supplies. 225
Taken together, these limitations restrict gas-on-gas competition, and
render the SMP's as temporary programs for working off the gas bubble
without forcing any dramatic changes in the structure of the gas indus-
try. Presently, the FERC is considering broadening the SMP concept. But
for now, the FERC feels that the present SMP's forms permit an orderly
deflation of the gas bubble, reduction in take-or-pay liabilities, and evo-
lution toward a more competitive gas market.226 The FERC also feels that
until the SMP experiments proceed further, it will not have enough infor-
mation to judge whether more intense gas-on-gas competition will be in
the public interest.2 2 7
(3) Off-System Sales
In order to help pipelines make orderly reductions in take obligations
that exceed their sales opportunities, the FERC has authorized interstate
pipelines to make off-system sales of gas. The purpose of off-system sales
is to reduce surplus take obligations of interstate pipelines. To be eligible,
a pipeline seller must have (1) enough contracted gas deliverability so that
its current on-system customers will not have their service impaired and
(2) a potential take-or-pay liability. 228 To keep the selling pipeline's on-
system customers from subsidizing the off-system sales and to prevent un-
due market raiding, the price of gas sold off-system must be the higher
of either the selling pipeline's system average load factor rate or its aver-
age acquisition cost of gas subject to the NGPA's § 102 price ceiling.229
2"Eligible end-users include those who in absence of a special marketing program gas sale
would be served by:
(1) alternative fuels;(2) producer direct sales arrangements;
(3) gas made available under an industrial sales programs (sic), or other similar
sales programs;
(4) gas sold by pipelines under special discount rates, or in an off-system sale;
(5) propane or synthetic natural gas; or
(6) interruptible sales service schedules.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 26 F.E.R.C. 1 61,340 (Mar. 16, 1984).
22STranscontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. 25 F.E.R.C. % 61,219.
2'Producer-Suppliers of Transco Gas Supply Co., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,029, at 61,056 (Jan.
16, 1984).
22Id.; Supra note 219.
2uOff-System Sales: Statement of Policy, 23 F.E.R.C. 61,140, at 61,307. (April 25, 1983).
ZZd. However, since the promulgation of this off-system sales pricing policy, the FERC
has permitted off-system sales at prices below the pricing standards in its policy statements
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Further.market raiding protection is provided by the FERC's policy of con-
ducting case-by-case approval hearings when market raiding allegations
are raised. 230 Off-system sales authorities are granted on a one year basis
simply to give the FERC periodic opportunities to review their usefulness. 231
The FERC's off-system sales policies have strong sectionalist implica-
tions. For the most part, the bulk of the volumes sold off-system has been
sold to the gas markets of Louisiana and California.2 32 More recently, the
Louisiana market has been the most important absorber of off-system
gas.233 Given the sectionalist pricing and allocation policies of the NEA,
intrastate pipelines have higher WACOG's and lesser access to new sup-
plies and historic lower priced supplies than do many interstate pipelines.2
Intrastate pipelines are therefore the most likely targets of market raiding
where a pipeline demonstrated that the lower rate will permit off-system sales to be made
that will provide net benefits to on-system customers by
(1) reducing take-or-pay costs,
(2) contributing an adequate share to the coverage of the pipelines fixed costs, and
(3) insuring that the pipeline's system average cost of gas will not increase as the
pipeline purchases gas to replace the volumes sold off-system.
Natural Gas Co. of America, 27 F.E.R.C. 61,235 (May 11, 1984); Natural Gas of America
Co., 26 F.E.R.C. 63,042 (Jan. 26, 1984) (Initial Decision of ALJ Lotis).
2 3OSupra note 228, at 61,308.
23nd
MU1d. at 61,306.
23Id.
-See id. at 61,306-08; Id. at 61,309-10 (Chairman Butler concurring); Review of Off-
System Sales Program, 47 Fed. Reg. 37,664-65 (FERC Aug. 26, 1983). See also notes 25-27,
124-29, 158 and accompanying text. But see supra note 228, at 61,312-23 (concurring opin-
ion of Commissioner Richard wherein it is argued that interstate pipelines with high gas
acquisition costs are in as bad a posture as complaining intrastate pipelines). Finally, there
is Commissioner Sheldon's dissenting opinion to FERC's off-system policy statement where-
in she articulated a decidedly different view of the reasons for the intrastate pipelines' cur-
rent anxiety with the following observations:
From the onset of interstate curtailments in 1971 to as recently as two years
ago, certain intrastate pipelines have enjoyed significant supply advantages to the
detriment of the interstate market. A major ingredient which spawned the intra-
state surplus was the absence of any price control. However, this absence of con-
trols enabled intrastate supplies to offer firm service to intrastate industrial and
boiler fuel markets. Moreover, countless industrial customers of interstate pipe-
lines faced with the option of no gas willingly relocated their plants to the gas
rich intrastate arena. Further, immediately upon passage of NGPA, these same
intrastate pipelines, who today the majority seeks to insulate from the rigors of
the marketplace, capitalized considerably under sections 311(b) and 312 of the
NGPA. Enormous volumes of surplus intrastate gas moved into the gas-starved
interstate market without a mention of market raiding or anticompetitiveness.
... Off-system sales are only a temporary and short-term response to the myriad
factors which have caused the current deliverability surplus. To deny appropri-
ate market responses for parochial reasons is a policy I cannot support. Further,
to suggest that the cushion is a creature of the statute flies in the face of the his-
tory of contractual and regulatory practices in the intrastate market. It has been
next to impossible for intrastates to acquire low-cost gas on a permanent basis
since virtually every intrastate contract contains favored-nations clauses which
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off-system sales. Since interstate pipelines participating in SMPs and off-
system sales do not have to release permanently any of their committed
reserves, 235 as the gas bubble deflates, intrastate pipelines and end-users
in their service areas are the most likely to face future deliverability
shortages. 236 It is therefore not surprising that intrastate pipelines have
been the most persistent critics of the FERC's off-system sales policies.Y7
VII. THE SPOr MARxET DEBATE
All these pipeline, producer, distributor, end-user and FERC interac-
tions have produced a more complete fusion of the intrastate and inter-
state markets and a greater acceptance of market-determined prices as reg-
ulatory and contractual price ceilings. At least in the short run, some pro-
ducers, pipelines, distributors and end-users have been induced to sup-
plant the security of long-term contractual arrangements with short-term
spot market transactions. For now, pipelines are increasing the percent-
age in their total operations represented by transportation service. In fact,
the current advantages of spot-markets and increased transportation avail-
ability are causing large industrial users who are incapable of fuel-switching
to assert regulatory and political pressures. These users want the natural
gas industry restructured to enable most gas to be sold in spot markets
at prices determined by direct negotiations between producers and end-us-
ers.
238
cause all intrastate prices to rise according to the highest price which any intra-
state buyer is willing to pay. Interstates today might be facing the same prospect
had not the Commission explicitly acted to prohibit the operation of these claus-
es in interstate contracts.
Id. at 61,309-2 to 61,309-3.
233See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,220, at 61,566 (Nov. 10, 1983)
(ordering paragraph Q) for the limited term abandonment authorization characteristic of
special marketing programs. Off-system sales involve no release of gas. Rather, each off-
system sale is "a sale of natural gas that is excess to the pipeline's current demand, that is
of a short-term, interruptible nature, and that is made to a customer outside or away from
the pipeline's traditional or historic market area." Supra note 228, at 61,305.
230Supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
2td., supra note 234. Besides intrastate pipelines, small producers have also been critical
of the FERC's off-system sales policies. See Gas Issues II, supra note 159, at 543, 545 (State-
ment of Danny H. Conklin-Chair, Natural Gas Committee, Independent Petroleum Associ-
ation of America).
SFor example, the Process Gas Consumers Group has been very critical of the FERC's
attempts to protect the core markets of pipelines from the special market program sales of
others. In response to the FERC's concern that such gas-on-gas competition will cause in-
creased take-or-pay woes and cost shifting among customers, the PGC alleged that:
(1) "there is no evidence that cost shifting will occur;"
(2) if cost shifting does occur, "the Commission can simply adjust the allowed
return on equity for pipelines that attempt to shift greater share of costs to
a contracting market if the prices charged are not competitive;"
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A. Oil Price Stability
Whether the recent industry and regulatory experimentation with com-
petition will lead to an industry dominated by spot markets will depend
on the development of sectoral and sectional consenses that a competi-
tive natural gas policy can well serve public and individual interests. The
key factor in the development of the consensus is continued price stabili-
ty in world oil markets. The real drops in the price of oil since 1981 have
narrowed the gap between oil and natural gas prices, established the in-
terfuel competition that is currently disciplining end-user energy prices,
and in contrast with the performance of the natural market, provided an
example of how competitive pricing policies can produce better results
than regulatory pricing policies. If world oil prices remain relatively stable
through 1985, the potential fly-up in natural gas prices may not occur,
because the real price of oil may be close to that which was predicted for
1985 by the authors of the NEA. 23 9
B. Continuing Deregulation
Assuming oil prices remain stable, the next important factor in the de-
velopment of natural gas spot markets is whether the market distortions
produced by federal natural gas policies and traditional industry contract-
ing practices have been or will be moderated enough so that the elector-
ate will allow the deregulation of natural gas wellhead prices to continue.
For the foreseeable future it appears that pipelines are unlikely to make
bids for new gas supplies at prices above market clearing levels. Many
interstate pipelines have lost their ability to make supracompetitive bids
(3) "take-or-pay liability will not necessarily be exacerbated by a less restricted
program;"
(4) "if it is, the Commission does not have to permit these costs to be borne by
ratepayers;" and
(5) wholesale competition among pipelines "is ineffective since pipelines do not
compete vigorously with one another. If they did, one would not expect the
price rigidity and rate increases that are readily observable."
Tenneco Oil Co., 26 FERC 61,030, at 61,068 (Jan. 16, 1984). See 12 ENERGY Usxis RPu.
(BNA) 144 (Feb. 23, 1984); 11 ENERGY UsEis REP. (BNA) 641 (June 23, 1983).
3
9
1n the opinion of the National Economic Research Associates (NERA):
ITjhere should be no upward pressure on the real prices of petroleum products
during the remainder of this decade, and at most a modest tendency for real pric-
es to increase during the 1990's. This stability in the price of the dominant energy
commodity will mean, in turn, a constraint on the tendency for the real price
of other fuels to increase.
12 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 172 (Mar. 1, 1984).
The current OPEC benchmark price is $29.00 per barrel. That price is under extreme com-
petitive pressure resulting from price reductions by Great Britain, Norway, and Nigeria.
A price drop to $24.00 is likely, and steeper declines to $15-$20 are not impossible. Martin,
The Troubling Economics of Oil, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1984 at Fl, col. #2.
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because their previous supracompetitive bids have overwhelmed the price
moderating effects of their low cost gas inventories, and as a consequence,
their burnertip prices are no longer competitive.2 40 This compacting of
the interstate gas cushion has, in combination with intrastate legislation'
that restricts the operation of indefinite price escalators and rolls back the
prices of some intrastate gas contracts, narrowed the discrepancy in gas
inventory values between interstate and intrastate pipelines. With the var-
iances in gas inventory values reduced, the ability of interstate pipelines
to bid-away gas supplies from intrastate pipelines has been reduced.241
Therefore, the market and political pressures to equalize the prices of all
gas supplies by eliminating vintaged pricing and deregulating all wellhead
prices have diminished.
Reducing supracompetitive burnertip prices in areas served by pipelines
that have lost their historic gas cushions is a continuing regulatory and
political priority. Efforts to reduce high burnertip prices have focused on
the securing of price roll-backs and take-or-pay relief through legislation,
administrative decision, and regulation. Except within some gas produc-
ing states, legislation has had little or no impact on this problem. 242 Reg-
ulators have established standards that should prevent such inflexibility
from occurring in future gas contracts. 24 3 Renegotiation is therefore the
key to reducing burnertip rates. The experimental direct sales and SMP's
authorized by the FERC have provided incentives and mechanisms for pro-
UOSee Tussing and Barlow, A Survival Strategy for Gas Companies in the Post-OPEC
Era, 111 Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 3, 1983, at 13, 14.
24lSee supra notes 161, 205, 206.
2 $'Supra note 183; see supra notes 161-82 and accompanying text. In fact, one commenta-
tor, Irene S. Wischer, President of the Panhandle Producing Co., offered the opinion that
the approval of a price recontrol bill by the House Energy Committee "is forcing independ-
ent producers to try to hold their prices high right now because of the threat that it might
become the base price for years to come." 12 ENERGY USERs REP. (BNA) 407 (May 10, 1984).34 The FERC has taken several actions designed to help order the market in a way that
reduces the gas bubble and brings down the price of natural gas at the burnertip. The major
steps the FERC has taken include:
(1) Attempting to formulate a workable off-system sales policy, supra notes 228-37;
(2) Authorizing special marketing programs, supra notes 219-27;
(3) Developing more flexible transportation programs in aid of direct sales be-
tween end-users and producers, and betwee end-users and pipelines and dis-
tribution companies with excess gas supplies, supra notes 213-17;
(4) Experimenting with commodity value pricing and net-back pricing, see supra
notes 269-10. 1 1
(5) Proposing more flexible procedures for enabling pipelines to quickly reflect
in their rates to end-users rapid changes in purchase gas acquisition costs re-
sulting from a partially deregulated market. Revisions to the PGA Regula-
tions: Notice of Inquiry, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (1984).
(6) Issuing rules forbidding pipelines from recovering any variable costs associ-
ated with gas not taken by the buyer through minimum commodity bills. Elim-
ination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Com-
modity Bill Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984).
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ducers and pipelines to renegotiate their contracts as to prices and take-
or-pay obligations. 2" At this time, it appears that the momentum for well-
head price reregulation and legislative contract abrogation is being blunt-
ed by renegotiation efforts and by the growing awareness that supracom-
petitive burnertip prices are being experienced by only a few pipelines. 245
The phased deregulation of gas prices pursuant to the NEA's gas policies
should continue unabated, at least for this year.
C. Freer Gas Supplies
Spot markets also require the availability of substantial supplies of gas
free from contract commitment. Most flowing gas is sold under long-term
contracts.A6 Historic gas supplies sold in interstate commerce are also sub-
ject to the NGA's abandonment procedures.247 Acquiring an abandonment
certificate to release gas committed to interstate commerce is often a dif-
ficult, if not impossible task.248 The FERC's SMP programs are securing
temporary short-term releases of gas from contractual and regulatory com-
mitments. 49 Market-out clauses in long-term contracts are also provid-
ing a method of releasing gas to the open market. 24
These release mechanisms may not be effective in securing uncommit-
ted gas supplies for a spot market once pipelines have brought their take-
or-pay obligations and their sales opportunities into equilibrium. The FERC
is not requiring pipelines to release the reserves backing the wells they
have shut-in to reduce their deliverability surpluses; 25 1 nor is the FERC
requiring pipelines to release the gas reserves that are the sources of the
SMP gas volumes. Rather, the FERC is granting pipelines participating
in SMPs the right to release specified volumes while retaining the long-
term contractual and regulatory commitments of the underlying reserves. 2s2
Moreover, although the average contract term has shortened over the last
decade, 25 3 given the storage and transportation difficulties associated with
$"Supra notes 213, 219-27 and accompanying text.
mSSee 12 Energy Users Rep. (BNA) 246 (Mar. 22, 1984).
2"A 1982 DOE Report showed that as of 1980, gas contracts with duration terms of 20
or more years comprised 85.8% of pre-1973 contracts, 54.8% of 1973-April 20, 1977 con-
tracts, and 63.9% of April 21, 1977-Nov. 8, 1978 contracts. U.S. Dept. of Energy, Natural
Gas Producer/Purchaser Contracts and Their Potential Impacts on the Natural Gas Mar-
ket: An Analysis of the Natural Gas Policy Act and Several Alternatives, Pt. II 43 (June,
1982) [hereinafter cited as DOE Contract Analysis].
'4Supra note 158.
mId.
249Supra note 222.
z2"DOE NGPA Report, supra note 138, at 5-2 to 5-3.
"S1 upra note 158.
7Tenneco Oil Co., 25 FERC 61,234, at 61,607 (Nov. 10, 1983).
mFor example, gas contracts with duration terms of 20 years or more comprise only 28.3%
of producer/purchaser contracts entered into between Nov. 19, 1978 and 1980, and only
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natural gas as compared with crude oil, producers and pipelines still pre-
fer bulk sales of gas under long-term contracts.254 Thus, for the present
it appears that important sectors of the natural gas industry do not yet
believe competitive markets can provide the supply and financial securi-
ty they require. This opposition threatens to block legislation that will
provide for releases of gas reserves whenever pipelines cannot honor their
take-or-pay obligations. Producers and end-users in producing states are
the chief advocates of this legislation. Pipelines and end-users in the in-
terstate markets, still worried about future shortages, have thus far man-
aged to block it.255
D. Flexible Transportation
Readily available flexible transportation is also a prerequisite to the cre-
ation of spot markets. Large industrial gas users that lack the ability to
use alternative fuels are seeking to break down institutional barriers which
7.3% of producer/purchaser contracts entered into in 1980. DOE Contract Analysis, supra
note 246, at 43.
2See Simes, A Spot Market for Natural Gas, 113 Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 16, 1984, at 24,
26, wherein he quotes the chairman of Panhandle Eastern (Richard L. OShields) as stating
in a recent talk that: "overlooked is the valuable service provided the market by pipelines
in assembling large volumes of gas from diverse sources, resulting in favorable price terms,
long-term supply strength, and protection against supply failure from any single source."
35A summary of the interstate market's resistance to legislative gas release mechanisms
is contained in A Critique of Legislation on Natural Gas Adopted by the House Energy Sub-
committee on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels on July 29, 1983, wherein, it was stated that under
the Act:
The option a producer has, under several provisions... to sell supplies to a
new purchaser if the gas is not taken by the current purchaser, even if never exer-
cised, could create considerable confusion at a time when the industry is already
hard-pressed to deal with changes in gas markets. The [Act) could create a poten-
tial for real damage to the supply situation for some interstate pipelines, in par-
ticular those pipelines which now have contracts for significant supplies of high-
cost gas and low-cost "old gas" which they have not been taking because of reduced
demand....
Due to the potential damage in a pipelines long-term supply outlook, the pro-
ducer's option to sell gas to a new buyer in several situations would give produc-
ers significant leverage vis-a-vis the current pipeline purchaser.
For example, if a pipeline wanted to continue to buy gas from an old well, the
producer would have considerable leverage on the pipeline's decision whether or
not to purchase any "enhanced" or extra gas at a decontrolled price. Most experts
agree it is virtually impossible to distinguish the volumes which would be "enhanced"
versus those which would be produced anyway; therefore, the pipeline might want
to continue buying all gas production from the well to assure that none of its "old
gas" was sold to a new purchaser under the guise of being "enhanced gas." Or,
a producer might tie negotiations on other deals to a pipelines agreement to pur-
chase the "enhanced" gas at a decontrolled price.
The option provided pipelines to reduce take-or-pay obligations to 50% ap-
pears to be a choice between Scylla and Charbydis: if a pipeline chooses to re-
duce take-or-pay obligations to 50%, it must risk permanently losing the gas sup-
ply represented by the extent of the contract obligation in excess of 50% ... If
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block the provision of bulk transportation by natural gas pipelines. These
users are sponsoring legislation that would require pipelines to perform
mandatory contract carriage. 2 6 At the present time, pipelines are resist-
ing mandatory contract carriage legislation with arguments that contract
carriage (1) will be inappropriate for the transportation of a product that
cannot be effectively and economically stored, 257 (2) will inflict addition-
al regulatory and operating complexities on pipelines that are already hav-
ing difficulty meeting end-user supply and service needs in a competitive
end-user market, 2s8 and (3) will inherently favor large users to the detri-
ment of small users since only they will be able to replicate economically
the gas acquisition and load balancing functions pipelines now perform.2 59
Conversely, large industrial end-users that have been denied the bene-
fits of the SMPs feel there is more supply and pricing security to be found
in spot markets.2 60 These end-users can point to pipeline refusals to carry
direct sales gas supplies that could be competitive with system supplies
for the business of pipeline core customers as examples of pipeline abuse
of transportation leverage. They argue that abuses such as these warrant
correction through contract carriage legislation. 261
The major gas policy proposals pending before Congress contain con-
tract carrier provisions.2 62 However, these provisions basically attempt
to integrate contract carriage functions with the pipelines' gas sales func-
tions rather than to convert pipelines into mere transporters. 263 Given the
radical changes more extensive contract carriage would impose on the
natural gas industry, an industry already awash in a sea of changing con-
the cost of short-term price relief is a long-term supply problem, a pipeline may
well opt not to make use of this tool.
11 ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 811 (Aug. 11, 1983).
''See 12 ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 494 (June 7, 1984); 12 ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 462
(May 31,. 1984); 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 763 (July 28, 1983).
237See Mogel & Gregg, Appropriateness of Imposing Common Carrier Status on Inter-
state Natural Gas Pipelines, 4 Energy L. J. 155, 182-83 (1983).
23OSee 12 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 463 (May 31, 1984); 12 ENERGY UsRs REP, (BNA)
47-8 (Jan. 19, 1984).
2591d.; see also 11 ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 763 (July 28, 1983); 11 ENERGY UsErs REP.
(BNA) 459 (May 5, 1983).
"OSupra note 238. See also 12 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) at 142-44 (Feb. 23, 1984); 12
ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 494 (June 7, 1983); 11 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 641 (June 23,
1983); 10 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 1103-04 (Nov. 4, 1982).
2'See 11 ENERGY UsERS REP. (BNA) 779 (Aug. 4,1983). See ANR Pipeline Co., 26 F.E.R.C.
61,170 (Feb. 10, 1984) (Pipeline transportation rates for end-user transportation found to
be unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.,
26 FERC 161,169 (Feb. 10, 1984) (The FERC found that end-user groups raised enough seri-
ous questions regarding availability of end-user transportation services to warrant setting
an oral argument to deal with such questions).
262Supra note 257, at 176-79.
263Id. at 181. See also 12 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 283 (April 15, 1984); 11 ENERGY UsERS
REP. (BNA) 773 (Aug. 4, 1983).
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ditions, it is highly problematic that pipelines will soon be required to
perform transportation functions exclusively.
For now, the changes in natural gas policies and practices required to
establish the spot market as the dominant vehicle by which gas is sold
are increasingly unlikely to occur. While the current experimentation in
the creation of spot markets is producing promising results, ironically,
it is also providing escape valves for the dissipation of pressures to make
fundamental changes in the nation's natural gas industry.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Structural changes in the nation's economy, demographics and natural
gas industry should reduce sectionalistic strife over natural gas policies
in the future. First, the legislative power of producer interests is declin-
ing. Since the Phillips decision, the natural gas delivery network has
reached maturity. Very few areas remain that lack adequate gas service
and have realistic chances of obtaining gas service under any set of natural
gas policies. The number of net consuming states have grown with the
expansion of the gas delivery network and the depletion of historic gas
fields. Conversely, the number of net producing states has fallen. More-
over, the dual gas markets preceding the NEA provided net producing
states in the old intrastate markets with the resources to expand their gas
consuming sectors. That expansion was so dramatic that the remaining
net producing states are the nation's leading consumers of natural gas.
Recently, the net producing states have seen their gas consuming sectors
increase in economic importance relative to their gas producing sectors.
As their gas consuming sectors increase in importance, the legislative per-
spectives of the net producing states have become more consumer oriented.
Second, over the last forty-six years the nation's natural gas industry
has experienced virtually every kind of industry-government relationship
except outright government take-over. This varied history has produced
valuable lessons both consumer interests and producer interests can ac-
cept. As long as world oil markets remain stable, there is a common ac-
ceptance that supply and demand imbalances can be avoided if gas burner-
tip prices and wellhead prices are set by reference to market clearing pric-
es, as established by the market for alternative fuels, rather than by costs
of production. There is also a consensus that natural gas policies must
promote a fully integrated national natural gas delivery system instead
of causing a fragmentation of the nation into separate gas markets.
Finally, there seems to have developed a resolve within producing states
and net consuming states that concepts of perfection should not be al-
lowed to destroy the workable. No amount of regulatory tinkering has
produced perfection. Just the opposite resulted from the imposition of more
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rigid forms of regulation. Workable solutions to the gas shortages of the
seventies and to the gas bubble of the eighties have a common theme: mar-
ket-oriented pricing and a more integrated gas transportation network.
Just as the regulatory experimentation with market-oriented solutions dur-
ing the seventies gave rise to a congressional willingness to experiment
with a phased deregulation, the FERC's current experimentation with even
more market-oriented solutions to the gas bubble seems to be producing
a congressional willingness to allow its deregulation experiment to con-
tinue, subject only to possible corrective actions to insure that current reg-
ulatory and structural barriers to the setting of wellhead prices by refer-
ence to consumer opportunity costs are removed. Thus, the decline of the
producing interests' congressional power need not lead to more regula-
tion in the name of consumerism.
The demise of sectionalism does not mean that the natural gas industry
will be exceptionally peaceful in the future or that controversial debates
over natural gas policies will not continue in Congress. Within each state,
conflicts are occurring among consumer interests as to how government
should respond to the competitive pressures now engulfing the natural
gas industry. Large industrial users advocate more deregulation. Small
end-users, especially those with low incomes, wish to restrain the increase
in competition in fear that they will be left to the mercy of higher prices
and lower service reliability as captured consumers of pipelines and dis-
tributors unable to cope with a competitive environment. Pipelines sup-
port deregulation at the wellhead, but resist attempts to subject them to
more competitive discipline and ask for aid in avoiding losses they have
incurred for misjudging the strength of interfuel competition. Large pro-
ducers with diversified production interests are willing to accept temporary
reductions in prices and take-or-pay reform in order to bring about a more
stable market which can provide better production opportunities in the
future. Small independents who invested heavily in high cost gas devel-
opments lack the financial leverage with which to renegotiate, and thus
they are bitterly resisting any regulatory or legislative changes that could
deprive them of the value of their contracts to sell high cost gas.
Natural gas controversies will continue. But they will be resolved in
a different manner. The demise of sectionalism will make it harder for
proponents to line up the entire congressional delegation of a single state
or section because of its identification as a net producing or net consum-
ing area. Changes in natural gas policies may occur, but if they do, they
will be the results of congressional representatives making decisions based
on what policies best serve the sectoral interests most important to the
areas they represent. The fact that a congressional representative is from
a net producing or a net consuming area is less likely to pre-dispose him
to vote for more competition or more regulation than it has been in the
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
past, for the history of U.S. natural gas regulation has clearly demon-
strated the economic interdependence of the nation's gas producing and
gas consuming sectors.
All this suggests that natural gas policy debates are losing their section-
alists theme and assuming a sectoral tone. Yet, the tenacious hold interstate
pipelines have on gas reserves dedicated to interstate commerce prior to
the enactment of the NEA, the bulk of the new gas commitments made
after the NEA's enactment, and offshore gas reserves could trigger anoth-
er sectionalist debate over natural gas allocation policies. Current attempts
by the FERC to encourage the orderly deflation of the gas bubble in a
way that avoids the creation of intrastate gas shortages have only papered
over the underlying imbalances in the commitments of future gas deliver-
ability. Most gas still flows pursuant to long-term contract commitments
and legislative interstate commerce dedications. The intrastate gas sales
which interstate pipelines have been willing to make and which the FERC
has been willing to authorize involve temporary release of natural gas pur-
suant to programs designed to reduce interstate pipelines' take-or-pay lia-
bilities. As a consequence, intrastate markets, which consume the largest
volumes of natural gas, have less claims on future natural gas deliverabil-
ity than do markets served permanently by interstate pipelines.
If domestic gas reserves backing current consumption levels deplete at
a faster rate than natural gas consumers can offset by finding acceptable
energy alternatives, the intrastate markets will experience dislocating short-
ages sooner than the rest of the nation. Intrastate gas shortages could give
rise to political pressures from traditional gas producing states calling for
a nationwide gas rationing program that would allocate natural gas on
the basis of need rather than onprivate contractual commitments and pri-
vate market transactions. Conversely, those served by interstate pipelines
will resist both the expansion of their supplying pipelines' service areas
and the involuntary allocation of interstate pipeline gas supplies to intra-
state gas consumers.
If a natural gas rationing program develops from a new sectionalist gas
allocation debate, further damage will be done to the sanctity of the con-
tract ideal, and wellhead price controls could be reimposed. Wellhead price
control pressures would be difficult to resist if alternative energy prices
rise significantly as natural gas reserves deplete. Such events could return
the nation to the natural gas policies that prevailed prior to the passage
of the NEA. Should this occur it would seem that once again rational
natural gas policy making was defeated by sectionalist passion.
However, sectionalist passion is usually the result of state coalitions cor-
rectly perceiving that their rational self-interests cannot be furthered by
current national policies. It is the genius of our constitutional system that
has fused together the world's greatest free trade union while preserving
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the opportunity for each state to insist that its legitimate concerns must
not be crushed by the weight of purely majoritarian politics. The oppor-
tunity of minority coalitions to assert effectively their concerns requires
the nation to examine critically its corporate goals before overriding
minority interests and provides the nation with the competition of ideas
that is the catalyst of orderly change. Sectionalist debate, in which all sides
exercise their constitutional tools within the confines of our legal system,
reacquaints the sections of our country with their economic interde-
pendence and reminds individuals of their common needs resulting from
the human condition. Natural gas sectionalism is a dramatic case study
of a nation achieving neither perfect efficiency nor perfect equity, but
through the debate, maintaining a workable political economy.

